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INTRODUCTION 
Learned commentators have called the Religious Freedom Resto­
ration Act of 1993 ("RFRA" or "the Act")1 "perhaps the most uncon­
stitutional statute in the history of the nation"2 and "the most egre­
gious violation of the separation of powers doctrine in American 
constitutional history."3 In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores,4 
the Supreme Court struck down the Act in its applications to state and 
local governments, declaring that "RFRA contradicts vital principles 
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance."5 
The Act's applications to · federal law, however, survived Boerne, 
which means that plaintiffs with religious freedom claims against the 
federal government have a formidable legal tool at their disposal. 
RFRA raises fundamental questions about the relationship between 
legislative and judicial power. This Article aims to facilitate the opera­
tion of RFRA's surviving federal law applications, which I will call 
"Federal RFRA," by considering how this statute fits into the consti­
tutional scheme of governmental power and how courts should pro­
ceed in construing it. 
RFRA offers a novel structural model for legislation. In the Act's 
applications to federal law, Congress made a blanket precommitment 
to protect religious liberty against federal encroachment, beyond what 
the Supreme Court has held the Constitution to require. This form of 
legislation may become increasingly important to the extent the Court 
abjures enforcement of constitutional rights against the federal gov-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). 
2. Lino A. Graglia, City of Boerne v. Flores: An Essay on the Invalidation of the Relig­
ious Freedom Restoration Act, 68 MISS. L.J. 675, 675 (1998). 
3. Eugene Gressman, RFRA: A Comedy of Necessary and Proper Errors, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 507, 538 (1999) [hereinafter Gressman, Comedy]. 
4. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
5. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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ernment.6 The Boerne Court's elimination of RFRA's state law appli­
cations casts a clear spotlight on two inquiries the Court did not have 
to make. First, did Congress exceed its constitutional role by legislat­
ing a precominitment to enhance free exercise protection against fed­
eral authority? Second, assuming Federal RFRA survives the first in­
quiry, how can courts follow Congress's directive to administer a 
statutory regime of mandatory religious accommodation without 
countenancing violations of the Establishment Clause? 
The answers to these questions have important implications for a 
broad range of litigants, from federal prisoners whose opportunities 
for religious exercise are constrained7 to members of minority relig­
ious groups whose practices violate federal regulations8 to unlicensed 
religious broadcasters9 and religion-motivated tax objectors.10 Analysis 
of Federal RFRA can also aid in assessing the constitutionality of sub­
sequent religious freedom legislation prompted by Boerne, notably the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.1 1  In addition, 
constitutional analysis of Federal RFRA is significant because the 
same Establishment Clause problems, and some variations on the 
same separation of powers problems, will confront the RFRA-like 
statutes many states are considering or have enacted in the wake of 
Boeme.12 
6. For a discussion of legislative attempts to fill gaps the courts leave in protecting 
rights, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1 
(1993) [hereinafter Lupu, Statutes). 
7. See, e.g., McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, 165 F.3d 32 (Table, Text in WESTLA W), Unpub­
lished Disposition, No. 97-1701, 1998 WL 879503 (7th.Cir. 1998) (holding that prison officials 
did not violate RFRA by punishing prisoner who refused to remove or cover religious pin 
worn on outside of clothing). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Valrey, No. CR96-5492, 2000 WL 692647 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 
22, 2000) (stating that, under RFRA, government's restriction on use of marijuana by 
Rastafarian on supervised release from prison may be accomplished through less restrictive 
means and without burdening exercise of religion). 
9. See, e.g;, United States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 1999 WL 
718646 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31', 1999) (holding that seizure of unlicensed religious radio station's 
equipment was notleast restrictive means of furthering compelling government interest, thus 
violating RFRA). 
10. See, e.g., Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1999) (ruling that IRS penal­
ties and interest levied for taxes withheld on grounds of religious opposition to war did not 
violate RFRA). 
11 .  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 
1 14 Stat. 803 (2000). Federal and state statutory protections for religious exercise are legion. 
See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 4-6 (2000) (discussing religious accommodation statutes) [hereinafter McConnell, 
Singling Out). 
12. See Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 32 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 
513 (1999); Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 153 (2000) (arguing that 
Illinois RFRA violates federal and state Establishment Clauses and state separation of pow­
ers principles); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Reiigious Exemptions, 46 
1906 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1903 
The few commentators who have paid more than passing attention 
to the question of Federal RFRA's constitutionality have tended to 
view both the separation of powers and Establishment Clause prob­
lems as amenable to unambiguous resolution, either clearing Federal 
RFRA of any constitutional deficiencies13 or condemning it across the 
board.14 Meanwhile, federal courts that have applied RFRA to federal 
law since Boerne have produced no consistent doctrine of accommo­
dations under the Act.15 This Article examines whether and how 
courts can apply Federal RFRA in a manner consistent with the Con­
stitution. It contends that courts have no basis for invalidating the 
Act's federal law applications; rather, courts should focus on the task 
of construing Federal RFRA to avoid Establishment Clause problems. 
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the genesis of Federal RFRA. 
Part II explores the implications of the separation of powers for Fed­
eral RFRA's enhancement of religious freedom at the expense of the 
federal government. This Part first contends that Federal RFRA is 
best understood as a legislative precommitment to protecting religious 
exercise across the range of federal law, secured by the political inertia 
RFRA requires Congress to overcome should it want to repeal the 
Act or to exempt any given governmental function from the Act's pro­
tection. That understanding compels the conclusion, detailed in the 
remainder of Part II, that the Court has no business invalidating Fed­
eral RFRA on any separation of powers ground. First, I will demon­
strate that Congress's apparent lack of constitutional authority in ap­
plying RFRA to federal law is irrelevant, because Federal RFRA -
UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999) (hereinafter Volokh, Common-Law Model] (discussing state 
RFRAs in conjunction with Federal RFRA). 
13. See Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 
ARK.-LITILE ROCK L.J. 715, 727-47 (1998) (hereinafter Berg, Constitutional Future]; 
Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 213 (1995) 
(hereinafter Laycock, Ratchet] (suggesting that Congress has power to protect religious free­
dom from federal encroachment); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Re­
ligious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995) (arguing that 
Congress's power should not be questioned with respect to RFRA's ability to trump federal 
laws); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 677-78 (1996) (approving of concessions 
that Federal RFRA is constitutional). 
14. See Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 525-29; Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (1998) (herein­
after Hamilton, Unconstitutional] (arguing that RFRA's federal applications violate separa­
tion of powers and Establishment Clause); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. 
REV. 227 (1995) [hereinafter Marshall, Concerns] (suggesting RFRA violates establishment, 
equal protection, and free speech principles); Edward J.W. Blatnik, Note, No RFRAF Al­
lowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake 
of City of Boerne v. Flores, 98 CO LUM. L. REV. 1410 (1998) (concluding that Federal RFRA 
violates Article V amendment provision). 
15. See infra notes 266-271 and accompanying text (discussing judicial applications of 
Federal RFRA). 
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properly construed to prevent Establishment Clause violations - re­
flects no exercise of power at all. Next, I will contend that a congres­
sional precommitment to overprotecting rights in the federal sphere 
neither usurps the judicial power to interpret the Constitution nor in­
terferes with courts' function in deciding cases. Finally, I will explain 
that the mechanism Congress chose to enforce RFRA's precommit­
ment in particular cases - heightened judicial scrutiny of federal re­
ligious accommodation claims - comports with the practical and con­
stitutional determinants of judicial competence. 
Properly focused judicial review of Federal RFRA entails two 
carefully balanced tasks. First, courts must give Federal RFRA 
meaningful effect. Second, they must determine whether and to what 
extent RFRA violates the Establishment Clause. Part III of this Arti­
cle contends that, although the Act on its face does not violate that 
Clause, many of its conceivable applications do. I propose and evalu­
ate two alternative approaches to statutory construction of Federal 
RFRA that would allow application of the Act to its constitutionally 
permissible extent. First, the Court could construe the Act to encom­
pass nontheistic claims for conscientious exemptions from the opera­
tion of federal laws. I favor this libertarian approach to construction of 
Federal RFRA because it would give maximum effect to the will of 
the political branches. An alternative would be for the Court simply to 
assert the constitutional force of the Establishment Clause to constrain 
the scope of RFRA's statutory expansion of rights. This approach 
would dramatically reduce the Act's force, but I believe it would per­
mit, at a minimum, accommodations to ensure equal treatment of 
similarly situated believers in different religions and idiosyncratic ac­
commodations that are not generally desirable.16 
I. FROM RFRA TO FEDERAL RFRA 
The story of RFRA is the latest chapter in a longstanding debate 
over the idea of mandatory religious accommodations by government 
entities.17 In 1 990, the. Supreme Court in Employment Division v. 
16. In addition to the constitutional problems, Federal RFRA raises the issue whether 
the Court may invalidate some subset of a statute's applications, without striking any of its 
substantive provisions, and then apply the statute in its valid applications. Courts to consider 
the question have found RFRA's federal applications severable from the applications struck 
down by Boerne. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Sutton v. 
Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 833 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999); Christians v. Crystal 
Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 
S. Ct. 43 (1998); see also Kent Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time for Constitutional 
Amendment: The Limited Reach of City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 689, 
693-94 (1998) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Amendment]. But see Henderson v. Kennedy, 2001 
U.S. App. Lexis 14235 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2001) at **8-9 (identifying severability of RFRA's 
federal applications as an open question). 
17. A "religious accommodation" is an exemption
.
from the effect of a neutral, generally 
applicable law where such effect would interfere with the claimant's religious exercise. The 
1908 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1903 
Smith18 rejected a claim that the Free Exercise Clause precluded a 
state from denying unemployment benefits to members of the Native 
American Church who had lost their jobs due to their use of peyote in 
a religious sacrament. The Court reached beyond the facts of the case 
to hold broadly that the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle plain­
tiffs who challenge applications of neutral laws on religious grounds to 
have their claims examined under heightened constitutional scrutiny. 
In so holding, the Court dramatically limited its earlier decisions in 
Sherbert v. Verner19 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,20 which had applied strict 
scrutiny to religious accommodation claims.21 Writing for the Court in 
term "exemption" is often used interchangeably with "accommodation." A "mandatory" 
accommodation or exemption is one that is not specified in the particular regulatory scheme 
at issue but that a court holds to be required under a superior law. Mandatory accommoda­
tion claims prior to Smith invoked the Free Exercise Clause; Congress designed RFRA as a 
statutory directive of mandatory accommodation. In contrast, a "discretionary" or "permis­
sive" accommodation or exemption is one the legislature chooses to provide as part of a 
regulatory scheme. For a detailed parsing of the different varieties of religious accommoda­
tion, see Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 749-
54 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, Trouble]. 
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
19. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (holding, in sustaining free exercise challenge to denial of 
unemployment benefits where claimant had been fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath, 
that any incidental burden on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a compelling 
state interest). The Supreme Court followed Sherbert in three subsequent decisions that in­
voked the Free Exercise Clause to reject states' denials of unemployment benefits. See 
Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding unconstitutional 
state's denial of unemployment compensation to claimant who lost job because of religion­
motivated refusal to work on Sunday); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 
U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (holding unconstitutional state's denial of unemployment compensation 
benefits to Seventh-Day Adventist terminated because religious beliefs forbade her from 
working from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
719 (1981) (holding unconstitutional state's denial of unemployment compensation benefits 
to Jehovah's Witness who terminated his munitions job because his personal religious beliefs 
forbade participation in arms production). 
20. 406 U.S 205, 214 (1972) (holding that a state may not "compel school attendance 
beyond eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a 
legitimate religious belief' absent a state interest of "sufficient magnitude" to overcome 
right to free exercise of religion). 
21. The Smith Court purported not to overrule Yoder or Sherbert but rather to distin­
guish both precedents. The Court distinguished Yoder as involving a claim of "hybrid 
rights," a free exercise claim combined with a due process claim of parents to direct their 
children's education. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 & n.1. The Court extended the "hybrid 
rights" umbrella to explain other successful free exercise challenges where the religious ex­
ercise at issue had an expressive component. See id. (distinguishing, e.g., Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). Justice Scalia, writing for the Smith majority, did not ex­
plain how or why a free exercise claim became more potent when combined with an appeal 
to another constitutional provision, or why the free exercise claim was not mere surplusage 
under the "hybrid rights" analysis. The Court distinguished Sherbert and its progeny because 
"a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility crite­
ria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemploy­
ment." Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. Justice Scalia explained neither how this characteristic distin­
guished unemployment compensation from most or all other administrative regimes nor why 
Smith, which raised an unemployment benefits claim, did not fit within the distinction. 
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Smith, Justice Scalia asserted that heightened scrutiny of religious ac­
commodation claims would produce "a system in which each con­
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social impor­
tance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. "22 The 
Smith decision was the subject of voluminous and intense academic 
criticism. 23 
The question of constitutionally mandated religious accommoda­
tion had produced inconsistent results in a series of decisions between 
Sherbert and Smith. As the Smith opinion acknowledged,24 the Court 
in that period generally had accorded free exercise claimants less pro­
tection than a strong reading of Sherbert and Yoder would have re­
quired.25 In the majority of free exercise cases, the Court rejected 
The Smith Court's distinction of Yoder and Sherbert has failed to persuade many com­
mentators. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. 1 ,  
37-38 [hereinafter Laycock, Remnants] (accusing Smith Court, as to distinction of Yoder, of 
preferring unenumerated to enumerated rights); id. at 48-51 (criticizing individualized con­
sideration distinction of unemployment benefits cases); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exer­
cise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121-24 (1990) [hereinaf­
ter McConnell, Revisionism] (criticizing Smith Court's distinctions of Yoder and the 
unemployment cases). But see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulner­
ability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1245, 1289-90 (1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience] (echoing "indi­
vidualized consideration" distinction of unemployment benefits cases). 
22. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
23. See John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: 
A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71 (1991); James D. Gordon III, Free Exer­
cise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REY. 91 (1991); Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21 ; 
Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief That 
Was Never Filed, 8 J. L. & RELIGION 99 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith 
and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259; McConnell, Revision­
ism, supra note 21; see also Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: 
The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REY. 925, 937 (1998) (assailing the 
Smith approach to religious accommodations as "superficial and unconvincing" and urging 
the Court to "try again"). But see Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1288-91 
(defending rejection of strict scrutiny in Smith while criticizing Court's understanding of Re­
ligion Clauses); Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion, 20 ARK.­
LITILE ROCK L.J. 619, 623-27 (1998) [hereinafter Hamilton, Rhetoric] (defending result and 
standard in Smith); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, Defense] (purporting "to defend 
Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending 
Smith itself'). 
24. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84. 
25. Commentators have emphasized the Court's retreat from strict scrutiny prior to 
Smith as a factor that proves legislative action was needed to protect religious freedom, 
demonstrates that strict scrutiny is unworkable in this setting, or simply complicates analysis 
of RFRA. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure 
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 783 (1998) 
[hereinafter Greenawalt, Religious Law]; Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restora­
tion Act, 1993 BYU L. REY. 221, 231 [hereinafter Laycock, Act]; Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and 
the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 
171, 182-85 (1995) [hereinafter Lupu, Lawyer's Guide]; William P. Marshall, The Case 
Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
357, 365-70 (1989-90) [hereinafter Marshall, Exemption]; Volokh, Common-Law Model, su­
pra note 12, at 1495 (characterizing strict scrutiny under Sherbert as "a complex body of law, 
1910 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1903 
mandatory accommodation claims.26 Only a few decisions, factually 
similar to Sherbert, reflected the solicitude for free exercise that had 
characterized Sherbert and Yoder.27 The Court between Sherbert and 
Smith also had decided a range of Establishment Clause cases that 
presented accommodation claims - though usually not framed as 
such - as to which it reached inconsistent results.28 These decisions 
reveal considerable tension within and between free exercise doctrine, 
which commands the government to safeguard religious liberty, and 
Establishment Clause doctrine, which constrains the government to 
avoid aggrandizing or coopting religion. "The Court has struggled to 
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which 
with not one but several tests"). But see Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the 
Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious 
Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 ARK.-LITILE ROCK L.J. 633, 636 n.13 (1998) 
("(T]he Court continued to endorse a relatively demanding standard of review until its deci­
sion in Smith . . . .  "); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1110 (calling pre-Smith strict 
scrutiny "a Potemkin doctrine" in the Supreme Court but arguing that it influenced deci­
sions of lower courts and federal and state political decisionmakers); see also Robert M. 
O'Neil, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 787-91 (1999) (noting that the Court between Sherbert and Smith 
generally weakened strict scrutiny of religious claims but' intensified scrutiny in unemploy­
ment compensation cases). 
26. Prior to Smith the Court employed three distinct methodologies to rule against re­
ligious claimants. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide 
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1994) (hereinafter Berg, 
Congress]; Lupu, Lawyer's Guide, supra note 25, at 178-185; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion 
and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 215-16 (1992}. In some cases, the Court ap­
plied a restrictive notion of what constitutes a "substantial burden" on religion. See Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (finding desecration of a 
Native American burial site also used for "specific spiritual activities" not to constitute a 
substantial burden); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (finding no substantial burden from 
requirement that government maintain a social security number for religious claimant); 
Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (finding no substantial 
burden on religious activity from imposition of Fair Labor Standards Act requirements on 
religious employer). In other cases, the Court carved out exceptions to the application of 
strict scrutiny. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (declining categorically 
to apply strict scrutiny to prisoners' free exercise claims); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 
503 (1986) (deferring to military authorities in rejecting officer's free exercise claim). In a 
handful of cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny but found the religious burden to Le the 
least restrictive means for the government to accomplish a compelling interest. See Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that government's interest in en­
forcing antidiscrimination laws outweighed burden placed on religious university by denial 
of tax exemption due to university's ban on interracial dating); United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252 (1982} (holding that government's interest in maintaining tax system outweighed 
burden on Amish employer who believed religious duty to provide for elderly rendered 
paying Social Security tax irreligious). 
27. See supra note 19 (discussing unemployment benefit cases). 
28. The decisions that most clearly drew the connection between accommodations and 
the Establishment Clause were Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidat­
ing exemption of religious publications from sales tax); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding exemption for religious employers from religious dis­
crimination prohibitions), and Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. , 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (strik­
ing down state statute giving sabbatarians right not to work on Sabbath}. The implications of 
the Establishment Clause for RFRA are discussed infra Part III. 
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are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical 
extreme, would tend to clash with the other."29 Justice Scalia's major­
ity opinion in Smith made no mention of the Establishment Clause, 
addressing only the potential effects of strict scrutiny on the govern­
ment's regulatory prerogatives. 
In 1993, Congress passed RFRA in an unabashed effort to reverse 
the Smith decision. The Act was supported by "one of the broadest 
coalitions in recent political. history, including Christians, Jews, 
Muslims, Sikhs, Humanists, and secular civil liberties organizations."30 
It passed both Houses of Congress almost without opposition.31 RFRA 
provides that "[g]ovemment shall not substantially burden a person's 
exercise of religion" unless the burden "is in furtherance of a compel­
ling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of fur­
thering" such interest.32 The text of the legislation includes "findings" 
that expressly criticize Smith33 and declare that "the compelling inter­
est test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for 
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing 
prior government interests."34 RFRA purported to "restore" the 
Sherbert-Yoder test for accommodation claims;35 in fact, the Act's ex­
press requirement of strict scrutiny for all free exercise challenges to 
29. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); see also infra notes 284-288 and 
accompanying text. Insightful discussions of the relationship between the two clauses iii.elude 
Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. 
PITI. L. REV. 673 (1980); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of ".Tests" 
Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 323; Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State 
and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, 
and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) [hereinafter 
Laycock, Neutrality]; Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burde.ns on the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Burdens]; William P. 
Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 
545 (1983); McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11; Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Para­
dox Redux, 1992 SUP. Cr. REV .. 123. 
30. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restora­
tion Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994); see also id. at 210 n.9 (listing all organizations that 
formed coalition that sponsored RFRA); 139 CONG. REC. 26415 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) 
(statement of Sen. Bradley) ("It is a testament to the importance of RFRA that virtually 
every religious group, spanning the entire spectrum, has voiced its support for this bill. It is a 
rare thing when such a diverse coalition joins. in wholehearted agreement."). But see Graglia, 
supra note 2, at 680 ("Few Americans were aware in 1993 that their religious freedom had 
deteriorated and was in need of restoration."). 
31. See 139 CONG. REC. 26416 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (reporting 97-3 Seil.ate vote in 
favor of passage of RFRA); id. at 27239-41 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (reporting no objection 
to unanimous consent request in the House). 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-(l)(a), 2000bb-(l)(b)(2) (1994). 
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1994) (stating that "m [Smith] the Supreme Court vir­
tually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise 
imposed by laws neutral toward religion"). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994). 
35. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb(b)(l) (1994). 
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general laws probably accords religious exercise more protection than 
it enjoyed before Smith, at least in theory.36 RFRA as enacted applied 
both to the states, as an exercise of Congress's enforcement power un­
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,37 and to the federal gov­
ernment. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores38 declared 
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments.39 
The Boerne case involved a church's challenge to application of a local 
government's zoning regulation; accordingly, the Court's opinion fo­
cused exclusively on problems with Congress's reliance on Section 5 to 
justify RFRA's applications to state and local governments.40 Justice 
36. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (noting that RFRA "imposes 
in every case a least restrictive means requirement - a requirement that was not used in the 
pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify"); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Law­
rence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 
1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 79, 102-03 (hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne] (arguing that 
RFRA permitted more exemption claims than pre-Smith case law); Laycock & Thomas, su­
pra note 30, at 224 (arguing, based on statement of purpose to restore Sherbert-Yoder stan­
dard, that RFRA is "highly protective"); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 55 & n.245 (arguing 
prior to enactment that RFRA "would provide far greater protection to religious freedom 
claims than has ever been the case"); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious 
Exemptions - a Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 598 (1999) 
(hereinafter Volokh, Intermediate Questions] (arguing that federal and state RFRAs "fa­
cially require strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious practices, something the 
pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence did not do"). Others have emphasized that 
RFRA is unclear about what standard it meant to restore. See, e.g. , Christopher L. Eisgruber 
& Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ls Unconstitutional, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451 (1994) (hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutiona� ("By 're­
storing' the Court's pre-Smith jurisprudence, RFRA did not enact any specific standard. In­
stead, it endorsed a bevy of conflicting standards."). This uncertainty has left room for ar­
gument about how broadly the Court should or might construe RFRA's scope. Compare 
Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 26-28 (arguing that inconsistencies in pre-Smith law require 
courts to read RFRA as adopting a stronger version of strict scrutiny than courts practiced at 
the time of Smith), with Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra, at 474-75 (suggesting 
Court might construe RFRA to incorporate Smith understanding of Free Exercise Clause). 
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (stating that 
Congress has authority to enact RFRA pursuant to Section 5); S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 14 
(1993) (same). No source of constitutional authority is cited in the text of RFRA itself. 
38. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
39. Congress subsequently amended RFRA to remove all references to the states, in 
conformity with Boerne. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 7, 114 Stat. 803, 806 (2000). 
40. Boerne is one in a line of decisions in which the Rehnquist Court has weakened the 
power of the federal government. See e.g. , United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598 (2000) 
(holding that Congress's powers under Commerce Clause and Section 5 did not extend to 
providing civil remedies for victims of gender-based violent crimes under Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Tenth 
Amendment bars Congress from "commandeering" state executive branch officers to en­
force provisions of the Brady Act); Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that 
Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity under enu­
merated powers of Art. I, § 8); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that 
congressional attempt to criminalize possession of firearms near schools exceeded congres­
sional authority under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). See generally 
Symposium, New Voices on the New Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). The 
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Kennedy, writing for the Court, made clear that Congress under Sec­
tion 5 had power only to remedy constitutional violations, not to de­
fine constitutional rights the Court previously had declined to recog­
nize: 
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with 
the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of 
the Fourteenth Amendment's restriction on the States. Legislation which 
alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be en­
forcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by 
changing what the right is.41 
Justice Kennedy found that Congress in RFRA had not merely en­
forced a constitutional right but had altered the Court's interpretation 
of the First Amendment as announced in Smith: "RFRA is so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot 
be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu­
tional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in 
constitutional protections."42 That substantive action encroached on 
"[s]tates' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for 
the health and welfare of their citizens"43 and thus exceeded 
Congress's constitutional authority.44 
fact that no Justice disputed the majority's Section 5 analysis in Boerne, while most of the 
other cited decisions have come on sharply contested 5-4 votes, suggests some of the Justices 
may have viewed Boerne more as a religious freedom case than a federalism case. 
41. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The Court proceeded to hold that "[t]here must be a con­
gruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end." Id. at 520. For elaboration of the Boerne "congruence and proportion­
ality" standard, see Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 536 (2001) (finding application to 
states of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (1994), not congruent and 
proportional under Boerne); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding 
application to states of Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, not con­
gruent and proportional under Boerne). The Boerne Court also defused the implication in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966), that Section 5 gave Congress substantive 
authority to define constitutional rights, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28, and it distinguished a 
series of voting rights precedents that had approved broad congressional action pursuant to 
Section 5. See id. at 530-33 (distinguishing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 
(1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Morgan, 384 U.S. 641; and South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)). 
42. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
43. Id. at 534. 
44. Boerne generated several separate opinions, although none disputed the Court's 
reasoning on the Section 5 issue. Justice Stevens, who joined the majority opinion, added a 
brief concurrence to state his view that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. See id. , at 
536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor dissented, advancing historical arguments 
to press her view that the Court had incorrectly decided Smith, although she expressed 
agreement with the Boerne Court's Section 5 analysis. See id. at 549-64 (O'Connor, J., dis­
senting). Justice Scalia responded with a partial concurrence that attacked Justice 
O'Connor's historical evidence. See id. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice 
Souter also dissented, maintaining that Smith had not been adequately briefed and that the 
Court therefore lacked a sufficiently firm legal basis for deciding the issue presented in 
Boerne. See id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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The Boerne Court nowhere expressly limited its holding to 
RFRA's applications to state and local governments, and it referred 
obliquely to the Act's federal applications.45 Near the close of his ma­
jority opinion, Justice Kennedy forcefully asserted the judicial pre­
rogative to interpret the Constitution in language that might be under­
stood to implicate the Act's applications to federal as well as state law: 
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best 
when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and 
the proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the 
Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province 
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. 
When the political branches of the Government act against the back­
ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it 
must be understood that in later cases and controversies, the Court will 
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, 
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. 46 
In the next sentence, however, the opinion states that "RFRA was 
designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one before us; 
but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond 
congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which 
must control."47 The emphasis on the particular case before the Court 
and especially on the provisions of RFRA "here invoked" implies an 
awareness that only RFRA's state law applications were presented in 
Boerne. Indeed, after a lengthy discussion of the history of the Four­
teenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy situated the Court's judicial su­
premacy concerns squarely in the context of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment and state sovereignty: 
The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in 
maintaining the traditional separation of powers between Congress and 
the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth 
self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has 
had primary authority to interpret those prohibitions .. . .  As enacted, the 
Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States 
which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. The 
power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in 
the Judiciary. 48 
45. See id. at 516 (quoting statutory language that applies RFRA to federal govern­
ment); id. (singling out RFRA's applications to states as "the most far reaching and substan­
tial of RFRA's provisions"); id. at 532 ("RFRA's restrictions apply to every agency and offi­
cial of the Federal, State, and local Governments."). 
46. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36 (citation omitted). 
47. Id. at 536. 
48. Id. at 523-24 (citation omitted); see also id. at 519 ("The design of the (Fourteenth] 
Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the 
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states."); 
id. at 529 ("If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amend-
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These passages indicate that Boerne did not strike down the Act's 
federal law applications. The Court's subsequent actions49 and schol­
arly commentary5° bear this reading out. 
Several federal Courts of Appeals since Boerne have held that the 
Supreme Court did not.invalidate RFRA as to federal law,51 and the 
Eighth Circuit in In re Young52 has declared the Act constitutional as 
ment's meaning . . .  it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional 
power."). 
49. After deciding Boerne, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the Eighth Cir­
cuit a case that implicated the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the Bankruptcy Code. 
See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). The Court's de­
cision to remand Christians rather than summarily reverse it suggests that RFRA's federal 
applications survived Boerne. See Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court 
Was Right: Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM . & MARY L. REV. 793, 808 n.77 
(1998) [hereinafter Lupu, Reflections]. But see Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: 
A Landmark for Structural Analysis, 39 WM . & MARY L. REV. 699, 718 n.104 (1998) [here­
inafter Hamilton, Landmark] (suggesting that remand of Christians indicated that the hold­
ing of Boerne applied to RFRA's federal applications). The federal government itself has 
vigorously asserted the continuing vitality of RFRA's applications to federal law. See Eric J. 
Rothschild, Opinion & Commentary: Testing for Freedom, 149 N.J. L.J. 1064, 1068 (1997). 
50. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959 & 
n.169 (3d ed. 2000); Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 745-46 (arguing that 
Boerne's comments on separation of powers should be read in conjunction with the Court's 
emphasis on federalism); Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 WM . 
& MARY L. REV. 665, 667-72 (1998) (arguing that separation of powers language in Boerne 
is "a red herring," because holding on judicial supremacy grounds that Congress may not 
alter constitutional protection of religious liberty would undeniline Boerne's federalism 
holding that the states - equally subject to judicial supremacy - may do so); Greenawalt, 
Amendment, supra note 16, at 691 ("Flores does not tell us whether Congress can qualify 
past and future federal legislation by RFRA-like language."); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual 
Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM . & MARY L. REV. 743, 745 (1998) [hereinafter 
Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs]; Lupu, Reflections, supra note 49, at 808 & n.77; Michael W. 
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of Cify of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 153, 162 n.68 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions]; see also Robin-Vergeer, 
supra note 13, at 677-79 (arguing pre-Boerne that RFRA presents federalism but not separa­
tion of powers concerns); William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration A ct Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 294 n.12 
(1996) (same); but see Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three 
Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 80 n.8 (2000) [hereinafter Gedicks, Normalized] ("Language 
in [Boerne] suggests that the Court might view RFRA's limitations on federal government 
action infirm on separation of powers grounds."); Steven D. Ginsburg & Natalie J. Carlos, 
Zoning in Florida Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts: What City Officials Should 
Watch Out for in Defending Their Ordinances Against Freedom of Religion Claims, 12 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 157, 160-62 (1999) (arguing that Boerne struck down RFRA's federal ap­
plications as violating the separation of powers); Hamilton, Landmark, supra note 49, at 718 
(arguing that "the vast majority of the Flores decision, as a matter of rhetoric and logic, ap­
plies as persuasively to federal as to state law; Sniolla, supra note 23, at 925 n.3 (calling effect 
of Boerne on RFRA's applications to federal law "unclear"). 
51. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 957-61 (10th Cir. 2001); Sutton v. Providence 
St. Joseph Med. Center, 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999); Caldwell v. Caesar, No. 98-1857, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6914 (D.D.C. May 22, 2001) (holding RFRA valid as to District of 
Columbia); see also Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church v. Fitzgerald (Jn re Hodge), 220 
B.R. 386 (D. Idaho 1998). One federal appellate court upheld RFRA against constitutional 
challenges prior to Boerne. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 469-70 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
. 
52. 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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applied to federal law. Young reaffirmed the Eighth Circuit's pre­
Boerne decision53 that RFRA barred a bankruptcy trustee from recov­
ering tithes debtors had made to their church, even though the tithes 
met the criteria for avoidable transactions under the Bankruptcy 
Code.54 As to the Act's constitutionality, the court first held that 
Boerne had not decided RFRA's viability as applied to federal law.55 
The court proceeded to reject the argument that RFRA violated the 
separation of powers, holding that Congress in RFRA had properly 
amended federal law pursuant to its Article I, section 8 powers.56 
Finally, the court rejected a facial argument that RFRA violated the 
Establishment Clause, holding that the Act had the requisite secular 
purpose and effect to avoid invalidation under the Supreme Court's 
Lemon57 test.58 
Most federal courts confronted with RFRA claims simply have as­
sumed the Act remains valid as to federal law.59 On the other hand, 
53. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
54. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 857. Following the decision in Young, Congress 
amended the Bankruptcy Code to exempt tithes up to fifteen percent of a debtor's gross in­
come from being treated as avoidable transactions, unless the debtor actually intended to 
defraud creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). See generally Julianne 
Belaga, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don't: The Impact of RFRA's Invalidation on Re­
ligious Tithes in Bankruptcy, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 353-54 (1998) (describing how courts 
have applied RFRA to permit debtors' tithes to their churches to supersede fraudulent con­
veyance law). 
55. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 858; see also Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958-59; Sutton, 192 
F.3d at 831-33. 
56. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 859-61. Senior District Judge Bogue dissented in Young 
based on his view that RFRA "attempts to impose upon the judiciary, a standard of review 
for interpreting constitutional rights which it believes is a better standard than that crafted 
by the Court itself." Id. at 864 (Bogue, J., dissenting). The majority did not analyze this ar­
gument, an aspect of what I call the structural objection to RFRA, which I discuss infra Sec­
tion 11.C. The majority also did not confront any argument that RFRA improperly counter­
manded the Smith Court's judgment that courts lack institutional competence to apply strict 
scrutiny. I consider such institutional competence-based objections to RFRA infra Section 
11.D. For criticism of the Eighth Circuit's separation of powers analysis, see Michael K. 
Sabers, Note, Well, It Depends on What Your Definition of "Unconstitutional" ls: The Eighth 
Circuit's Misinterpretation of Flores in Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 44 S.D. 
L. REV. 432 (1999). 
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a description of the Lemon 
test, see infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text. 
58. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 861-63. The Eighth Circuit did not consider the possi­
bility that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause as applied. I maintain that Young was 
incorrectly decided because the result in that case violated the Establishment Clause. See 
infra notes 386-388 and accompanying text; see also Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Free Ex­
ercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne: Charting a Middle Course, 68 MISS. L.J. 105, 153-
55 (1998) (contending that the claim in Young clashed with the Establishment Clause); 
Caitlin Garvey, Note, Through Amos-Colored Glass: The Eighth Circuit Fails to See the 
RFRA 's Real Meaning in Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 
1998), 24 DAYTON L. REV. 491 (1999) (criticizing Eighth Circuit's Establishment Clause 
analysis). 
59. See generally cases cited infra notes 267-268. 
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several federal courts have held or assumed, usually with little analy­
sis, that RFRA is invalid as applied to the federal government.6() 
II. RFRA, LEGISLATIVE PRECOMMITMENT, AND THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 
Federal RFRA makes heightened protection for religious freedom 
the default position in the application of all present and future federal 
legislation. In creating this default, Congress did not draw on constitu­
tional authority or affect the constitutional structure of government in 
any way. Rather, Congress simply relinquished a measure of its own 
authority to the people in order to advance religious freedom.61 The 
discu�sion that follows will begin by explaining the precommitment 
60. See La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. FCC, 223 F.3d 313, 319 (6th Cir. 2000) (ex­
pressing "doubt" that RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law); Carpa v. Smith, No. 
CIV96-1435, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11625 *14 (D. Ariz. July 20, 1998) (dismissing claims 
against federal employees on ground that Boerne invalidated RFRA); Waguespack v. 
Rodriguez, 220 B.R. 31, 36-37 (W.D. La. 1998) (holding that Boerne declared RFRA uncon­
stitutional in its entirety); In re Andrade, 213 B.R. 765, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (holding 
that Boerne declared RFRA unconstitutional in its entirety); In re Gates Comm. Chapel, 212 
B.R. 220, 225-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); In re Saunders, 215 B.R. 800, 803-06 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (holding that application of RFRA in bankruptcy cases violates the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses); Saleem v. Helman, No. 96-2502, 1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22572 *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 21, 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1096 (1998); Monet v. 
United States, No. 97-00281 DAE, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15269 *5-*6 (D. Haw. Sept. 15, 
1997) (same); Patel v. United States, No. 97-1083, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34067 *5 (lpth Cir. 
Dec. 4, 1997) (dismissing federal prisoner's RFRA claim on ground that Boerne invalidated 
RFRA); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. �upp. 591 , 595-600 (D. Md. 1996) (holding, 
prior to Boerne, that RFRA violated separation of powers). 
61. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, § 5-16 at 959 ("Congress certainly may choose to exer­
cise less than all of its legislative power"); Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 729 
("[T)he application of RFRA to federal law does not expand congressional power, but 
makes it possible for Congress to limit its own power, its own laws, so as not to infringe on 
religious freedom . . . .  "); Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?": The Sources and Limits of 
Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction over Matters "Touching Religion," 29 IND. L. 
· REV. 1, 91 (1995) ("As long as congressional action does not amount to a law 'respecting an 
establishment of religion,' it is for Congress to define how solicitous of religious freedom the 
executive branch shall be as it goes about the task of seeing that the laws 'be faithfully exe­
cuted.' "); Laycock, Ratchet, supra note 13, at 1 56 ("Congress can restrain the federal agen­
cies if it wants, and that is what it has done [in RFRA).''); Loewy, supra note 58, at 153 n.215 
("Separation of powers . . . does not preclude the Congress from voluntarily limiting the 
reach of its own statutes."); see also William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due 
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 603 (1975) ("Congress can limit the 
exercise of federal governmental power, creating individual rights that the courts have de­
clared not to be compelled by the Constitution."). 
The authority of which Congress relinquished a part subsumes the authority of instru­
mentalities over which the Constitution gives Congress plenary power. See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 17 (empowering Congress "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatso­
ever, over such District . . .  as may . . .  become the Seat of the Government of the United 
States"); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (giving Congress "Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States"). These grants of plenary authority ensure that no constitutional issue akin to 
the federalism concerns aired in Boerne arises from RFRA's application to the District of 
Columbia or to the Territories. 
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methodology of Federal RFRA. With that explanation in place, Fed­
eral RFRA transcends the numerous separation of powers objections 
that have been lodged against it. First, Congress did not need any 
source of constitutional authority to restrain the effect of its own en­
actments on religious freedom. Second, congressional precommitment 
to heightened religious freedom does not force courts to accept or ap� 
ply a congressional interpretation of the Constitution and thus does 
not undercut judicial authority. Finally, the Court may not refuse to 
effectuate Federal RFRA on the belief that the Act forces courts to 
analyze cases in a manner outside the institutional competence of the 
judiciary. 
A. RFRA as a Legislative Precommitment to Protect Religious 
Freedom 
A "precommitment" is a binding constraint that forecloses the 
possibility of future impulsive behavior.62 Jon Elster defines a decision 
as a precommitment when its effect is to trigger an extrinsic causal 
process that makes the undesired later behavior less likely than it 
would be without the precommitment.63 The paradigm of a precom­
mitment is the frequently recounted story of Ulysses' command to his 
crew to bind him to the mast · of his ship to avoid being drawn over­
board by the songs of the sirens.64 In the same way Ulysses predicted 
he would need outside intervention to prevent him from succumbing 
to the sirens, a governmental precommitment can entrench a long­
term policy decision reached during a time of perceived rational delib­
eration, in preparation for the future danger that short-term interests 
might overwhelm the long-term goal.65 
62. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: an Economic 
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 123 (1993); 
see also Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357 (1985) 
(defining a system for setting up anticipatory self-commands). 
63. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY 36-47 (1979). Professor Eisler lists five specific criteria for precommitment. 
First, the precommitment must "bind oneself . . .  to carry out a certain decision at time t1 in 
order to increase the probability that one will carry out another decision at time t2." Second, 
"[i]f the act at the earlier time has the effect of inducing a change in the set of options that 
will be available at the later time, then this does not count as binding oneself if the new fea­
sible set includes the old one." Third, "[t]he effect of carrying out the decision at t1 must be 
to set up some causal process in the external world." Fourth, "[t]he resistance against carry­
ing out the decision in t1 must be smaller than the resistance that would have opposed the 
carrying out of the decision at t2 had the decision at tl not intervened." Finally, "[t]he act of 
binding oneself must be an act of commission, not of omission." Id. at 39-46. 
64. See id. at 36-37; see also Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 123; Jeremy 
Waldron, Banking Constitutional Rights: Who Controls Withdrawals?, 52 ARK. L. REV. 533, 
539-41 (1999). 
65. For a discussion of the potential utility of precommitment strategies by candidates or 
voters as means to enhance leverage in the electoral process, see Saul Levmore, Precom­
mitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567 (1996). 
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As a methodology for protecting high-priority societal values, pre­
commitment has several advantages. First, by definition, precommit­
ment increases the likelihood that a normative preference expressed at 
t1 will be honored at t2. Second, precommitment reduces the unpre­
dictability and instability of legal rules and regimes, because it gives 
the people some assurance that the entrenched policy goal will survive 
some measure of variation in other governing priorities.66 Third, pre­
commitment decreases the costs of legislative decisionmaking by an­
swering in one motion a question that might recur in a variety of socie­
tal controversies.67 Of course, the precommitment methodology has 
precisely countervailing disadvantages. First, again by definition, it in­
creases "dead hand" control over future decisions, binding future gen­
erations of governors and governed to an increasingly distant past. 
Second, the importance of the entrenched policy goal may be difficult 
to balance against unpredictable future priorities.68 Third, precom­
mitment decreases the extent to which decisionmakers debate and 
consider the consequences of the entrenched decision in the variety of 
circumstances it will affect over time, many of which are unpredictable 
at the time of precommitment.69 
Jere my Waldron has suggested a distinction between two varieties 
of precommitment that helps place the advantages and disadvantages 
of the methodology into perspective. In what may be called a strong 
66. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 126. Even an unenforceable legislative 
precommitment might provide this advantage through its persuasive force. See Akhil Reed 
Amar, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution's Succession Gap, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 215, 227 (1995) (suggesting general legislation that set rules for presidential 
succession in contingencies for which Constitution does not provide would "serve as a pre­
commitment and focal point" and that "deviation from this clear focal point will obviously 
smack of changing the rules in the middle of the game - indeed, after the game has 
ended"). 
67. Discussing constitutionalism as a limit on majoritarian decisionmaking, Cass 
Sunstein observes that 
the decision to take certain questions off the political agenda might be understood as a 
means not of disabling but of protecting politics, by reducing the power of highly controver­
sial questions to create factionalism, instability, impulsiveness, chaos, stalemate, collective 
action problems, myopia, strategic behavior, or hostilities so serious and fundamental as to 
endanger the governmental process itself. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 642 (1991); see 
also Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 126 ("[S]tabilizing governance rules encour­
ages investment and avoids the deadweight losses that accrue from continual attempts to 
manipulate the decision-making rules."). 
68. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 504-07 (1997) (noting absence of readily available normative baseline to 
indicate how much present interests should weigh against future interests); Waldron, supra 
note 64, at 550-51 (describing constitutional precommitment as "the artificially sustained 
ascendancy of one view in the polity over other views whilst the complex issues between 
them remain unresolved"). 
69. This disadvantage gives rise to concerns about the due process of lawmaking. See 
infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text. 
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precommitment, the decisionmaker renders the constraint on its future 
behavior inexorable. This form of precommitment provides the maxi­
mum assurance of constraint while also assuring that the effects of t.he 
precommitment will flow completely from the decisionmaker's 
autonomous will.70 Strong precommitment, with its concentration of 
control in the decisionmaker and its inexorable consequences, maxi­
mizes both the advantages and the countervailing disadvantages . . of · 
precommitment. In contrast, what may be . called a third-party pre­
commitment gives a trusted extrinsic actor responsibility for assuring 
the behavioral constraint.71 A third-party precommitment provides a 
less certain assurance of behavioral constraint, because the third party 
may weaken the constraint, and the effects of the precommitment will 
reflect inputs other than the original decisionmaker's autonomous 
will.72 Professor Waldron characterizes the Constitution as this latter 
variety of precommitment, because the Framers depended on courts 
to interpret and effectuate the constraints they placed on the govern� 
ment's behavior.73 
Precommitment is most familiar as a constitutional methodology.74 
Federal RFRA is a relatively l!nusual example of legislative precom- · 
mitment. The Act precommits the federal government to a heightened 
degree of solicitude for religious freedom by providing that courts in 
religious freedom cases shall allow any present or future federal law or 
rule to interfere with religious exercise only where the challenged fed­
eral action satisfies strict scrutiny. In recent years, the closest parallel 
to Federal RFRA's legislative methodology has been the federal Line 
Item Veto Act.75 That statute, which precommitted the federal gov-
70. See Waldron, supra note 64, at 553 (discussing ELSTER, supra note 63, at 42). 
71. Professor Waldron's example of this sort of precommitment is "the drinker giving 
his car keys to a friend at the beginning of a party with strict instructions not to return them 
when they are requested at midnight." Waldron, supra note 64, at 553. 
72. See id. at 554-55. 
73. Because the Constitution requires judicial application, Professor Waldron rejects the 
precommitment model as an explanation for how constitutional judicial review can be con­
sistent with democratic self-government, even by a "People" defined as retaining its identity 
across generations. See id. at 555-59. · 
74. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 124-26; Samuel Freeman, Constitu­
tipnal Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 9 LAW & PHIL. 327, 353 (1990-91); 
Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and Su­
permajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609, 655 (2000) (discussing benefits of constitutional 
precommitment); Klarman, supra note 68, at 496-97 (discussing objections to constitutional 
precommitment); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique 
of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (dis­
cussing precommitment and constitutional amendments); Levmore, supra note 65, at 593-9� 
(discussing case law relating to constitutional precommitment politics); Nancy C. Staudt, 
Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105 (1998) (discussing 
idea of constitutional precommitment to balanced budget); Sunstein, supra note 67, at 639; 
Waldron, supra note 64. · 
75. 2 U.S.C. § 691-691d (Supp. II 1996). 
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emment to perceived fiscal prudence by authorizing the president to 
cancel certain specified types of spending enactments subject to con­
gressional disapproval, was struck down because it empowered the 
president to encroach on the Article I legislative power.76 Legislative 
precommitments such as Federal RFRA artd the line-item veto use 
procedural approaches to effectuate substantive policy choices over a 
range of cases.77 
Closer analysis, however, reveals an important difference between 
the ' line-item veto a:nd Federal RFRA. The line-item veto entrenched 
a policy of cutting federal spending in appropriate cases by a single 
precommitment to oversight of budgetary decisions, enforced by the 
president. ·  Federal RFRA, in contrast, includes two distinct levels of 
precommitment. At the first level, Federal RFRA binds Congress to 
heightened judicial scrutiny of religious freedom claims against the 
government in particular cases. This is a third-party precommitment 
because it depends on a presumptively trustworthy third party -
courts - to effectuate the policy choice. At that first level, Federal 
RFRA is · only marginally unusual. Every statute depends on some 
combination of courts and executive officials for effectuation, inter­
pretation, and enforcement.78 Federal RFRA's first-level precommit­
ment is distinct from other statutes, and similar to the line-item veto, 
only because it governs an unusually broad range of as-yet unspecified 
drcumstances.79 
At the second level, however, Federal RFRA binds Congress to 
include heightened protection for religious freedom as a component of 
all present and future legislation. Congress has denied itself the option 
of legislating burdens on religious exercise unless it can overcome the 
extrinsic political inertia imposed by RFRA (distinct from the intrinsic 
76. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
77. See Saul Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 16 B.U. L. REV. 807, 828 (1996) 
(identifying line-i�em veto and single-subject rule as legislative procedural precommitments); 
see also David Currie, RFRA, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 637, 643 (1998) (comparing RFRA 
and the Line Item Veto Act as instances where "Congress . . .  has . . .  succumbed to the 
temptation to respond to perceived defects in the Constitution, or in the Courts under-
standing of it, by enacting simple legislation"). 
· 
78. RFRA is hardly unique in "overprotecting" constitutionally inscribed rights, in­
cluding the right to free exercise of religion, against federal encroachment. For example, af­
ter the Court held in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), that the Free Exercise 
Clause did not obligate the military to permit the wearing of religious headgear, Congress 
imposed such an obligation by statute. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1987). Similarly, Congress re­
sponded to Smith by amending the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to protect 
Native Americans' sacramental use of peyote against federal and state discrimination. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(l) (1994). 
: 79. Federal RFRA's third-party precommitment feature, like the line-item veto, is for­
mally subject to challenge on the ground that the legislative directive to the third party re­
quires some unconstitutional action. In the case of Federal RFRA, however, the challenge is 
unavailing. See infra Section III.D (discussing institutional competence objection to Federal 
RFRA). 
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political inertia that Congress must overcome whenever it seeks to 
amend or pass a law). This is a strong precommitment because the en­
trenched substantive policy choice is secured not by a congressional 
instruction to courts or the Executive Branch but by the political iner­
tia that affects Congress itself - the fact that Congress has to muster 
exceptional political will to alter it.Bo Federal RFRA is distinctive in 
placing this self-executing political constraint on the entire output of 
the legislative process.Bi 
Federal RFRA's strong precommitment to require heightened 
protection for religious exercise makes it a distinctly potent statute. 
The Act, however, does not exactly lash Ulysses to the mast. Congress 
has two ways around Federal RFRA - repeal of the Act itself or ex­
emption of a particular action from the Act's effects - either of which 
it can achieve by a simple majority vote. Thus, Federal RFRA is far 
easier to abrogate than a constitutional provision. The Act's strong 
precommitment places the firmest constitutionally permissible limit on 
legislative discretion by creating a default preference for protecting 
religious freedom. However, the constitutional rule that Congress may 
not bind future congresses,B2 and the attendant unavailability of a 
stronger security mechanism akin to the Article V procedure for con­
stitutional amendment, ensure that legislative discretion remains 
broad. Although Federal RFRA's legislative methodology is novel, 
80. See Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1481-82 (describing decrease 
under RFRAs of legislative burden faced by advocates of any given religious accommoda­
tion). The vastly more formidable constitutional analog is the amendment procedure, which 
requires Congress and/or state legislatures to muster supermajority support. See U.S. CONST. 
art. V. 
81. The closest analogy to Federal RFRA's strong precommitment feature is public 
property, such as federal parkland, public waterways, or the Social Security trust fund, that 
the government holds in trust. The trust can be viewed as a politically secured promise or 
precommitment to future generations that the government will maintain and protect the 
property despite competing priorities that may arise in the future. See, e.g. , William G. 
Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461 (1996) (dis­
cussing importance of preserving the financial trust funds for Social Security and Medicare); 
Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Colo­
nial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 623 (1998) (discussing definition of a public trust regarding 
waterfront land). 
82. See, e.g. , Amar, supra note 66, at 227; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 
483, 505-06 (1995) (noting Blackstone's principle and Constitutional indications that one 
legislature may not bind a future legislature). Some have argued that contract law may pro­
vide exceptions to this rule. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Government Precommitment to Tax In­
centive Subsidies: The Impact of United States v. Winstar Corp. on Retroactive Tax Legisla­
tion, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (1997) (discussing implications of Winstar case for legislative 
precommitment through government contracts); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Oppor­
tunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
1129, 1183 (1996) (suggesting use of contract law to force government to provide previously 
promised tax subsidies). 
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nothing about that methodology steps outside any boundary the 
Constitution draws for Congress.83 
The balance of this Part will proceed from this precommitment 
analysis to explain why the various separation of powers objections to 
Federal RFRA should be dismissed. The disadvantages of precom­
mitment - dead hand control, the indeterminate importance of the 
entrenched policy goal, and decreased debate about applications -
remain in the background. Nothing in the Constitution forbids legisla­
tive precommitment on any of these grounds, and the relative ease 
with which Congress can sidestep the strong precommitment in Fed­
eral RFRA ameliorates all of them. The problems of the precommit­
ment methodology, however, underscore the danger that a statute like 
Federal RFRA might encroach on constitutionally protected rights in 
particular circumstances. Strategies for dealing with that danger will 
be the subject of Part III. 
B.  No Power Required: Federal RFRA and the Enumerated Powers 
Doctrine· 
The most fundamental separation of powers objection to Federal 
RFRA, advanced vigorously by both Eugene Gressman84 and Marci 
Hamilton,85 is that no provision of the Constitution gives Congress 
authority to enact RFRA and apply it to federal law.86 The enumer-
83. Laurence Tribe suggests Federal RFRA might violate the Constitution to the extent 
it "add[s] to art. I's requirements for the enactment of legislation by a subsequent Congress." 
1 TRIBE, supra note 50, § 5-16 at 959 n.169. He concludes, however, that the only conse­
quence of such a violation would be that any future federal statute whose plain meaning 
connoted exemption from RFRA would have to be deemed to include such an exemption. 
See id. Thus, the effect on Federal RFRA's strong precommitment feature would be mar­
ginal. In a different vein, Ira Lupu suggests Federal RFRA's presumption in favor of height­
ened statutory protection for religious freedom raises constitutional concerns because sub­
sequent legislative adjustments to the reach of the statutory protection might favor 
particular sects. See Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Lib­
erty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 584-86 (1999) [hereinafter Lupu, Codification]. That objec­
tion proves too much. All statutes are subject to amendment, and any statutory scheme of 
benefits carries a risk that subsequent amendments may allocate its benefits in violation of 
constitutional nondiscrimination norms. Courts must deal with any such violations as they 
arise. See infra Part III. 
84. See Eugene Gressman, The Necessary and Proper Downfall of RFRA, 2 NEXUS 73, 
81-84 (Fall 1997) [hereinafter Gressman, Downfall] ; Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3; 
Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 119-38 (1996). 
85. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into 
the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 
357 (1994) [hereinafter Hamilton, Section 5]; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 
1 4-19; Hamilton, Landmark, supra note 49, at 718-22. 
. 86. For additional statements of the enumerated powers objection to RFRA, see 
Aurora R. Bearse, Note, RFRA: Is It Necessary? Is It Proper?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1045, 
1 060-66 (1998) (questioning Congress's power to enact federal component of RFRA); J. 
Jeffrey Patterson, Note, The Long Road Towards Restoration of Religious Freedom: Con-
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ated powers objection proceeds from the premise that RFRA has the 
coercive effect of "enforc[ing] the Free Exercise Clause . . .  when en­
dangered by action of the federal govemment,"87 just as, prior to 
Boerne, the Act enforced the incorporated Free Exercise Clause 
against state and local governments. This premise, in tum, draws on 
the Boerne Court's statement that RFRA "at every level of govern­
ment" has the effect of "displacing laws and prohibiting official actions 
of almost every description and regardless of subject matter. "88 The 
enumerated powers critics posit that, if Congress is to impose its will 
on the federal government through RFRA, it requires some source of 
constitutional authority. 
As Professor Hamilton points out, Congress could not have en­
acted RFRA as to the federal government pursuant to Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because that provision only authorizes legis­
lation affecting the states.89 No other constitutional provision, includ­
ing the First Amendment, gives Congress authority to enforce consti­
tutional guarantees against the federal government in the manner that 
Section 5 authorizes such enforcement against the states.90 The subject 
matter of the Act does not fall within any of the congressional powers 
enumerated in Article l.91 The enumerated powers critics also reject 
the suggestion that Congress applied RFRA to the federal govern­
ment pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, sec­
tion 8.92 RFRA might be necessary and proper to effectuate either (1) 
the religious freedom guarantee of the First Amendment or (2) all the 
federal statutes passed pursuant to Congress's enumerated powers. 
Professor Hamilton and Professor Gressman both dismiss the first 
formulation on the view that Congress lacks power to enforce consti-
gressional Options in Light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 87 KY. L.J. 253, 264-71 (1998-99) 
(expressing doubt about possibility of using any Art. I, § 8 power to restore RFRA's applica­
tions to state and local law). For responses to this objection, see Berg, Constitutional Future, 
supra note 13, at 730-38 (arguing against enumerated powers critique); Lupu, Lawyer's 
Guide, supra note 25, at 213 (dismissing enumerated powers critique); Ira C. Lupu, The Fail­
ure of RFRA, 20 ARK.-LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 578 (1998) [hereinafter Lupu, Failure] (same); 
Paulsen, supra note 13, at 253 (same). 
87. Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81. 
88. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (quoted in Gressman, Downfall, 
supra note 84, at 77; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 7). 
89. See Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 370-78; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra 
note 14, at 15. 
90. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 362-63; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 
14, at 14; see also Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81. 
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The most substantial hint RFRA's legislative history 
offers as to the constitutional grounding of the Act's federal applications relies on the Neces­
sary and Proper Clause. See H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (declaring congressional 
authority to enact RFRA to provide statutory protection for a constitutional value pursuant 
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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tutional rights against the federal government.93 As for the second 
formulation, both maintain that Federal RFRA fails the standards 
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Marylancf4 set for necessary 
and proper legislation95 because the Act lacks a legitimate purpose and 
does not actually pertain to any action taken by Congress pursuant to 
one of its enumerated powers.96 ' · 
The fundamental problem with the enumerated powers objection 
lies in its premise that Congress needed to draw on any constitutional 
authorization · at all in order to apply RFRA to the federal govern­
ment. Federal RFRA's precommitment to minimize the federal gov­
ernment's encroachments on religious freedom is simply a method of 
enforcing voluntary self-restraint. If the population consists of three 
groups - A, B, and C - and Congress passes a statute whose text 
states that it applies to groups A and B, Congress has not exercised 
power by exempting group C. The same result follows if Congress af­
firmatively states that the statute shall not apply to group C. Nothing 
about this analysis changes if courts that apply the statute necessarily 
must ensure that the statute is not applied against members of group 
C. Neither Professor Gressman nor Professor Hamilton can identify 
any previous instance when a federal statute that merely withdrew 
federal regulatory authority has been struck down, or even challenged, 
for exceeding Congress's enumerated powers.97 RFRA, as applied to 
93. See Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81 & n.52; Hamilton, Landmark, supra 
note 49, at 720; Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 365; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra 
note 14, at 14-15; see also Blatnik, supra note 14, at 1427-29. · 
94. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
95. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohib­
ited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch, 
17 U.S. at 421. 
96. See Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81-84; Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, 
at 519-25, 527-29; Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 133-34, 137-38; Hamilton, Land­
mark, supra note 49, at 718-20; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 18-19. But see 
McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at 162 n.68 (arguing that Necessary and Proper 
Clause authorizes RFRA's applications to federal law); Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at 
677-78 & n.358 (same). Professor Gressman's articulation of the "necessary and proper" ar­
gument suggests the objection is circular. As part of his argument that RFRA lacks any con­
stitutional authorization, he asserts that RFRA lacks a constitutionally legitimate end, in 
violation of the first McCulloch principle. His reason for concluding RFRA has no constitu­
tionally legitimate end is that "[b]oth the language of RFRA and the expressed intent of its 
framers loudly proclaim that the purposes of the statute are to restore the pre-Smith free 
exercise jurisprudence and to create an expanded version of the Free Exercise Clause . . . .  " 
Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 82; see also Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 
133-34. Those purposes are not legitimate because they are "saturated . . .  with separation of 
powers problems." Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 82; see also Gressman & 
Carmella, supra note 84, at 134-36. This boils down to an argument that RFRA lacks consti­
tutional authorization because RFRA lacks const\tutional authorization. 
97. Professor Gressman argues, by analogy to the Section 5 context, that "the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, by its own terms and purposes, imposes limitations on Congress's 
authority to regulate its own instrumentalities and on limiting the reach of its own stat-
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the federal government, disadvantages no one but the federal gov­
ernment.98 Congress needed a proper source of constitutional author­
ity to apply RFRA to the states, because that application precommit­
ted not Congress itself but independent sovereigns to cede some 
measure of power. When it ceded a measure of its own authority to 
the People, Congress renounced power rather than exercising it.99 
Defenders of RFRA's federal applications generally have argued 
or presumed that Congress had power to apply RFRA to the federal 
government commensurate with the various instances of Article I, sec­
tion 8 authority it employed and will employ to enact all the affected 
legislation in the first instance.H>0 On this view, Federal RFRA is a sort 
utes . . .  if, in so doing, Congress violates the separation of powers." Gressman, Comedy, su­
pra note 3, at 534 n.103 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). My argument is 
that, because Congress exercises no power when it does nothing more than "limit[] the reach 
of its own statutes," it cannot possibly violate the separation of powers. 
98. My conclusion that Federal RFRA need not partake of any constitutional grant of 
power to Congress necessarily rests on the premise that the Act's federal applications do not 
violate any other provision of the Constitution. If Federal RFRA encroached on judicial 
authority in some other way, or if it abridged any rights-bearing provision of the Constitu­
tion (i.e., the Establishment Clause), then the Act's federal law applications would represent 
an exercise of constitutiorial power, just as the applications of RFRA struck down in Boerne 
represented an exercise of power over state and local governments. I contend infra Part III 
that the Court properly may construe Federal RFRA as avoiding Establishment Clause vio­
lations. 
99. Two provisions of RFRA might appear to require exercises of power. First, the Act 
provides that "[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this sec­
tion may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain ap­
propriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. As to RFRA's state law appli­
cations this provision certainly required constitutional authorization, because Congress 
exposed states to a new cause of action just as it imposed new obligations on them. As to 
RFRA's federal law applications, however, the provision is essentially surplusage. RFRA 
simply withdraws federal regulatory authority in certain cases. Claiming a RFRA exemption 
from regulation is no different from claiming exemption because a statute provides a dis­
crete safe harbor or because a statute simply does not reach a given person or situation. Sec­
ond, RFRA's stated application to federal law "unless such law explicitly excludes such ap­
plication by reference to this (Act] ," 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b), might be characterized as 
empowering Congress to regulate behavior if it chooses to abrogate RFRA's protection. 
Such an abrogation would involve an exercise of power, but not any power created by 
RFRA. Rather, any abrogation of RFRA in a future statute simply will define part of that 
statute's coverage pursuant to whatever enumerated power authorizes the statute. 
100. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 860 (invoking Art. I, § 8 bankruptcy power to justify 
application of RFRA in bankruptcy case); Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 731-
33; William G. Buss, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Religious Free­
dom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L. REV. 391, 412-13 (1998); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties 
with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1625 n.401 (1995) (suggesting that Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
conjunction with Art. I, § 8 powers, authorizes Federal RFRA); Greenawalt, Amendment, 
supra note 16, at 695 ("Congress does not need any independent constitutional base to ex­
cuse people from conformity with ordinary federal standards"); Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs, 
supra note 50, at 745 ("RFRA's application to federal law . . .  is based on Congress's Article 
I powers . . . .  "); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 211 (describing Federal RFRA as 
"both a rule of interpretation for future federal legislation and an exercise of general legisla­
tive supervision over federal agencies"); Lupti, Lawyer's Guide, supra note 25, at 213 ("With 
respect to [federal applications of RFRA], Congress presumably has affirmative power to 
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of "super-amendment" to the entire U.S. Code, and the source of con­
stitutional authority for Federal RFRA varies with each application of 
the Act, tracking the sources of authority underlying each affected 
statute. For Thomas Berg, 
[Congress in RFRA] is respecting the limits placed on it by the First 
Amendment, by amending its own laws to conform to its own conscien­
tious understanding of what the free exercise of religion requires. 
Congress has the power to amend its own laws in this way because it had 
power to enact the laws in the first place.101 
The "no power" explanation of Federal RFRA has rhetorical ad­
vantages over the "super-amendment" explanation. First, it is truer to 
the idea that the government has limited power over the sovereign 
people than is any account that equates exemption from regulation 
with an exercise of power. When Congress amends a duly enacted 
statute to exempt some class of persons or situations from the statute's 
reach, the enhanced freedom of the newly exempt class is not a prod­
uct of congressional power. Rather, their freedom predated congres­
sional power, and Congress simply has revoked a prior decision to 
limit it in a manner authorized by the Constitution.102 Second, the "no 
power" explanation deflates a key premise of the enumerated powers 
objection: that a "wholesale" statute like RFRA differs in kind from 
an amendment that restrains congressional authority in a single stat­
ute.103 The "no power" explanation makes clear that Congress, 
whether revoking a measure of its own authority in one statute or in 
ten thousand, is not exercising power at all.104 
Three objections advanced against the "super amendment" expla­
nation of congressional power also might have relevance for the "no 
power" explanation. First, the enumerated powers critics posit that 
protect religious freedom; whatever power authorizes the underlying legislation will support 
an accommodation of religious liberty as part of the legislative scheme."); Paulsen, supra 
note 13, at 253 ("Congress possesses the same power to pass RFRA, a:s RFRA concerns fed­
eral statutes, as it had to pass those other federal statutes in the first place."); Robin­
Vergeer, supra note 13, at 677 n.358; see also Blatnik, supra note 14, at 1436-42 (suggesting 
that Congress would have to rely on all its enumerated powers as authority for RFRA's fed­
eral applications); Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 131 (same). 
101. Berg, Constitutional Future,_ supra note 13, at 731. 
102. See U.S. CONST., amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 106 (1960) ("We are not . . .  !} subject people begging or fighting for such limited 
privileges and powers as may be grudgingly granted to us by a sovereign legislature. We are 
the sovereign and the legislature is our agent."). 
103. See infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text (discussing legislative process objec­
tion to Federal RFRA). 
104. For the same reason, the "no power" explanation obviates Professor Hamilton's 
complaint that "RFRA poses a new phenomenon . .. . requiring even further expansion of the 
enumerated powers' boundaries: a statute that reveals its enumerated powers basis only 
upon application in each particular case." Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 366. 
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RFRA does not amend substantive law at all, but rather impermissibly 
imposes on courts a standard of review for constitutional free exercise 
claims: "RFRA creates no new substantive religious rights, privileges 
or entitlements. Nor does it add to or supplement any such rights . . . .  
The statute confers the right to have one's free exercise claim adjudi­
cated under a balancing approach."105 The problem with this objection 
is that the distinction between an amendment to a law and the direc­
tion of a judicial standard is very elusive. Virtually any statute that 
creates legal rights can be characterized as implicitly or explicitly di­
recting courts to enforce or apply a legal standard. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has construed even a statute that directed outcomes in 
specific pending litigation as amending substantive law.106 
Second, Professor Hamilton argues that Federal RFRA makes an 
end run around the Article V procedure for amending the Constitu­
tion.107 "As applied to federal law," she argues, RFRA "is a constitu­
tional amendment. It permits Congress to act on First Amendment 
freedoms without the constitutional restraints crafted by the Framers 
in the enumerated powers requirement. "108 This notion that RFRA 
amounts to a back-door constitutional amendment fails to take ac­
count of how constitutional amendments differ from statutes. The de­
fining characteristic of a constitutional amendment is that it alters the 
supreme law of the land by changing the Constitution.109 As others 
have noted, Federal RFRA is only a statute, and it occupies the same, 
inferior position to the Constitution that every other federal statute 
occupies.U° Federal RFRA resembles a constitutional provision only 
105. Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 107-08; see also Dolan, supra note 12, at 
166-67 (suggesting that legislatures may not "alter the judiciary's standard of review for a 
previously existing constitutional claim"); Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 364 
("RFRA is a bare standard of review yoked to no particular substantive policy arena within 
which Congress is constitutionally empowered to act."); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra 
note 14, at 3-4. This assertion resembles the argument that RFRA violates the separation of 
powers by directing outcomes in particular cases. See infra Section II.C.2. 
106. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 437 (1992) (holding that 
challenged statute compelled change� in the law because, in operation,. it merely m0dified 
the existing law by adding two new provisions under which a claim could fail). 
107. U.S. CONST. art. V.; see Hamilton, Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 629 (characterizing 
RFRA as "an amendment to the Constitution without. the involvement of the people, a 
stealth amendment, if you will"); Hamilton, Landmark, supra note 49, at 721-22; Hamilton, 
Section 5, supra note 85, at 386; Blatnik, supra note 14, at 1443-60. 
108. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 386 (footnote omitted). 
109. Thus, for example, pre-existing provisions of the Constitution must be read in light 
of the amendment. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (affirming congres­
sional authority to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating pursu­
ant to the later-enacted Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 
222 (1934) (noting that the Eighteenth Amendment immediately became inoperative upon 
ratification of Twenty-First Amendment). 
· 
110. See Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why . 
They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415; 446-48 (1999) [hereinafter Berg, New Attacks] 
(arguing that RFRAs create new statutory rights rather than directing outcomes of constitu-
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in that its methodology of precommitment to protect minority inter­
ests is more characteristic of constitutions than of statutes.U1 Unlike in 
the case of a constitutional provision, the Court may use its judicial re­
view power to strike down Federal RFRA to whatever extent it finds 
the Act to violate any substantive constitutional provision,112 and 
Congress may revoke or amend the Act through legislation.113 
tional cases); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional 
Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 605-06 (1998) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Expansion] ("the Court's inte_rpretive judgment that a particular right is not 
constitutionally protected is in no way incompatible with a legislature's statutory recognition 
and safeguarding of the liberty"); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 243 ("RFRA creates 
a statutory cause of action - nothing more."); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2543 (1998) (chara<;terizing RFRA "as a statute, 
pure and simple . . .  not as a constitutional imposition masquerading as a legislative enact­
ment"); Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at 614 ("[T]he First Amendment guarantee of free 
exercise is enduring, while RFRA, a mere statute, is subject to repeal or amendment . . . .  "); 
Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 14, at 1474 ("state RFRAs, being state statutes, 
can be modified by the legislatures that enacted them"). 
With respect to RFRA's applications to state law,' it is possible to argue that Congress 
did effectively amend the Constitution, because it altered the authoritative understanding of 
the First Amendment that bound the states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 
(1997). 
111 .  For a discussion of the Constitution as a precommitment strategy, see Waldron, 
supra note 64. · 
1 12. Professor Hamilton asserts that "[i]f RFRA is deemed constitutional as applied to 
federal law, it would endow Congress with the authority to alter the constitutional balance 
between church and state through nothing more than a majority vote." Hamilton, Unconsti­
tutional, supra note 14, at 8. That statement ignores the Establishment Clause, which neces­
sarily trumps any congressional enactment, including RFRA. See infra Section 111.D.1.. The 
Boerne Co!lrt also expressed the concern that under RFRA " [s]hifting legislative majorities 
could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detaile<;I amend­
ment process contained in Article V." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. But the Court identified that 
concern as a consequence "[i]f Congress could define its OWn powers by altering the Four­
teenth Amendment's meaning." Id. (emphasis added). As to federal law, RFRA is simply one 
vehicle, along with discretionary accommodations, see supra note 17, by which Congress may 
alter the balance between religious freedom and governmental authority. Given that 
Professor Hamilton believes RFRA violates the Establishment Clause, see Hamilton, Un­
constitutional, supra note 14, at 8-14, she appears to believe courts cannot constrain RFRA 
within Establishment Clause norms. I describe two methods by which ·courts can do so infra 
Part III. 
1 13. See Lupu, Codification, supra note 83, at 589 ("It is the relative imperviousness of 
constitutional provisions to change by ordinary lawmaking mechanisms, rather than the sub­
stantive content of such provisions, that makes them legally unique."); Rodney K. Smith, 
Converting the Religious Equality Amendment Into a Statute with a Little "Conscience," 1996 
BYU L. REV. 645, 685 ("If a court errs in interpreting a statute, the harm is far more negli­
gible than an error in constitutional interpretation because it can easily be corrected through 
conventional legal processes without having to resort to onerous amendment procedures."). 
Professor Hamilton includes Congress's option to exempt any given federal law from 
RFRA's coverage among "policy reasons" to hold the Act unconstitutional, on the ground 
that Congress's reservation of a safety valve demonstrates its weak commitment to religious 
liberty. See Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 380; see also Hamilton, Unconstitutional, 
supra note 14, at 7 n.33. Aside from the fact that Congress's retention of authority to alter its 
precommitment to overprotect any right is a constitutional given, see supra note 82 and ac­
companying text, the argument that the retention more than negates the precommitment 
strains credulity. But even if Professor Hamilton's argument refutes the thesis that RFRA is 
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Finally, Professor Hamilton asserts that RFRA's protection of re­
ligious freedom across the entire range of federal law warps the legis­
lative process.114 She would require Congress to act in discrete statu­
tory increments; such that "money and power interests enter the 
picture . . .  [and] more publicity and more active factions with real in­
centives to question the sincerity and necessity of Congress's foray 
into religious liberty will likely arise."115 Whether or not discrete en­
actments would be a preferable legislative approach, Professor 
Hamilton does not and cannot point to any explicit constitutional re­
quirement for the legislative process that Federal RFRA violates.116 
Rather, her argument appeals to the idea that the Constitution re­
quires some quantum of due process in legislative methodology. This 
is a salutary goal, and a reasonable argument exists that Congress 
should take more time and care when legislating with the breadth of 
RFRA. But Professor Hamilton's insistence on individually contextu­
alized deliberations about religious freedom exceeds even the most 
vigorous calls for judicial enforcement of "due process of lawmaking." 
One account of due process requirements for statutes urges judicial 
enforcement of the explicit constitutional and statutory rules that gov­
ern the legislative process.117 That account does not support the sort of 
good for religious freedom, the fact that Congress may exempt legislation from RFRA un­
dermines her assertion that RFRA operates in the manner of a constitutional amendment. 
114. Professor Hamilton argues in part that, at least in the area of First Amendment 
freedoms, Congress may overprotect rights on a statute-by-statute basis but may not do so 
wholesale, because wholesale overprotection of rights entails a flawed legislative process. 
See Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 386 ("If Congress is so devoted to religious liberty, 
let it publicly pledge to abide by higher standards than the Court has set by rising to such 
standards in every law it passes."); cf Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 735-36 
("The arguments offered as to why RFRA does not fall within Congress's enumerated pow­
ers all boil down to criticisms of the wisdom of Congress in choosing to legislate by a general 
standard rather than case-by-case rules."). 
115. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 382-83 (advocating judicial inquiry into "due 
process of lawmaking defects"); see Hamilton, Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 628 ("No govern­
ment should be able to adjust the balance of power between church and state across the 
board in one fell sweep. Such adjustments require ratification by the people."); Hamilton, 
Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 17 ("To the extent that Congress has rubber stamped the 
actions of particular interest groups without consideration of the polity's concerns, the courts 
should read the enumerated powers requirement strictly."); see also Gressman, Downfall, 
supra note 84, at 82 (dismissing "super-amendment" explanation for RFRA on the ground 
that Congress failed to make specific findings that established the need to amend every fed­
eral statue to protect religious exercise); cf Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 23 (arguing that 
statutory adoption of "judge-made constitutional terminology" may "repress[] . . .  debate 
and careful consideration of alternatives"). 
· 
116. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down statute that author­
ized president to veto portions of appropriations bills because partial veto violated Art. I, § 7 
requirements for enactment of legislation by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1986) 
(striking down one-house legislative veto provision of Immigration and Nationality Act be­
cause Art. I, § 7 requires bicameral passage and presentment to president for legislative ac­
tion). 
117. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 240-42 
(1976); see also Waldron, supra note 64, at 535-36 (discussing constitutional constraints on 
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subjective, politically charged judicial critique of the representative 
quality of deliberation Professor Hamilton advocates. A second ac­
count would require "a deliberate and broadly based political judg­
ment" in situations where "governmental action trenches upon values 
that may reasonably be regarded as fundamental."118 That approach 
does not implicate Federal RFRA, which neither undermines specially 
protected values or classes nor reflects any lack of legislative atten­
tion.119 Professor Hamilton's approach would cut to the heart of 
Congress's political discretion.12° Perhaps congressional precommit­
ment to a high level of protection for religious liberty is a bad idea,121 
but the Constitution nowhere prohibits such legislative self-restraint.122 
Professor Hamilton's assertion that forbidding the sort of process that 
led to RFRA would "encourage more searching and creative public 
legislative process); cf Peter M. Shane, Back to the Future of the American State: Overruling 
Buckley v. Valeo and Other Madisonian Steps, 57 U. PITI. L. REV. 443, 454-59 (1996) (advo­
cating recognition that Constitution places procedural requirements on congressional delib­
eration but suggesting that such requirements should not be judicially enforceable). 
118. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1 188 
(1977); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-49 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for enhanced judicial review of legislative process where statute draws a suspect 
classification). 
119. Violation of the Establishment Clause would implicate a specially protected value; 
that issue is discussed infra Section III.A. Legislative inattention was the subject of Justice 
Stevens's objection in Fullilove. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (argu­
ing that Congress, by giving only perfunctory consideration to the consequences of a racial 
set-aside program, "failed to discharge its duty to govern impartially" as required by due 
process). 
120. Thomas Berg objects to Professor Hamilton's argument from legislative methodol­
ogy on the more general ground that judicial pronouncements on the "wisdom" of congres­
sional actions would encroach on the congressional power recognized in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 
737. This strikes me as the converse of Professor Gressman's circular error in arguing from 
McCulloch that RFRA exceeds congressional authority. See supra note 96. Professor Berg 
invokes the presumed legitimacy of RFRA's ends to discredit Professor Hamilton's attack 
on the means by which Congress legislated the Act. But her argument, in McCulloch terms, 
is that the end of "heightening protection for religious freedom in all federal statutes" is not 
legitimate. 
121. But cf Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. at 469-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (defending 
legislative technique of altering effects of previously enacted statutes en masse on grounds of 
practicality). 
122. Professor Gressman, in a ·  related arguinent, would extend the Boerne Court's 
holding under Section 5 that RFRA was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, un­
constitutional behavior," City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997), to strike down 
the Act's federal applications as well. See Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 526-27 & n.77. 
No basis for this argument is apparent. As to RFRA's applications to state law, the Boerne 
Court saw a need to protect the states from RFRA's "disproportionate" sweep. Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 533-35. The federal applications, in contrast, present no problem of dueling sover­
eigns. If Congress decides to protect an interest against federal regulatory authority, the 
Court has no separation of powers basis for declaring that any degree of protection is too 
much. For a description and refutation of a similar objection to Federal RFRA in the Estab­
lishment Clause context, see infra notes 305-310 and accompanying text. 
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debate"123 rings especially hollow given that her approach would place 
courts in charge of the form and extent of legislative deliberation. 
C. The Structural Objection: Confusing Federal RFRA's 
Constitution-Like Methodology with the Judiciary's Power to Interpret 
and Apply the Constitution 
Precommitments to protect rights are much more familiar in the 
constitutional setting than in statutes.124 Federal RFRA's distinctive 
use of a characteristically constitutional methodology to "overprotect" 
a constitutional right may help to account for the structural objection 
to Federal RFRA, which insists that, notwithstanding the federalism 
problem addressed in Boerne, even the Act's federal applications 
usurp the judiciary's constitutional power. The structural objectors 
find fatal fault with Congress's unapologetic intent to overrule Smith125 
and its decision to phrase RFRA in the constitutional nomenclature of 
"substantial[] burden," "compelling governmental interest," and "least 
restrictive means."126 These, writes Professor Gressman, are "terms 
that clearly assert a congressional takeover of free exercise jurispru­
dence."127 Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager elaborate: 
Congress was moved to enact RFRA by a reading of the Constitution 
deeply antagonistic to the Court's reading in Smith. RFRA's mandate is 
couched in exquisitely constitutional terms, and, like many constitutional 
precepts, it sweeps across virtually the whole domain of state and federal 
governmental activity. And RFRA insists that the Court return to the 
compelling state interest test, which was specifically rejected by the 
Court. In all, RFRA is a congressional attempt to subvert rather than to 
supplement the constitutionaljudgment of the Supreme Court.128 
The structural objection takes two distinct forms: that RFRA 
usurps the Court's power to interpret the Constitution, and that 
RFRA improperly tells courts how to decide religious freedom cases. 
123. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 382. 
124. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying .text. 
126. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-l (1994). 
127. Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 76; see also Neal Devins, How Not To Chal­
lenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 654 (1998) (arguing that "RFRA's embrace 
of strict scrutiny review effectively limited the judicial role to the application of the statutory 
compelling justification test"). But see Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settle­
ment Function, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 849, 858 (1998) ("Congress utilized judicial lan­
guage because members of Congress share the widespread public belief that responsibility 
for interpreting the Constitution is primarily judicial. [RFRA was] expressing an opinion 
about which Court was right in interpreting the First Amendment, not claiming a fully inde­
pendent legislative prerogative of interpretation."). 
128. Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 443. 
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l. Usurping the Power to Interpret: The Argument from Marbury v. 
Madison 
The more straightforward version of the structural objection holds 
that Congress redefined the free exercise guarantee of the First 
Amendment, thereby encroaching on the Court's interpretive pre­
rogative under Marbury v. Madison.129 Several commentators have ar­
gued that RFRA's constitutional rhetoric invades the judicial domain, 
a contention independent of the federalism concerns that animated 
Boerne.U0 According to Professor Devins: 
F/ores's chief, if not only, complaint with RFRA was that the statute op­
erated as a naked power grab, transferring from the Court to Congress 
the power to define constitutional standards of review. In this way, 
Boerne does little more than reaffirm the core holding of Marbury v. 
Madison, that is, judicial review is necessary to ensure that the Constitu­
tion not be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts . . .  alterable when 
the legislature shall please to alter it. "131 
The Act's quasi-judicial language strikes Professor Devins as espe­
cially inappropriate in light of the excoriation of Smith in RFRA's 
legislative history, which, he writes, "smelled, looked, and tasted like a 
129. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to [s]ay what the law is."); sie also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 18 
(1958) (declaring that Supreme Court is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Consti­
tutiop" and that its interpretation of the Constitution is "the supreme [!Jaw of the [!]and"). 
130. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional 
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 78 (1995) (hereinafter 
Conkle, Constitutional Significance] ("RFRA directly repudiates the Supreme Court's basic 
constitutional reasoning. As such, it represents an unprecedented congressional challenge to 
the Court's well-established role as the primary interpreter of the Constitution."); Devins, 
supra note 127; Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 511-14; Gressman & Carmella, supra 
note 84, at 120 ("Congress (in RFRA] has interfered with the 'province and duty' of the ju­
diciary 'to say what the law is' in free exercise cases and controversies"); Hamilton, Land­
mark, supra note 49, at 718 ("RFRA exhibits its structural weaknesses even when one looks 
at its application to federal law. The law is a slap in the face of the Court, crossing separation 
of powers boundaries in an unapologetic fashion."); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 
14, at 3-7; Jonathan Mallamud, Religion, Federalism and Congressional Power: A Comment 
on City of Boerne v. Flores, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 58 (1997) (concluding, in discussion of 
RFRA's federal applications, that "Congress appears to have provided a basis on the face of 
(RFRA] for a finding that Congress intended to change the Court's interpretation of the 
Constitution"); Steven D. Smith, Mother, May We?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 501, 506 (1999); 
see also Currie, supra note 77, at 640 ("Congress cannot tell the Court what the Constitution 
means."). Because some of these arguments were made prior to the Court's decision in 
Boerne, the extent of their intended reach to RFRA's federal applications is not entirely 
clear. See, e.g. , Devins, supra note 127 at 664 n.113 (expressing uncertainty about the status 
of RFRA's federal applications after Boerne). The logic of the argument from Marbury, 
however, encompasses the Act in all its applications, at least to the extent the argument em­
phasizes the Act's appropriation of constitutional rhetoric. Cf Robin-Vergeer, supra note 
13, at 678 (arguing that if RFRA is unconstitutional as "an impermissible repudiation of 
Supreme Court constitutional doctrine, then it should not matter whether the statute is ap­
plied to the federal government or the states"). 
131. Devins, supra note 127, at 646 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177). 
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populist abrogation of the judicial function."132 He concludes that, be­
cause "RFRA supporters invested no energy in casting their handi­
work as anything but the de jure nullification of the Supreme Court's 
voice in religious liberty decision making,"133 the Court "had no choice 
but to view RFRA as a frontal assault on its authority."134 Professor 
Hamilton concurs: "With RFRA, Congress has acted out of manifest 
disrespect for the Supreme Court as an institution, and has done so in 
the most unsubtle fashion imaginable."135 
The argument from Marbury cannot and does not maintain that 
Federal RFRA invades the judicial domain in the way ultra vires acts 
of the political branches usually do, by altering substantive outcomes 
the Constitution entrusts to another branch.136 Leaving Establishment 
Clause concerns aside for the moment, the only power shift Federal 
RFRA effects is Congress's blanket surrender in a class of controver­
sies that might arise between the federal government and the peo­
ple.137 Rather, the Marbury-based critique emphasizes legislative 
rhetoric. Professor Devins explains that " [m]ore than anything, my 
point is about the message that Congress sent the Court."138 The 
Marbury-based objection posits that Federal RFRA's "outright repu­
diation of the judicial function"139 undercuts the judiciary's "institu-
132. Id. at 655; see also id. at 652-54 (recounting "highly personal, highly incendiary 
rhetoric [that] typified much of Congress's consideration of RFRA"). 
133. Id. at 650. 
134. Id. at 654; see also Gardbaum, supra note 50, at 669 (suggesting that "RFRA's his­
tory both inside and outside Congress and the sharp criticism of Smith in the legislative text" 
led the Court to treat Boerne incorrectly as a case about judicial supremacy). 
135. Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 5. 
136. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714· (1986) (striking down provision that allowed 
Congress to remove executive branch official); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking 
down statute that permitted Congress to overrule deportation decisions); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting President's attempt to resist subpoena based on his 
own interpretation of constitutional executive privilege); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting President's nationalizing of steel mills). Defenders of 
RFRA argued prior to Boerne that the Court should permit Congress to define the scope 
within which free exercise rights should be protected. See, e.g. , Chemerinsky, Constitutional 
Expansion, supra note 110, at 628-29 (rejecting Marbury critique of RFRA in context of 
Act's application to states); Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 245-48. Rejection of that posi­
tion, which would have accorded Congress significant power to affect substantive outcomes 
of constitutional disputes, was the central thrust of Boerne. See supra notes 38-48 and ac­
companying text. My contention here is distinct from, and narrower than, the position that 
Congress and the Court should share responsibility for constitutional interpretations that 
affect outcomes of constitutional disputes. For pre-Boerne consideration of that issue, see, 
e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitu­
tional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819 (1986); Cohen, supra note 61; Archibald Cox, The 
Role of Congress In Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971). 
137. See supra Section 11.B. 
138. Devins, supra note 127, at 651.n.43. 
139. Id. at 658. 
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tional integrity,''140 its command over an analytic lexicon and a body of 
evolving doctrine. "For practical purposes,'' argues Professor 
Gressman, "RFRA constitutes a congressional seizure and reforma­
tion by Congress of the entire free exercise jurisprudence developed 
by the Supreme Court."141 Congress has broken into the Court's 
house, and even if nothing has been stolen, the Court must protect its 
interests. 
For Professor Berg, the Marbury critique of RFRA "is just another 
way of asserting that Congress cannot protect religious freedom 
through a general standard."142 That response misapprehends the ar­
gument from Marbury. Professor Devins and Professor Gressman pre­
sumably would concede that Congress is free to pass a law that con­
strains federal authority with respect to a single statute. But they 
would not countenance that law any more than they countenance 
RFRA if, like RFRA, it spoke in constitutional terms, and especially if 
it expressed open contempt for the Court's leading decision in the cor­
responding constitutional area. The Marbury critics are concerned 
with RFRA's constitutional rhetoric, not with its practical conse­
quences. 
The flaw in the Marbury-based critique lies in its presumption that 
the congressional view of the Free Exercise Clause underlying RFRA 
will have any force in the Act's applications to federal law. The Boerne 
Court objected to RFRA's deployment of free exercise principles not 
because Congress had "reinterpreted" the Free Exercise Clause in 
some abstract sense, but because Congress had imposed a substantive 
burden on the states.143 In its applications to federal law, the Act can­
not possibly interfere with the Court's development of free exercise 
doctrine, let alone "make the Court's interpretations of the Constitu­
tion superfluous,''144 because Congress's view of what the First 
Amendment should mean will have no consequences. Indeed, Federal 
RFRA cannot even generate a justiciable challenge to the Court's 
authoritative interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court's 
1 40. Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 519. 
1 41. Id. at 518; cf Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 460 n.79 (dis­
tinguishing RFRA from Title VII on the ground that "Title VII offers the judiciary the op­
portunity to develop a coherent jurisprudence consistent with its own understanding of con­
stitutional justice"). 
142. Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 738; see also id. at 740-44. 
1 43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-35 (1997): 
The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation 
burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far 
exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Oause 
as interpreted in Smith. Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state 
laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion. 
144. Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 8. 
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power "to say what the law is" extends only to justiciable cases.145 
Challenges to federal action under RFRA will give rise to disputes and 
precedent about the mechanics of strict scrutiny under the Act, but 
not claims about the meaning of the constitutional term "free exercise 
of religion."146 RFRA challengers of federal action will not need to 
dispute the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause: either 
RFRA applies and overprotects the challenger or it does not. Like­
wise, government defendants obviously will have no occasion to assert 
the Act's broad conception of religious liberty against the Smith 
Court's narrow account of governmental obligations under the Free 
Exercise Clause.147 
Federal RFRA employs the Constitution-like methodology of pre­
commitment in order to protect rights ordinarily enforced by the 
Constitution. Congress guaranteed Federal RFRA's precommitment 
not by any appeal to constitutional authority but only with the weight 
of political inertia. 148 Perhaps Congress fully intended for RFRA to 
revise the constitutional understanding of free exercise. But the Act, 
at least in its federal applications, neither had the capacity to change 
the Constitution149 nor needed to do so in order to effectuate 
145. See, e.g. , United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (stating that a federal court 
may not evaluate the constitutionality of state or federal statutes unless and until "it is called 
upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies"); United Pub. Workers v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("The power of courts, and ultimately (the Supreme Court], 
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of liti­
gants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interfer­
ence."). 
146. Again, I defer discussion of the obvious caveat to this statement, the possibility that 
overprotection in some circumstances may violate the Establishment Clause, until Part III. 
147. Professor Gressman insists that RFRA's critical error is its invasion of Congress's 
Article III power to decide cases or controversies: 
In essence, Congress has created a statutory "case or controversy," replete with congres­
sional standards of review, for use whenever a neutral law has allegedly burdened some re­
ligious exercise. In that situation, RFRA becomes a congressional or statutory substitute for 
a First Amendment "case or controversy" wherein the legislature - not the judiciary - sets 
the review standards. 
Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 517; see also Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 73 
(objecting to RFRA on the ground that "(n]ever before had Congress sought to dictate to 
the judiciary how to inte.rpret some provision of the Constitution in the course of performing 
the core judicial functi_on of resolving cases and controversies"); id. at 74. The problem with 
this argument is that Congress's blanket precommitment in Federal RFRA to protect relig­
ious freedom has nothing to do with the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution, and 
thus Federal RFRA cannot generate any disputes about constitutional interpretation. 
Professor Gressman is exactly right to state that "if Congress wants to dictate to the courts 
how best to interpret the Constitution . . .  it necessarily must cross over into the case-or­
controversy realm of the judiciary." Id. at 77. RFRA, however, does not do so. 
148. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
149. Cf 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, at 949 n.121 (arguing that Boerne Court could not have 
struck down RFRA's application to the states had it found Congress's interpretation of the 
First Amendment consistent with Court's prior holdings, even if Congress had intended to 
deviate from those holdings); see also Buss, supra note 100, at 413 (noting that Congress's 
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Congress's will.150 If Congress really had designs on the Court's inter­
pretive authority, the only rebuke the Court needs is the echo of 
RFRA's constitutional rhetoric in empty courtrooms. The delicate 
construct of tripartite government is no place to punish futile attempts 
to break the rules. 
The Marbury-based critique of Federal RFRA also proves too 
much. Its misplaced emphasis on protecting judicial authority from in­
effectual congressional rhetoric threatens to undermine the proper 
and important role Congress plays in interpreting the Constitution. 
Scholars have argued persuasively that the working relationship be­
tween the Court and the political branches is dialogic.151 On this view, 
congressional engagement with the Court and the Constitution is es­
sential to the health of the nation.152 lnterbranch dialogue, at least out-
intent to override Court's constitutional judgment has no bearing on constitutionality of 
RFRA's federal applications). 
150. Professor Hamilton argues that Congress.'s inattention · to the constitutional 
authority for RFRA's federal applications should render those applications unconstitutional: 
The record accords the courts nothing on which to peg a theory of constitutional power. This 
procedural failure should doom RFRA. As a structural, constitutional principle, the courts 
should not create arguments to justify such legislation after the fact, but rather should send 
the law back to Congress so that it can engage in the deliberation necessary to make its laws 
both apparently and actually constitutional. 
Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 16-17; see also Hamilton, Landmark, supra 
note 49, at 720 (RFRA's federal applications "should not be upheld, if for no other reason 
than to send a message to Congress that when a law is unusual and the enumerated power 
issue is opaque, Congress is constitutionally obligated to provide at least a modicum of ex­
planation of what power it believed itself to be engaging."); id. at 706, 720. Such a rule may 
have a place where the predicate for a source of constitutional power needed to animate a 
statute requires joint legislative and judicial attention. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the 
Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996) (advocating requirement of explicit congressional findings 
to support exercise of commerce power); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial 
Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
757, 761-71 (1996) (elaborating Frickey's notion as a "sense of the record" canon of constitu­
tional interpretation). It is irrelevant to Federal RFRA, which required and used no consti­
tutional power. See supra Section 11.B. 
151. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); Barry Friedman, 
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); see also Carter, supra note 136, 
at 851-62 (advocating interbranch dialogue in lieu of debates about substantive power under 
Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); Devins, supra note 127, at 648, 661; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27, 76-
95 (1994) (discussing role of institutional interests in division of labor between Court and 
Congress). 
152. Indeed, commentators have argued that, notwithstanding the separation of powers, 
legislators have an obligation to evaluate the constitutionality of their actions. See 1 TRIBE, 
supra note 50, § 3-4 at 262 ("Congress and the President must thus be recognized as having 
the power and the duty to interpret the [Constitution] in a way that may command the re­
spect of others."); Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Inter­
pretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975); Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (and 
What Do They Do with Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 441 ,  453-54 (1985) ("[I]f legal texts have meanings, then they speak to all participants 
in the legal system, of whom judges are only one set and not necessarily the most impor­
tant . . . .  I think it absolutely vital that all public . officials, including citizens, confront the 
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side the ramparts of federalism erected by Boerne, is essential in a 
context as politically and emotionally charged as religious freedom.153 
Such dialogue is especially important if one has a normative commit­
ment to rights, 154 because for long stretches of its history the Court has 
shown little interest in expanding rights.155 Professor Devins makes the 
instructive observation that, in Boerne, both Congress and the Court 
violated the principle of dialogue. Congress erred because " [r]ather 
than encourage dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution's relig­
ious liberty protection, RFRA sought to silence the Supreme 
Court." 156 The Boerne Court, however, "never acknowledged that dis­
agreement with its rulings by lawmakers, government officials, and in­
terest groups often plays a pivotal and salutary role in defining consti­
tutional values."157 The subconstitutional character of RFRA's federal 
applications, which obviates the first problem Professor Devins identi­
fies, should deter the Court from repeating the second. 
2. Usurping the Power to Decide: The Argument 
from United States v. Klein 
A second form of structural objection that encompasses Federal 
RFRA posits that Congress employed an unconstitutionally heavy 
question of what it might mean to take the Constitution seriously as a source of guidance."); 
Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of 
Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 485-501 (1987). 
153. See, e.g. , Smith, supra note 1 13, at 650-57 (urging deliberative dialogue over relig­
ion between Court and Congress in context of proposal for religious equality statute). 
154. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Constitutional Expansion, supra note 110, at 617 ("the pro­
tection of additional rights is inherently desirable under the Constitution"); Eskridge & 
Frickey, supra note 151, at 77 (advocating more aggressive judicial review of congressional 
enactments that limit personal rights). 
155. RFRA's advocates and critics alike have made this point. Compare Berg, Congress, 
supra note 26, at 28-29 & n.123 (citing scholarly commentary for the position "that legislative 
action usually provides a firmer foundation for protection of civil liberties than do judicial 
decisions"), and Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 257 (arguing that "part of the genius of sepa­
ration of powers is that all three branches can protect liberty when motivated to do so"), 
with Devins, supra note 127, at 660 ("Ever since Thomas Jefferson declared the Alien and 
Sedition Act . . .  a constitutional 'nullity' . . .  the executive and legislative branches have lim­
ited the effects of court rulings, more often than not by providing for greater individual 
rights protection than the judiciary."). The concern, of course, is not a remote one. See 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 151, at 27 (describing 1990s as "a decade of downscaling in 
American public law" characterized by "the Rehnquist Court's comparative reluctance to 
expand, or in some cases even to protect, established constitutional rights of individuals"); 
Laycock, Act, supra note 25 at 257 (noting that in recent years "Congress has been more in­
terested in protecting liberty than the Court has been"). 
156. Devins, supra note 127, at 647; see also id. at 658 ("RFRA's slash and burn ap­
proach to dialogues between the Court and elected government promotes acrimony between 
the branches and little else."). 
157. Id. at 647; see also id. at 662 (criticizing Boerne for "formalistic rhetoric" that "�ug­
gests an institutional compartmentalization that is overly parochial, ultimately shortsighted, 
and factually inaccurate"). 
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hand to dictate federal courts' decisions in free exercise cases. This ar­
gument, pressed by Professors Eisgruber and Sager158 and also raised 
by Professor Gressman,159 maintains that RFRA's mandate of strict 
scrutiny for religious freedom claims "insists that the Court adopt a 
legal test that the Court has repudiated,"160 thereby "conscript[ing] . . .  
the Court . . . to play a role in a charade - a charade in which the 
Court is obliged to act as though its own judgment about a matter of 
consequence is different than it actually is."161 Where the Marbury 
objection focuses on the Court's interpretive authority, this second 
version of the structural objection posits that Congress in RFRA inter­
fered with courts' decisional authority. Professor Gressman charges 
that "RFRA represents an unprecedented effort by Congress to exe­
cute one of the core functions of the Court, the delicate function of in-
158. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1309-11; Eisgruber & Sager, 
Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 469-73; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, 
Protecting Without Favoring Religiously Motivated Conduct, 2 NEXUS 103, 107-08 (Fall 
1997) (hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting]; Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra 
note 36, at 135-36; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 
86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2532-35 (1998). Professor Sager has expressly invoked Klein as a basis for 
striking down the federal law applications of RFRA. See id. at 2533 (arguing that "Klein re­
mains a good and sufficient reason to invalidate RFRA in (its] second, federal, life"). The 
structural argument advanced by Professors Eisgruber and Sager is closely linked to their 
objections to RFRA based on both what I label "substantive institutional competence" and 
the Establishment Clause. See infra notes 245-246, 321-328 and accompanying text; cf 
Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 136 (arguing that RFRA violates Klein 
because "Congress simply told the judiciary to do something it knew the judiciary had de­
clared to be impossible"); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 472 
(equating "charade" imposed by RFRA in violation of Klein with "a false endorsement of 
religion as especially privileged by the Constitution"); see also Meltzer, supra note 1 10, at 
2549 (posing question whether Sager's articulation of Klein-based objection to RFRA de­
pends on an underlying appeal to the Establishment Clause); Sager, supra note 158, at 2533 
(maintaining that "RFRA could violate Klein whether or not it violated the Establishment 
Clause as well"). 
159. See Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 83-84 (arguing that Klein "supplies an­
other precedential nail in RFRA's constitutional coffin"); Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, 
at 517 & n.36; Gressman & Cannella, supra note 84, at 134-37; see also Ira Bloom, Prisons, 
Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall Separating Legislative from Judicial 
Power, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 390-91 (1998) (favorably discussing Boerne at outset of article 
that accuses Congress of frequently violating Klein); Mallamud, supra note 130, at 55-56 
(suggesting that RFRA resembles the statute struck down in Klein); Van Alstyne, supra note 
50, at 309-14 (discussing Klein in argument that RFRA exceeded congressional authority 
under Section 5); cf J. Richard Broughton, Boerne Down the House: The Religious Liberty 
Protection Act and the Separation of Powers, 2000 DET. C.L. REV. 317, 350 (arguing that 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999), violated separation 
of powers by "requiring courts to prefer Congress's view of the Free Exercise Clause to the 
view that the Supreme Court has already expressed in a final judgment on the matter and 
one in which it expressly rejects the congressional view"). 
160. Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 443. 
161. Id. at 471 ;  see also Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1310; Eisgruber 
& Sager, Protecting, supra note 158, at 108 (maintaining that RFRA violates separation of 
powers because "to enforce RFRA, the Court had to behave as though it were applying a 
constitutional test which was, in its judgment, unworkable") (emphasis added); Eisgruber & 
Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 136. 
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terpreting the Constitution and applying that interpretation to specific 
cases and controversies."162 The answer to the Marbury objection -
that Congress in RFRA did not invade the Court's interpretive do­
main 163 - does not suffice to answer this second form of structural 
objection, because Federal RFRA certainly will require courts to de­
cide cases differently than they would have absent the statute. Rather, 
the problem with this objection is that it condemns Congress for doing 
exactly what Congress is supposed to do. 
The second version of the structural objection invokes the Court's 
repudiation, in the 1871 case of United States v. Klein,164 of a blatant 
congressional attempt to countermand the Court's constitutional 
judgment. Prior to Klein, the Supreme Court had held that a presiden­
tial pardon was sufficient proof of loyalty for former Confederate 
sympathizers who, pursuant to a federal statute, sought to recover 
property the federal government had seized from them during the 
Civil War.165 Congress, unhappy with the Court's holding, passed a 
new statute that made a pardon a conclusive presumption of disloyalty 
and that relieved the Court of Claims and Supreme Court of appellate 
jurisdiction in any case where the granting of a pardon was proved.166 
In Klein, the Court struck down the statute as contrary to the separa­
tion of powers. The Court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the 
Court found that Congress impermissibly had "prescribe[ d] a rule in 
conformity with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction 
[previously] conferred, because and only because its decision, in ac­
cordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and fa­
vorable to the suitor."167 Second, the statute "impair[ed] the effect of a 
pardon, and thus infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Execu­
tive. "168 
Reliance on Klein by RFRA's critics reflects a misapprehension of 
that case. Granting the first Klein principle sufficient independent 
force to undermine RFRA would lead to results the Klein Court can­
not have intended. If Klein meant Congress may not change a rule of 
decision previously applied by courts, then numerous federal statutes 
would be invalid.169 If Klein meant Congress may not attempt to influ-
162. Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 74 (emphasis added). 
163. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text. 
164. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
165. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869). 
166. Appropriation Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235 (1870). 
167. Klein, 80 U.S. at 147. 
168. Id. 
169. See Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2540-43, 2545-48 (discussing statutes that alter pre­
viously announced judicial rules of decision and therefore would be threatened under broad 
reading of first Klein principle). One interesting, as-yet unadjudicated instance of congres­
sional alteration of a rule of decision is the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 
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ence substantive outcomes by limiting the Court's appellate jurisdic­
tion, then the principle of Ex Parte McCardle110 would be cast into 
doubt. If Klein meant Congress may not tell courts how to decide 
cases involving statutory rights, then legislative discretion to define the 
substance of statutory rights would be severely compromised.171 The 
Supreme Court, which in recent years has had two opportunities to 
apply the first Klein principle, instead has gone out of its way to dis­
tinguish the case.172 Likewise, the leading Federal Courts treatise sug­
gests that Klein "hold[s] no more than that an unconstitutional inva­
sion of the judicial function occurs when Congress purports . . .  to bind 
the Court to reach a result that is independently unconstitutional."173 
The best understanding of the first Klein principle is that it merely 
augments the second by expressly barring Congress from using its 
power to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction as a means toward a 
substantive unconstitutional end, such as usurping executive power.174 
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (Supp. IV 1998), which announces new substantive standards for courts 
to apply in cases challenging prison conditions. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) 
(leaving open question of standards' constitutionality); Bloom, supra note 159, at 406-14 (ar­
guing that PLRA standards are unconstitutional .under Klein); see also infra notes 355-358 
and accompanying text (discussing Miller Court's construction of PLRA's automatic stay 
provision). 
170. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding pursuant to Exceptions Clause, Art. III, § 2, 
cl. 2, that Congress has broad power to limit or withdraw the Supreme Court's appellate ju­
risdiction). 
171. See Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Soµrces, Alterna­
tive Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2613 (1998) (rejecting reading of Klein 
as barring Congress from telling courts how to decide cases because " legislation often affects 
- if not directs - the outcome of litigation"). Professor Sager acknowledges that reading 
Klein to preclude Congress from altering a statutory right by telling courts how to decide 
cases that implicate the right would "exalt form over substance." Sager, supra note 158, at 
2526. . . 
172. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (Scalia, J.) (distin­
guishing Klein on the ground that statute that retroactively altered limitations period "d[id] 
set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply, and in that sense change[d] the 
law"); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (Thomas, J.) (declining 
to consider whether Klein prohibited Congress from enacting statutes that direct decisions in 
pending cases without amending any law, based on conclusion that statute settling pending 
disputes over timber amended applicable law); cf Bloom, supra note 159, at 397-98 (criti­
cizing Robertson and arguing that timber settlement violated Klein). 
173. RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 369-70 (4th ed. 1996); see also Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2538-
39 (discussing narrow reading of Klein). In fact, Federal RFRA is more likely to violate the 
second Klein principle than the first. The Act applies to any "official . . .  of the United 
States," 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1994) (amended 1997), and it governs "all [f]ederal . . .  law, 
and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 
(1994) (amended 1997). That language appears to encompass executive orders, agreements, 
and even treaties. If a claimant invoked Federal RFRA to gain relief from the effects of an 
executive action that rested on a specific constitutional grant of authority to the president, 
the reviewing court might appropriately invoke Klein to safeguard presidential authority. 
174. Call this the "hybrid wrongs" explanation of the first Klein principle. See supra note 
21 (discussing Smith Court's distinction of "hybrid rights" claims under Free Exercise 
Clause). · 
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Aside from the hazards of a strong reading of the first Klein prin­
ciple; the analogy between Klein and Federal RFRA is strained. 
RFRA's heightened scrutiny standard does not impose anything close 
to conclusive presumptions on litigation, as the modest success rate of 
early RFRA claims confirms.175 The Act certainly does not direct out­
comes in the federal government's favor;176 quite the contrary, its cen­
tral purpose is to disadvantage the government in religious freedom 
cases. RFRA does not direct outcomes in specific cases but merely 
creates a statutory rule for application over an entire category of cases 
involving an unpredictable range of parties and factual circum­
stances.177 Finally, as discussed above, Federal RFRA announces no 
constitutional standard, and thus it simply lacks the capacity to affect 
the decision in any constitutional case.178 By setting a legal standard 
and instructing courts to apply it, Federal RFRA does what countless 
other statutes do. It is distinct only in that its rule applies across the 
board to religious freedom claims against all applications of federal 
law.119 
None of the Court's major statements on the conflict between leg­
islative and judicial power is squarely on point with Federal RFRA, 
because all have involved situations in which Congress altered results 
in pending or prior court cases.180 The most salient comparisons are to 
175. See infra notes 265-267 and accompanying text. 
176. The Court emphasized this aspect of Klein when it.described the first Klein princi­
ple in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980) (stating that Congress in Klein 
"prescribed a rule of decision in a case pending before the courts, and did so in a manner 
that required the courts to decide a controversy in the [g]overnment's favor"). 
177. See supra note 110. 
178. See supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text. A variation on the Klein objection 
emphasizes the expressive character of judicial decisions: "The judiciary will not permit its 
articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment; the ju­
diciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact 
disagrees." Sager, supra note 158, at 2529 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 2534-35 (arguing 
that essence of first Klein principle is to prevent public spectacle of Congress's forcing judi­
ciary to adjudicate based on standards with which judiciary disagrees); Eisgruber & Sager, 
Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 471 (arguing that RFRA violates Klein because any court 
that applies RFRA "is being asked to assume the role of a false conscience"); Meltzer, supra 
note 110, at 2540 (agreeing that first Klein principle means "Congress may not compel the 
courts to speak a constitutional untruth" but advocating substantially narrower view of that 
principle than Sager advances). This is the mirror image of the Marbury obj ection's empha­
sis on constitutional language. There, the concern is with the impact of RFRA's constitu­
tional rhetoric. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text. Here, the concern is with the 
impact of the constitutional rhetoric RFRA elicits from courts. The answer is the same: Fed­
eral RFRA is not a constitutional rule, and thus it has no impact on our understanding of 
constitutional principles. See Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2543-49 (refuting Sager's rhetoric­
focused version of Klein objection). 
179. See supra Section II.B. 
180. In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) 
(rejecting separation of powers challenge to statutory provision that imposes automatic stay 
of previously entered injunctive relief when inj unction is challenged under new statutory 
standard); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (striking down on separation of 
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United States v. Sioux Nation181 and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co. 182 In both of those cases Congress changed the law 
in order to reverse the effects of prior court decisions. In each instance 
the Court upheld Congress's action as a valid change to the underlying 
law. The statutes in both cases posed greater threats to judicial 
authority than Federal RFRA does, because they altered previously 
settled outcomes in specific disputes. In addition, Sioux Nation en­
tailed congressional waiver of "legal defenses based upon doctrines 
central to the courts' structural independence."183 Both cases differ 
from Klein primarily in that Congress's underlying policy goals did not 
violate the Constitution. Sioux Nation and Wheeling Bridge establish 
that Congress does not usurp judicial power simply by telling the 
Court to adjudicate a claim or set of claims under a different rule than 
th.e one the Court developed prior to receiving any congressional 
guidance. Sioux Nation makes that conclusion especially clear for cir­
cumstances in which Congress has acted. against the government's in­
terest.184 The two decisions also strengthen the conclusion that any ar­
gument that RFRA violates Klein must appeal to some independent 
constitutional violation.185 
Beyond the logical failings of the arguments from Marbury and 
Klein, prudential considerations should compel the Court to respect 
Congress's precommitment in Federal RFRA to protect religious 
freedom. A judicial declaration that a statute intrudes on courts' 
authority, especially in an area of acute political concern like religious 
liberty, necessarily disturbs interbranch comity and restricts the vigor­
ous give and take that characterizes robust government.186 Such a 
powers grounds congressional effort to apply a new, more generous statute of limitations 
retroactively to reopen final judgments of dismissal); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 
503 U.S. 429 (1992) (upholding against separation of powers challenge federal statute that 
prescribed outcomes in pending cases involving timber claims); Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 409 (1792) (establishing principle that Congress may not authorize Executive Branch 
officials to review judicial decisions). 
181. 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (sustaining against separation of powers challenge a statute 
that required Court of Claims to rehear Native American tribe's claim against the govern­
ment without regard to res judicata or collateral estoppel defenses, even though that court 
previously had rejected the claim). 
182. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855) [hereinafter Wheeling Bridge II] (sustaining 
against separation of powers challenge a statute that, in contravention of Court's prior order 
that a bridge be altered or removed because it unlawfully interfered with navigation, de­
clared bridge a "lawful structure[]" and thus authorized its reconstruction). 
183. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 230-32 (discussing congressional waiver in Sioux Nation of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel defenses). 
184. See supra text accompanying note 176. 
185. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. As above, the discussion in this section 
rests on the premise that Federal RFRA does not violate the Establishment Clause. I justify 
that premise at length below. See infra Part III. 
186. See supra notes 151-157 and accompanying text. 
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declaration is a constitutional trump, analogous to Congress's constitu­
tional authority to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, 187 albeit less 
potent. Prudence dictates that these trumps should be instruments of 
last resort. The Court, for its part, should restrict action to protect its 
own territory against otherwise valid congressional action to instances 
where Congress invades the judicial domain in such a manner or to 
such an extent that the Court can preserve the structural integrity of 
government only by rejecting the congressional action.188 The invalida­
tion of Federal RFRA urged by the structural critics would intensify 
interbranch conflict, thus threatening just the sort of governmental 
tumult these critics fear from RFRA itself, while also denying a legis­
lative effort to expand rights.189. 
187. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (defining appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court 
subject to "such Exceptions, and 'under such Regulations as the Congress shall make"); Ex 
parte McCardle, 74 U:S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (dismissing appeal on authority of statute strip­
ping Court of jurisdiction). For discussion of the proper scope of congressional power under 
the Exceptions Clause, see, for example, Symposium, Congress and the Courts: Jurisdiction 
and Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998); Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Juris­
diction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Gerald Gunther, Congressional 
Power To Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme 
Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Exami­
nation, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982). 
188. See David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits 
on Congress' Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2506-10 (1998) (praising 
Court's historic tendency to construe congressional efforts to limit courts' jurisdiction nar­
rowly enough to preserve sufficient jurisdiction to satisfy apparent constitutional standards, 
rather than addressing constitutional issues directly); Devins, supra note 127, at 661 
("Balance-of-powers disputes, in particular, are best resolved through [a] process of give­
and-take between the branches."); Friedman, supra note 150, at 771, 777-78 (suggesting 
value of moderation in both legislative and judicial use of constitutional trumps); Meltzer, 
supra note 110, at 2543 (contending that "the Court needs to have . . .  a strong moral or po­
litical justification for broadly curtailing the authority of legislative (and other) institu­
tions"); cf Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing for a dialogic process between Congress 
and Court to determine boundaries of federal judicial power). 
189. Calls for judicial retaliation based on RFRA's legislative history are especially dis­
turbing. Professors Gressman and Carmella, for example, argue that the Court should strike 
down RFRA as an "incursion[] by Congress into the independent kingdom of the judiciary" 
based in part on "repeated statements by RFRA's sponsors that [their] real purpose is to 
overrule Smith." Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 122, 123 n.237; see also id. at 93 
(stressing that "(m]embers of Congress . . .  [called Smith] an infamous, disastrous, unfortu­
nate, mischievous, dastardly, and ill-advised opinion that should and must be 'overruled' ") 
(citation omitted); id. at 133; id. at 139 n.283; Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 77-78 
(basing argument that RFRA is unconstitutional on "[t]he entire legislative history of 
RFRA, supplemented by the later statements of its ardent defenders"). For the Court to use 
such second-hand evidence of motive where legislative purpose made a substantive constitu­
tional difference would be problematic enough. Cf infra notes 311-313 and accompanying 
text (discussing limits of appropriate judicial inquiry into legislative purpose under Estab­
lishment Clause). To invoke legislative vitriol as. an independent basis for holding that 
Congress exceeded its powers woulci provoke the political branches needlessly. 
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D. The Institutional Competence Objection: RFRA and the .Court's 
Power to Constrain Judicial Methodology 
The final separation of powers objection to Federal RFRA, the in­
stitutional competence objection, implicates not RFRA's legislative 
methodology of precommitment but rather the Act's requirement that 
courts apply the judicial methodology of strict scrutiny in religious 
freedom challenges to neutral applications of federal law. The institu­
tional competence critics emphasize that the Court in Employment 
Division v. Smith190 categorically rejected the judicial inquires into re­
ligious substance that are necessary for strict scrutiny.191 Having an­
nounced that limit on judicial competence, these commentators main­
tain, the Court had to reject Congress's attempt, through RFRA, to 
force courts to make just that sort of inquiry. In questioning the 
mechanism by which Congress sought to enforce Federal RFRA's 
precommitment to safeguard religious freedom, the institutional com­
petence challenge is the RFRA analog to the arguments that doomed 
the federal line-item veto.192 Critics have articulated two variations on 
the institutional competence objection: that RFRA encroaches on the 
Court's fundamental power to assess which issues judges are capable 
of deciding, and that RFRA runs afoul of a substantive judgment 
about religious freedom implicit in the Smith account of judicial com­
petence. 
190. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
191. See Smith, 494 U.S at 887 (citations omitted):. 
What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that 
a particular act is "central" to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious 
practices is akin to the unacceptable "business of evaluating the relative merits of differing 
religious claims." . . .  Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts 
must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility 
of a religious claim. 
The Smith Court's rejection of substantive inquiries into religious doctrine was not 
novel. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988) 
(stating that judicial determination of which lands are "central" to a religion "would require 
[the Court] to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs. 
We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our precedents, 
and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play."); Thomas 
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) ("[The] guarantee of free exercise is not limited 
to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect. . . .  [I]t is not within the 
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire [who] more correctly perceived the 
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."); Ser­
bian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976) (noting that, because judi­
cial resolution of controversies over religious doctrine and practice jeopardizes First 
Amendment values, courts are bound to the decisions of church judicatories regarding such 
controversies). 
192. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's rejection of the 
Line Item Veto Act provides no more than an analogy to Federal RFRA. That statute failed 
because it gave the president excessive discretion in violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. See 
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
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1. Pure institutional Competence 
The first version of the institutional competence objection claims 
that Smith authoritatively denied that courts have the capacity to de­
termine whether a given religious practice is sufficiently "central" to a 
plaintiff's religious belief that interference with that practice "substan­
tially burden[s]" her exercise of that belief.193 According to Daniel 
Conkle, "[t]he Court [in Smith] especially objected to the prospect of 
balancing religious claims against competing state interests in a wide 
variety of possible contexts, a task for which, according to the Court, 
judges are not well-suited."194 Joanne Brant concludes that this judicial 
rejection of free exercise balancing is "the only intelligible basis for 
the Smith opinion"195 and maintains that "the Court's power to make 
decisions based on this line of reasoning cannot be doubted" because 
"[e]ach branch of government has the inherent power to determine its 
own limitations."196 Thus, Congress's direction in RFRA of a standard 
that requires such balancing violates the separation of powers.197 
193. See Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591, 600 n.8 (D. Md. 1996); 
Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and 
Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995); see also Scott C. Idleman, The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 266-
67 (1994) (arguing that the difficulty of defining a "substantial[] burden" on religious exer­
cise renders RFRA a dangerously manipulable statute). 
194. Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 57 (citation omitted). 
Professor Conkle expressly objects only to RFRA's state and local applications. See id. at 40. 
But his arguments, articulated prior to Boerne, apply to the Act's federal applications as 
well, insofar as he believes the Act countermands the Smith Court's authoritative assessment 
of judicial competence or violates the Establishment Clause. 
195; Brant, supra note 193, at 13; see also id. at 17 ("Smith is not a decision about 
authority: jurisdictional, constitutional or otherwise. It is a decision grounded in the Court's 
somewhat inchoate concerns about institutional limitations."); Berg, Congress, supra note 
26, at 8-9 ("Smith's rule was based on 'judicial restraint' and institutional concerns related to 
the separation of powers . . .  balancing the relative importance of the religious claim against 
the governmental interest gave too much discretion to unelected and unaccountable 
judges"); Layock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 31-33 (characterizing and attacking Smith as a 
rejection of balancing generally); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 59 (calling Smith "a deci­
sion about institutional arrangements more than about substantive merits"); Michael W. 
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 685, 736 (1992) [hi<reinafter McConnell, Update] ("The principal argument 
in Smith is that judges are institutionally incapable of engaging in the balance between re­
ligious conscience and the interests of the government that free exercise accommodations 
are said to require."). But see Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at 663-71 (arguing that Smith 
reflected both substantive and institutional concerns). 
196. Brant, supra note 193, at 19. 
197. Douglas Laycock and others have attempted to portray the institutional compe­
tence strand of Smith as merely a statement that "the Court does not want final responsibil­
ity for applying the compelling interest test to religious conduct." Laycock, Act, supra note 
25, at 252 (emphasis added); see also Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 745 
(summarily rejecting the "pure institutional competence" objection on the ground that the 
Smith Court was merely practicing judicial restraint, not defining the limits of its compe­
tence); Paulsen, supra note 13, at 253 n.11 (same); Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 
12, at 1491-92 (same). On this reading, RFRA presented no problem under Smith because 
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An initial flaw in the pure institutional competence objection is 
that RFRA does not necessarily require balancing.198 Rather, a claim­
ant must meet the substantial burden threshold, and the government 
must then show that the burden imposed is the least restrictive means 
of accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. Even assuming 
RFRA will prompt a balancing analysis in many cases, the Court 
should resist any inclination to strike down Federal RFRA based on 
the pure institutional competence strand of Smith for two reasons. 
First, Smith on this reading depends on an unprecedented and un­
workable mandate for the Court to define judicial competence. Sec­
ond, to whatever extent the Smith Court acted within its authority to 
abjure judicial competence to perform the analysis required by 
RFRA, it erred by presuming that strict scrutiny requires Courts to 
determine the "centrality" of claimants' burdened religious prac­
tices.199 
"Congress, rather than the Court, will retain the ultimate responsibility for the continuation 
and interpretation of [religious accommo9ations]." Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 253. On 
Professor Brant's reading, however, Smith flatly denied courts' capacity to perform the 
analysis mandated by RFRA. Even the availability of a legislative corrective does not elimi­
nate that concern. A court might make matters worse by its incompetent attempt at analysis, 
thereby tainting subsequent legislative deliberations, or any number of institutional con­
straints might prevent Congress from correcting an errant judicial decision, thereby giving 
the court the last word. 
198. In a recent amendment to RFRA, Congress may have muted the pure institu­
tional competence objection as to future cases. The Religious Land Use and Institutional­
ized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIP A) defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to a system of religious belief." Pub. L. No. 
106-274, § 8(7)(A), 114 Stat. 803, 807 (Sept. 22, 2000). RLUIPA extends that definition to 
RFRA, replacing RFRA's original language that defined "religious exercise" as "the exer­
cise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution." See id § 7(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3, 2000bb-2(4) (2001). The amended definition seems likely to encourage the alternatives 
to centrality analysis discussed infra notes 222-234 and accompanying text. See, e.g. , 
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960-61 (10th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that amended defini­
tion of "religious exercise" relieved RFRA claimant from having to show that religious prac­
tice at issue was mandatory). 
199. Several commentators have dismissed the pure institutional competence critique by 
arguing that the Smith Court could not have meant that courts cannot adjudicate religious 
freedom claims under strict scrutiny, because the Smith Court itself allowed for such adjudi­
cation in "hybrid rights" cases. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 & n.1 (1990); 
see Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 744-45; Lupu, Codification, supra note 83, 
at 589. That argument, however, presumes the Smith "hybrid rights" doctrine reflects a co­
herent and principled distinction of Sherbert and Yoder that entails a true free exercise 
analysis. In fact, the least problematic account of the "hybrid rights" exception is that its re­
quirement of a second constitutional claim independently amenable to adjudication (e.g., 
free speech or due process) obviates the need to analyze the free exercise claim at all. See 
supra note 21. The Smith Court's continued allowance for strict scrutiny in cases that involve 
"system[s] of individualized exemption[]," Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, or burdens targeted at re­
ligion, id. at 877-78, also has been noted. See Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 
744-45. Both of those categories, however, involve willful discrimination. See Eisgruber & 
Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1287-88 (arguing that denials of religious exemptions in 
unemployment benefit cases reflected failure of equal regard for religious beliefs); Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down ordinance on 
ground of purposeful discrimination against a religious practice). Such discrimination creates 
a presumption of invalidity that effectively obviates the need to invoke RFRA. The even 
1948 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1903 
The notion that the Supreme Court may limit categorically the 
types of issues courts are capable of deciding is highly problematic. 
The closest analogues in federal law are the abstention doctrines200 and 
the requirement of a judicially manageable standard as a baseline for 
distinguishing judicially cognizable matters from political questions.201 
But those doctrines differ dramatically from the pure institutional 
competence reading of Smith. Both abstention and the refusal to adju­
dicate absent judicially manageable standards reflect judicial self­
limitation and deference to the power of coordinate branches or dis­
tinct sovereigns. The Court will declare an absence of judicially man­
ageable standards where it is in danger of usurping legislative or 
agency decisionmaking authority.202 Similarly, federal courts abstain 
from decision to avoid usurping state courts' authority to construe the 
meaning of state statutes.203 In contrast, reading Smith as an authorita­
tive statement on judicial competence would allow the Court to abjure 
decision - and in this case, to strike down a federal statute - based 
not on deference to the power of a coordinate branch or distinct sov-
broader argument that the pure institutional competence critique fails because courts apply 
heightened scrutiny in other circumstances, see McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at 
191-92, simply denies the premise that religion differs at all from other characteristics that 
entail heightened scrutiny and thus fails to confront Smith on its own terms. 
200. See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts 
should abstain from deciding a constitutional issue pending a definitive ruling by a state 
court on a matter of state law that could resolve the controversy); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 
U.S. 51, 54-55 (1973) (holding that where challenged state statute is susceptible of construc­
tion by state court that would avoid or modify necessity of reaching federal constitutional 
question, the federal courts should abstain); see also Brant, supra note 193, at 25 (comparing 
pure institutional competence reading of Smith to Pullman abstention doctrine). 
201. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that the lack of a judicially 
manageable standard indicates that the Constitution has committed the issue to another 
branch of government, making the controversy nonjusticiable); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1961) (holding that the lack of a judicially discoverable and manageable standard for re­
solving a case indicates that resolution of the issue may be better handled by another branch 
of government); cf Brant, supra note 193, at 22-25 (comparing the pure institutional compe­
tence reading of Smith to the political question doctrine and the requirement of a judicially 
manageable standard); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 59 (considering Smith as a "political 
question case, holding that judicially manageable standards for the resolution of Free Exer­
cise exemption claims are lacking"). 
202. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-10 (holding challenge to state legislative apportionment 
within judicial competence). Qualitative difficulties in managing constitutional standards are 
common outside the political question setting. See Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 760; 
McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at 737. 
203. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976) (stating in general that where a 
state statute has not been construed by the state courts and is susceptible to a reading which 
would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge, the district court 
should abstain from passing on the constitutionality of the statute); Harris County Comm'rs 
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1975) (concluding that where the uncertain status of a 
local law stems from the unsettled relationship between the state constitution and a statute, 
the district court should abstain from determining the constitutionality of the local law until 
the state court can construe the state statute); see also Brant, supra note 193, at 25 (acknowl­
edging that "[a)bstention is rooted in considerations of federalism and comity"). 
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ereign but on the Court's conclusion that a legal concept simply defied 
application. For the Court to strike down RFRA as in excess of legis­
lative power by reference to doctrines whose purpose is to rein in judi­
cial power would be perverse.204 
Professor Brant points to Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife205 as an­
other analog to the idea of rejecting RFRA based on the Court's as­
sessment that the judicial branch lacks competence to balance relig­
ious claims against state interests.206 In Lujan the Court rejected 
Congress's decision to allow citizen suits under the Endangered Spe­
cies Act207 because Congress purportedly had authorized plaintiffs to 
sue the government absent any "injury-in-fact," a requirement for 
standing under Article III.208 Lujan, however, differs critically from 
Professor Brant's reading of Smith, for the same reason the abstention 
and political question doctrines do: it is a decision not about compe­
tence but about authority. The Lujan Court held squarely that the 
Constitution did not authorize courts to decide the kind of cases 
Congress directed them to decide in the citizen suit provision. It did 
not hold that courts had authority to decide such cases but lacked the 
capacity to do so.209 
Even aside from the dearth of precedent, the validity of sua sponte 
judicial denials of institutional competence within the scheme of sepa­
ration of powers is highly questionable. The Constitution gives 
Congress broad power to control the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
204. Cf Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 33-36 (characterizing Smith decision as 
"Ll]udicial activism in pursuit of judicial minimalism"); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 
50, at 191 (suggesting, in context of criticizing Section 5 holding of Boerne, that Congress has 
authority to supersede Supreme Court's declaration of institutional incompetence, because 
Congress lacks the institutional limitations that inspire such a declaration); Resnik, supra 
note 171, at 2614-15 (discussing phenomenon of Court's rejecting litigation authorized by 
Congress). 
205. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
206. See Brant, supra note 193, at 26-27. 
207. 16 u.s.c. § 1540(g) (1994). 
208. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-73. For an incisive critique of Lujan, see Cass R. 
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article III, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 163 (1992). 
209. Professor Brant characterizes this critical difference as a mere distinction between 
constitutional and prudential limits on judicial authority, and she suggests that the Lujan 
Court collapsed that distinction. See Brant, supra note 193, at 27 n.96 (noting widely held 
view that Lujan simply "constitutionalized" the prudential rule against standing to raise gen­
eralized grievances, and suggesting a similar move could undermine RFRA). But even the 
"prudential" rule against standing to raise generalized grievances deals with how much 
power the judicial branch should exercise, not merely judicial competence to decide a par­
ticular sort of case. See, e.g. , United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974) ("[T]o 
invoke judicial power the claimant must have a 'personal stake in the outcome,' or a 'par­
ticular, concrete injury,' or 'a direct injury;' in short, something more than 'generalized 
grievances.') (emphasis added; citations omitted). Moreover, the hypothesis that the Lujan 
Court mustered a majority for the unprincipled act of "constitutionalizing" a nonconstitu­
tional rule provides no reason to believe the Court can, let alone should, do so again. 
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diction and the existence of lower federal courts.210 The political 
branches, not the courts, define the particular boundaries within which 
the constitutional judicial power operates. In that context, broad dec­
larations of institutional incompetence by courts, particularly in areas 
that Congress expressly has instructed federal courts to adjudicate, 
seem at least undesirable and perhaps impermissible, absent a sub­
stantive constitutional barrier - federalism or a guarantee of personal 
freedom.211 "The judicial role is defined by the Constitution; the 
Constitution is not defined by changing conceptions of the judicial 
role."212 
Allowing courts to opt out of particular controversies would give 
them far too much opportunity to reach particular outcomes without 
addressing the merits. Imagine that Congress passed a law permitting, 
or requiring, the consideration of statistical evidence in evaluating 
equal protection challenges to capital sentences.213 Could the Supreme 
210. U.S. CONST. art. III ;  see supra note 187. 
211.  Professor Sager has argued that the Court forswears full enforcement of various 
constitutional provisions on "institutional" rather than "analytic" grounds. See Lawrence 
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217-20 (1978). While Professor Sager characterizes such institutional 
self-limitations as "based upon questions of propriety or capacity," id. at 1217 (emphasis 
added), none of his examples mirrors the "pure institutional competence" account of Smith. 
Professor Sager's underenforced constitutional norms reflect either judicial regard for coor­
dinate branches or for state sovereignty, see id. at 1218 (discussing federal courts' refusal to 
enforce equal protection norms against state tax and regulatory measures); uncertain distinc­
tions between institutional and analytic/substantive limitations, see id. at 1220 & n.24 (dis­
cussing substantive due process); or traditions of nonenforcement dating to the inception of 
the norm at issue. See id. at 1219-20 & n.23 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities Clause). Moreover, the increased vitality in the ensuing two decades of the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause, which Professor Sager included among his underenforced 
norms, demonstrates that courts' reasons for declining to tackle a constitutional provision 
may not run any deeper than the normative or intellectual commitments of the judiciary at a 
particular time. 
212. Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 38-39; see also Berg, Constitutional Future, 
supra note 13, at 744 ("Concerns for administrability may be one important factor in the 
courts' choice between constitutional rules, but it hardly follows that such concerns author­
ize the courts to refuse to follow or enforce a statute enacted by Congress."); McConnell, 
Institutions, supra note 50, at 192 ("Although concern about the lack of judicially manage­
able standards is reason for courts to avoid taking upon themselves an inappropriately intru­
sive role, it is not a sufficient reason for refusing a responsibility vested in them by 
Congress."). But see Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland 
Revisited, 1989 Sur. CT. REV. 373, 374-75 (advancing "administrability" argument in favor of 
restricting accommodation of religion). 
213. Such legislation has been proposed. Title XVI of the Omnibus Crime Control Act 
of 1991, the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, would have barred imposition of the death 
penalty on the basis of the race of the defendant or victim; to prove the influence of race in a 
particular case, the Act permitted the use of statistical evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-242 (pt. I), at 153-59 (1991). Professor 
Brant recognizes that such legislation would amount to congressional expansion of rights, see 
Brant, supra note 193, at 34, but she denies that it could "threaten(] the Court's determina­
tion of its institutional capabilities." Id. at 35. Under Professor Brant's view of the Court's 
authority to determine its own institutional competence, however, the accuracy of her pre­
dictive judgment would depend entirely on whether or not the Court chose to characterize 
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Court affirm a capital sentence against a "statistical equal protection" 
challenge by deciding that courts are not competent to consider that 
sort of evidence, without addressing the merits of the petitioner's 
equal protection argument? Similarly, would the Court be justified in 
banning abortion, or in forbidding all restrictions on the right to re­
productive choice, by positing that the distinction between fetus and 
person was dispositive of the constitutional question and then declar­
ing courts institutionally incompetent to draw the requisite line?214 
Such declarations of institutional limits would have the uncomfortable 
appearance of substantive decisions masquerading as judicial restraint. 
Courts have a duty to make what they can of what Congress gives 
them,215 and if their work does not satisfy Congress, it can amend the 
statute.216 
The ultimate problem with the view that the Smith Court authori­
tatively proscribed judicial competence is that no principle would limit 
such judicial authority. Professor Brant, attempting to identify a lim­
iting principle, suggests two possibilities. First, she argues that " [t]he 
Court cannot refuse to enforce an explicit provision of the Constitu­
tion. "217 The major problem with this suggestion is that the Court itself 
has authority to define what is or is not an "explicit" command of the 
Constitution.218 Moreover, Professor Brant never suggests why the dis­
tinction between explicit and implicit provisions, if it can be charted, 
should make a difference in the Court's determination whether or not 
it has the capacity to enforce a constituti?nal provision.219 In any 
the legislation as threatening that authority - a characterization that seems perfectly rea­
sonable. 
214. In fact, abortion is a topic as to which the Court probably is institutionally incom­
petent in some meaningful sense but has shown the fortitude to resolve a difficult constitu­
tional dispute where no path of least resistance was available. In its watershed abortion 
rights decisions, the Court has acknowledged the intractability of the question when life be­
gins but has developed a constitutional jurisprudence based on its best understanding of that 
issue. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, SOS U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13 
(1973). 
21S. Cf W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991) ("Where a statu­
tory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that per­
missible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously 
and subsequently enacted law . . . .  [I]t is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of 
the corpus juris.") (citation omitted). 
216. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at 623 ("If it turns out that RFRA is not easily 
adlninistered, the answer is for Congress to amend or repeal it."); Slnith, supra note 113, at 
684-8S (describing "definitional dialogue" in which Court and Congress may engage to ar­
rive at correct interpretation of statutes); see also supra notes 1Sl-1S7 and accompanying 
text (discussing dialogic approach to implementation of Federal RFRA). 
217. Brant, supra note 193, at 3S (emphasis added); see also id. at 19 (suggesting that a 
determination of institutional competence "amounting to abdication of an essential func­
tion" would not be binding on coordinate branches). 
218. See, e.g. , Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (196S). 
219. As Professor Brant acknowledges, the Court in the past has refused to enforce ex­
plicit constitutional provisions where it concluded that such provisions committed authority 
1952 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1903 
event, a strong argument exists that Smith represents the quintessen� 
tial refusal to enforce an explicit provision of the Constitution: . the 
Free Exercise Clause.220 Second, Professor Brant suggests · that 
Congress may override prudential limits on judicial authority where 
"their relationship to judicial competency is more attenuated than the 
claim made in Smith."221 Here again, however, the Court would appear 
to have the last word on how "attenuated" any prudential limit is from 
its authority to determine judicial competence, and thus the posited 
limiting principle disappears. 
Even assuming the Court owns the sort of power to proscribe the 
judicial role posited by the pure institutional competence critique of 
RFRA, the Smith Court overstated the necessity of "centrality" analy­
sis under strict scrutiny. Courts that apply RFRA have two well­
established alternatives. First, courts can focus on the categorical de­
termination whether a given claim .is "religious" within the meaning of 
the Act.222 This . was the Court's approach in Thomas v. Review 
Board,223 which distinguished between "religious" and "nonreligious" 
conscientious claims224 but accorded great deference to the claimant's 
account of his religious belief.225 Such an inquiry requires sufficient 
deference to ensure that novel or nontraditional religious claims will 
be fully recognized.226 Although defining what is religious is a delicate 
to other branches. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224-26 (1962) (canvassing Guaranty 
Clause cases challenging congressional acti?ns); Brant, supra note 193, at 24-25. 
220. See, e.g. , Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 38-39; McConnell; Revisionism, su­
pra note 21, at 1141-44; see also infra notes 249-255 and accompanying text. Professor Brant 
rejects the notion that Smith abdicated the Court's duty to enforce the Free Exercise Clause: 
"Smith did not find that enforcement of the. Free Exercise Clause was inconsistent with the 
judicial role. The Court merely rejected the use of the compelling interest test and substi­
tuted a neutrality standard. Enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause continues under this 
new standard." Brant, supra note 193, at 28 (citation omitted). This account of Smith is cir­
cular. The question is whether the Court's power to define the competence of the judiciary 
extends to proscribing enforcement of "explicit" constitutional provisions. To reply that the 
Smith Court did no such thing, because the Court continues to enforce a narrowed version of 
the Free Exercise Clause, is no answer if, as Professor Brant posits, the Smith Court's basis 
for narrowing the Free Exercise Clause was its narrow view of judicial competence. 
221. Brant, supra note 193, at 36 (suggesting that Congress could overrule abstention 
doctrines); see also Laycock, Ratchet, supra note 13, at 169 (same). 
222. The contours of this inquiry would depend on the meaning of the term "religion" in 
RFRA, a matter whose resolution may be influenced by Establishment Clause concerns. See 
infra Section III.C. 
223. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
224. Id. at 713 ("Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion."). 
225. See id. at 714 (stating that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consis­
tent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection"). 
226. The Court has long acknowledged this dictate in the free exercise context, stating 
that "it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one 
group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment." Fowler v. Rhode Island, 
345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); see also Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution of Issues About Relig-
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task;227 any complaint that attempting to do so entangles the court ex­
cessively in religious substance228 proves too much. Courts must make 
judgments about what is religious in order to enforce the Religion 
Clauses at all.229 Analysis of whether a practice is religious at all re­
stricts judicial subjectivity far more tightly than does centrality analy­
sis, which asks whether a given practice has an especially important 
religious pedigree. Second, courts can focus on the subjective validity 
of a RFRA claim.230 In Mack v. O'Leary,231 for example, Chief Judge 
ious Conviction, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 461, 463 (1998) (hereinafter Greenawalt, Judicial Reso­
lution] (advocating "a broad approach to what counts as religious"). But see Jonathan C. 
Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 622-28 
(2000) (criticizing deference under RFRA in defining "religion" where exemption at issue 
causes harm to third parties). 
227. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 682-87 (1999) (discussing problems with defining what is relig­
ious); Greenawalt, Religious Law, supra note 25, at 812-16 (describing complexities inherent 
in determining religious character of bill of divorce und.er traditional Jewish law). 
228. See Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 957-58 (expressing concerns that religiosity 
may defy definition and that attempts to define what is religious discriminate against minor­
ity religions); Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 359, 386-88 (arguing that attempts to 
define religions entangle courts in matters of religious substance); Professor Greenawalt also 
has noted the Establishment Clause problem with judicial declarations on "debatable issues 
of religious law," as opposed to "straightforward determinations of religious requirements." 
Greenawalt, Religious Law, supra note 25, at 839. 
229. See Tony anci Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 299 (1985) 
(ncting that lower courts, in assessing religious group's claim that its regulated activity had 
religious purpose, "were correct in scrutinizing the activities at issue by reference to objec­
tively ascertainable facts concerning their nature and scope"); Greenawalt, Judicial Resolu­
tion, supra note 226, at 463-65 (discussing types of cases that require judicial inquiries into 
religiosity); Lipson, supra note 226, at 602 (criticizing courts' reluctance to define religion on 
ground that "(i]t is difficult to see how courts can protect something if they cannot define 
it"); Loewy, supra note 58, at 112-113 (maintaining that some measure of centrality analysis 
is necessary for free exercise adjudication); Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause 
Seriously, · 1986 BYU L. REV. 299, 325-31 (studying courts' tendency to avoid questioning 
religious sincerity or defining religion, and proposing ways in which courts may do so in or­
der to effectuate Free Exercise Clause); see also infra notes 256-261 and accompanying text. 
230. See Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra note 226, at 462-63 (discussing inquiry 
into sincerity as a baseline for accommodation claims); Paulsen, supra note 13, at 277-78 
(explaining that courts focused on the subjective sincerity of religious claimants' beliefs in 
the wake of Sherbert v. Verner, and advocating such an approach to RFRA). Professor Lupu 
and Professor Marshall object to inquiries into subjective validity, just as they object to "re­
ligiosity" inquiries, on grounds of judicial entanglement with questions of religious sub­
stance. See Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 954-57. Marshall, Defense, supra note 23, at 310-
11;  Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 359, 386-88. Professor Marshall encapsulates the 
concern: "[H]ow can one judge the sincerity of an individual's belief without judging the rea­
sonableness of the belief?" Id. at 387; see also id. at 403. The answer is that every credibility 
determination involves a determination of sincerity, and many of those determinations con­
cern unreasonable beliefs. If a court can determine that a party before it is a sincere Nazi or 
misogynist or millenarian, as any number of cases might require, then it must be able to de­
termine whether a party before it sincerely holds a religious view, whether that view appears 
reasonable to the finder of fact or not. The Supreme Court has established that a judicial 
determination of an actor's subjective motivation need not entail any judgment about the 
merits of the motivating thought or idea. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (up­
holding against free speech challenge a statutory penalty enhancement for bias-motivated 
crimes). 
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Posner adopted what he termed a "generous" test for substantial bur­
dens under RFRA, focused on the subjective importance of the bur­
dened religious practice.232 Again, inquiry into the importance of a re­
ligious practice to the claimant herself entails far less judicial meddling 
in matters of religious substance than centrality analysis, which exam­
ines the importance of the practice in the religion's doctrine generally. 
Either of these two alternatives would avoid centrality analysis and 
defuse the pure institutional competence concern.233 Once a court has 
made such a prima facie inquiry, it can proceed to evaluate how se­
verely the government's action impedes the claimant's practice.234 
The extent to which either the religiosity or the subjective impor­
tance approach would ease the prima facie showing required for a 
RFRA claim means courts would need to exercise some control over 
231. 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 801 (1997), on re­
mand, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7239 (N.D. Ill. 1999). . 
232. "[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, within the meaning of the 
Act, is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct, 
inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a person's re­
ligious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs." Mack, 80 
F.3d at 1179. 
233. In addition, under heightened scrutiny "there are also easy cases - cases that can 
be decided without any case-specific balancing whatsoever - and the principles constrain 
judicial discretion. Indeed, in most free exercise cases no 'balancing' is required at all, be­
cause the relevant factors are ones of kind rather than of degree." McConnell, Revisionism, 
supra note 21, at 1145; see also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 757 (contending that prob­
lems of judicial inquiry into centrality "are at the margin" because centrality of some relig­
ious practices lies "beyond reasonable controversy"); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Estab­
lishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 555, 602 (1991) [hereinafter Lupu, Reconstructing] (arguing that balancing is not al­
ways necessary in free exercise cases because "OJudicial decisions must rest on norms that 
transcend the immediate context in which they are applied.") (citation omitted); McConnell, 
Update, supra note 195, at 735 (arguing that inquiries into religiosity and sincerity often are 
unnecessary). Thus, even if the reasoning of Smith did· force courts to abjure all analysis of 
the seriousness of religious freedom claims, many RFRA cases would remain amenable to 
adjudication. 
234. Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 240-41: 
The Court should not say that minor burdens on constitutional rights require no justification. 
Rather, it should say that minor burdens require justification proportionate to the burden -
that the state's interest must compellingly outweigh the burden on the constitutional 
right. . . .  
It is only common sense to recognize that a minor burden on a right may be justified by a 
less compelling interest than a total prohibition on the same right. 
To the extent such an analysis "require[s] both empirical guesswork and delicate compu­
tations of tradeoffs," Brant, supra note 193, at 17, it is no more or less problematic under 
RFRA than under any other scheme that employs strict scrutiny. Courts always have had to 
contend with the question "what public purposes are sufficiently important that they justify 
limiting rights of conscience." Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution 'Or Protec­
tion of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819, 826-27 (1998) (hereinafter McConnell, 
Historical Arguments]; see id. at 822-32 (examining historical roots of religious accommoda­
tion doctrine). Neither the Smith rule nor RFRA nor any other formulation of religious ac­
commodation doctrine can obviate that question. 
August 2001] RFRA and Federal Law 1955 
the Act's reach on the back end, by sympathetically considering the 
government's asserted "compelling interest."235 This imperative to 
take serious account of the government's interest raises two concerns. 
First, courts might fall into a pattern of overly credulous acceptance of 
the government's asserted interests, a serious problem under pre­
Smith jurisprudence.236 Although this problem could dilute the force of 
RFRA, it is preferable to the alternatives of no protection on one side 
and rule of law problems on the other. The scheme of RFRA compels 
some measure of trust - backed up by legislative oversight - that 
courts will implement the Act with sensitivity to the religious liberty 
interests that prompted the Act as well as the genuine societal inter­
ests that-sometimes trump them.237 
Second, the Smith Court warned that the proven integrity of the 
compelling interest standard, established in the free speech, equal pro­
tection, and Dormant Commerce Clause contexts, would be under­
mined by a more credulous jurisprudential approach to strict scrutiny 
in religious freedom cases.238 As an initial matter, this concern seems 
somewhat gratuitous, given that strict scrutiny still applies after Smith 
in constitutional religious accommodation cases that involve either so­
called "hybrid rights" or government actions other than generally ap­
plicable laws.239 In any event, congressionally directed strict scrutiny 
under RFRA need no more affect the meaning of constitutional strict 
scrutiny generally than it affects the meaning of the Free Exercise 
235. See Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra note 226, at 469 (discussing judicial 
strategies for adjusting strict scrutiny in religious freedom cases if sincere motivation became 
the only test for a substantial burden); Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 948 ("At the level of 
claim definition, as well as in the application of the relevant standard of review, free exercise 
adjudication provides seemingly legitimate ways for judges to say no."). 
236. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; Idleman, supra note 193, at 274-80 
(emphasizing manipulability of "compelling interest" standard as a reason to doubt RFRA 
as a substantial guarantor of religious liberty); William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with 
Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 210 (2000) (hereinafter Marshall, Equality] 
(suggesting, based on RFRA and pre-Smith free exercise·cases, that courts tend "to under­
enforce religious exemption claims because of the difficult interpretive steps that religion 
claims require") (citation omitted). 
237. As Michael Paulsen has noted, the universal coverage of RFRA in the federal 
sphere effectively precludes the government from arguing that uniform application of an 
affected law is itself a compelling interest that justifies an exception to RFRA's directive to 
accommodate religion. See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 270-74. 
238. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990); see also Eisgruber & 
Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 452 (arguing that use of strict scrutiny in RFRA 
"will almost certainly have the effect of diluting that test in other contexts where the Court 
has found the test normatively apt and workable in application"); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 
6, at 66 (positing dilution concern); Sherry, supra note 29, at 149 n.103 (same); Volokh, 
Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1500-01 (same). 
239. See McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11 ,  at 3-4. 
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Clause.240 Moreover, the Court has shown no tendency to allow its un­
derstanding of strict scrutiny, including the soft version applied in re­
ligious freedom cases between Sherbert and Smith,241 to bleed from 
one context to another. 
2. Institutional Competence Based on a Substantive Determination 
About Religious Liberty 
Professor Conkle observes that "judicial decisions rejecting 
heightened constitutional scrutiny typically involve a complex inter­
play of substantive and institutional considerations."242 A variation on 
the institutional competence objection reads Smith as an authoritative 
constitutional judgment that the substantive content of the Religion 
Clauses precludes courts from balancing religious claims against gov­
ernment interests.243 This critique does not purport to prove the cor­
rectness of the Court's substantive constitutional judgment; rather, it 
invokes the Court's authority to make that judgment as a reason to 
honor the Court's antecedent methodological judgment. From the 
perspective of the substantive institutional competence critique, the 
Smith Court's authoritative rejection of the methodology of strict scru­
tiny as incompatible with the First Amendment compels invalidation 
of RFRA. 
Professors Eisgruber and Sager portray the Smith Court's holding 
that strict scrutiny of religious exemption claims produced a "constitu­
tional anomaly"244 as meaning that strict scrutiny "does not support 
religious liberty at all, and that even if [RFRA] does not rise to the 
level of an Establishment Clause violation, it works at cross-purposes 
240. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text (explaining that RFRA can have 
no effect on meaning of Free Exercise Clause). 
241. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; see also Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, 
at 64 (maintaining that strict scrutiny as applied in Sherbert and Yoder actually called for 
"judicial evaluation of tradeoffs among the intrusion on liberty, the weight of the state's 
ends, and the relative effectiveness of the intrusion, as compared with other means, for 
reaching those ends"). 
242. Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 66. 
243. See Brant, supra note 193, at 23 ("the [Smith] Court's institutional argument may 
prove to have a foundation in the Establishment Clause"); Conkle, Constitutional Signifi­
cance, supra note 130, at 64-65 ("the Court [in Smith] was concerned that religious equality 
could not be adequately protected by the process of judicial balancing"); Hamilton, Uncon­
stitutional, supra note 14, at 10-12; see also Greenawalt, Amendment, supra note 16, at 696 
(noting that "the separation of powers objection to RFRA approaches the related objection 
that a legislative directive to courts to apply an unmanageable standard for religious exercise 
amounts to an establishment of religion"); Marshall, Equality, supra note 236, at 208-11 
(generally discussing constitutional concerns arising from judicial determinations about mat­
ters of religious substance). But see 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, § 5-16 at 951 n.121 (dismissing 
idea that RFRA's conception of free exercise so clashes with Establishment Clause as to 
render RFRA outside bounds of constitutional power). 
244. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 (citation omitted). 
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with the Court's understanding of religious liberty or other elements 
of constitutional justice."245 Similarly, Eugene Gressman and Angela 
Carmella, who reject the "pure" institutional competence critique of 
RFRA,246 argue that the Smith Court's rejection of strict scrutiny in fa­
vor of a categorical approach to free exercise was a methodological 
decision whose "natural consequence" is a free exercise doctrine that 
affords less protection to religious exercise against the effects of neu­
tral, generally applicable laws.247 For Professors Gressman and 
Carmella, Smith provides the last word on resolving conflicts between 
religious liberty and government's regulatory prerogatives: "Smith re­
jected the balancing approach for generally applicable, facially neutral 
laws and with it the doctrinal formulation that the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause is dependent upon a judicial weighing of religious 
claims and governmental interests."248 
The substantive institutional competence objection turns on an 
unnecessarily sweeping reading of Smith that would diminish protec­
tion of religious freedom far more drastically than the Court appears 
to . have intended. If Smith rejected judicial balancing of religious 
claims against governmental interests not only · as a constitutional 
mandate but also when called for by a statutory system, then the Court 
irreparably skewed the proper institutional roles of Congress and the 
judiciary in protecting religious freedom.249 In Smith, the Court appro­
priated the congressional role of deciding how to deal with the broad 
political issue of religious accommodation and held that the Religion 
Clauses required Congress to decide whether particular accommoda­
tions should be granted.25° Federal RFRA accedes to the Smith read­
ing of the Religion Clauses but attempts a better allocation of institu­
tional roles by announcing a general standard to govern 
accommodations and enlisting the courts to strike proper balances in 
245. Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra· note 36, at 98; see also Eisgruber & Sager, 
Conscience, supra note 21, at 1302-04 (arguing that courts lack capacity to balance compet­
ing interests in many cases that implicate core religious freedom principle of "equal re­
gard"); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 459 {same). 
246. See Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 73-75, 92 & n.116. 
247. See id. at 75-92. 
248. Id. at 86. Professor Gressman reiterates this argum<;mt in_ a post-Boerne article that 
addresses RFRA's federal law applications. · 
249. See Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra note 226, at 471-72 (defending "trouble­
some" judicial line-drawing in religious freedom cases as preferable to alternatives of nonen­
forcement, underenforcement, and overenforcement); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 
50, at 191-92 (arguing that legislatures should set general principles for religious accommo­
dations and courts should adjudicate particular cases). 
250. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (holding that accommodation of religious exercise is 
properly left to the political process rather than to judges who would weigh the social impor­
tance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs). 
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particular cases.251 This arrangement is particularly appropriate in the 
religious freedom setting. The Religion Clauses are designed to pro­
tect minorities from majoritarian tyranny.252 A doctrine of religious 
exemptions that transcends discrete legislative judgments can strongly 
enhance that protection.253 If Smith bars Congress from harnessing the 
courts' adjudicative function in this manner, then the Smith Court se­
verely constrained the constitutional rights of religious minorities and 
251.  Some commentators have argued that, under RFRA's division of labor, courts 
should grant exemptions more freely than they did under the pre-Smith Free Exercise 
Clause because now they are effectuating the (amendable) political will rather than imposing 
their own moral judgments. See Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 29; Volokh, Intermediate 
Questions, supra note 36, at 617-18; Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1487-90. 
That view understates the proper force of courts' constitutional judgments under both the 
Free Exercise Clause (pre-Smith) and the Establishment Clause, see infra Section III.D.1., 
while also confusing courts' duty to effectuate the political will as expressed in statutes with 
a license to legislate from the bench under statutory cover. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, 
at 25 ("A judge who perceives that a legislature has chosen her institutional path rather than 
its own may erroneously interpret such an enactment as more of an affirmation of judicial 
discretion than it is meant to be."). 
252. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) 
("Indeed, it was 'historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave con­
cern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.' ") (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 703 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 638 (1943) (describing Bill of Rights as designed to remove certain interests "from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy"); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative acts that discriminate 
against "discrete and insular minorities"). I argue below that this deeply entrenched princi­
ple of protecting minority religions makes accommodations that equalize the government's 
treatment of similarly situated religious groups acceptable under the Establishment Clause. 
See infra Section IIl.D.2.a. 
253. "To move application of the [compelling interest) test from the courts to lawmak­
ing bodies . . .  would maximize the risks of underprotecting small or unpopular faiths and 
overprotecting large, well-accepted faiths." Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 221; see 
also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 777 ("[L)egislative politics most probably will favor 
dominant religious traditions."); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at 192 ("To insist 
that legislatures deal with 'concrete cases' on an individual basis is an invitation to arbitrari­
ness and favoritism.'') (footnote omitted); Sherry, supra note 29, at 152 (arguing that giving 
legislature responsibility for deciding accommodation claims exacerbates bias against mi­
nority religions already present in judicial determinations). But see Marshall, Equality, supra 
note 236, at 210 (arguing that, under regime of aggressive judicial protection of religious 
freedom, "minority belief systems will undoubtedly be the worse for wear"); Volokh, Com­
mon-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1554 (arguing that "[legislative] exemption-by-exemption 
decisions would neither violate constitutional equality guarantees nor be inherently unfair") 
(footnotes omitted). 
· 
One response is that "RFRA is· largely the majoritarian product of the demands and 
pressures brought by a powerful religious coalition.'' Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 
518; see also Lupu, Codification, supra note 83, at 582-83 (maintaining that RFRA increases 
danger of religious discrimination because its drafting reflects the interests of majority re­
ligions). That argument has force to the extent RFRA raises concerns about competing 
rights that may be undermined by RFRA's heightened protection of religious liberty. See 
infra Part Ill. In the context of minority religions' quest for protection, however, it is difficult 
to argue that judicial review under RFRA is worse than legislative fiat. See infra Section 
III.D.2.a. 
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permanently consigned what remains of those rights to majority will.254 
That would be a strongly undesirable outcome.255 The better reading 
of Smith is that it held strict scrutiny inappropriate for constitutional 
adjudication under the Religion Clauses but not necessarily incom­
patible with the substance of the First Amendment. 
Aside from its unpalatable doctrinal consequences, the substantive 
institutional competence reading of Smith would cause severe inter­
pretive problems for courts in applying the Religion Clauses. The de­
terminations about religious substance necessary for strict scrutiny of 
accommodation claims differ only in degree from the most basic 
judgments about what constitutes "religion" within the meaning of the 
First Amendment.256 If courts could not make such judgments, then 
they could not protect religious exercise even against the sort of inten­
tional and discriminatory attacks that Smith acknowledged courts 
254. This is the state of free exercise doctrine after Smith. Justice Scalia made clear that 
the fate of minority religions under a weakened Free Exercise Clause did not trouble the 
Court: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela­
tive disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoid­
able consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each 
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws 
against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Commentators have condemned the" Smith Court's indifference to 
minority interests. See Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1709, 1727 (2000) ("Smith poignantly illustrates . . .  the reduction in the level of Supreme 
Court protection for nonmainstream religions."); McConnell, Historical Arguments, supra 
note 234, at 824 (arguing that "[w]hile the Smith interpretation of free exercise is adequate 
to ward off religious persecution, it is not adequate to achieve a full liberty of conscience"). 
But see Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 130 (arguing that Smith leaves 
religious minorities with the same degree of legislative protection enjoyed by speech); Ham­
ilton, Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 631 (asserting that minority religions, as "small, organized 
groups," will "do better in the legislative process than disorganized minorities"); Volokh, 
Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1535 (asserting that "[m]ost religious groups in the 
United States today do not lead particularly discrete and insular lifestyles"). 
255. Professors Eisgruber and Sager argue that "legislatures may be better at . . .  the 
general task of accommodating religious interests." Ejsgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra 
note 21, at 1304. They offer two salves for the danger of legislative bias. First, they argue that 
bias is more of a danger "in small policy-making bodies that work in poorly lit corners of the 
public square" than in "more cosmopolitan institutions" like Congress. Id. at 1305. Majori­
ties are majorities, however, and they will exert the same pressure on large, "cosmopolitan" 
institutions that they exert on local school boards. Moreover, even when representative 
bodies have good intentions, they may be prone to careless or. ignorant disregard of minori­
ties' preferences. See infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text. Second, Professors 
Eisgruber and Sager maintain that "political institutions may react differently to an issue 
once they see it as a matter of religious liberty," correctly noting that on several occasions 
Congress has accommodated religious exercise where the Court would not. Eisgruber & 
Saga, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1305-06. But this is, at best, a guarantee of a fair political 
fight. By applying RFRA to federal law, Congress made a precommitment to give religious 
exercise more than that, out of the belief that legislators might not always respect this impor­
tant value in the heat of political battle. 
256. See supra notes 222-229 and accompanying text (suggesting objective religiosity 
inquiry for judicial assessment of prima facie claims under RFRA). 
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could proscribe.257 Forbidding such judgments out of concern about 
judicial encroachment on religion would amount to killing free exer­
cise protection with kindness. By the same token, if courts could not 
discern which practices are "religious," then they could not credibly 
assess governmental actions under the Establishment Clause.258 They 
could not, in effect, distinguish between a nativity scene and a red­
nosed reindeer.259 Absolute judicial avoidance of inquiries into relig­
ious substance, especially if it resulted in a weakened Establishment 
Clause, would cross the line that divides appropriate respect for relig­
ious autonomy from inappropriate solicitude for religious claims of 
transcendence.260 As Professor Conkle has observed, "[t)he Court can­
not entirely escape the definitional problem - that is, as long as the 
Court finds any content in the religion clauses. "261 
E. Turning to the Real Challenge of Federal RFRA 
The preceding discussion has established that the Court should re­
spect and effectuate Congress's precommitment in Federal RFRA to 
provide heightened protection for religious freedom. Despite the Act's 
employment of a methodology usually associated with the Constitu­
tion, its federal law applications neither exercise power without consti­
tutional authority nor usurp the Court's authority to interpret or apply 
the Constitution. Moreover, the mechanism Congress chose to carry 
257. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78 (stating that governmental prohibition of acts or ab­
stentions when performed solely for religious reasons, or only because they display religious 
belief, violates the Free Exercise Clause); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down local ordinance held to burden purposefully a 
particular religion's practice of animal sacrifice). 
258. "The majoritarianism reflected in Smith complements the majoritarianism implicit 
in the permissive establishment cases: It is as if the Court wears blinders, so that it cannot 
see an establishment of mainstream Christianity and cannot see free exercise violations of 
anything else." Sullivan, supra note 26, at 216; cf. Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra 
note 226, at 467 (noting similarity between inquiry into individual's subjective perception of 
substantial burden on religious exercise and inquiry into subjective perception that govern­
ment action "endorses or impermissibly aids a religion"). Professor Marshall, vigorously 
objecting to judicial attempts to define religion, recognizes this Establishment Clause prob­
lem but offers no answer to it. See Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 386 n.136. 
259. Whether courts have proved capable of making such distinctions in the past is a fair 
question. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding municipal display of creche 
as part of "traditional" Christmas display); id. at 712 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
majority for holding creche " 'traditional' and therefore no different from Santa's house or 
reindeer"). 
260. See Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 772 ("(I]t is easy to slip from a belief in the 
'sovereignty of God' to the idea that the state lacks authority to question the bona fides of 
religious claims.") (footnote omitted); McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11,  at 25 
("merely because the civil magistrate is not a competent judge of a particular category of 
truth does not mean that it enjoys any special constitutional status"). 
261. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original The­
ology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 32 (2000) (hereinafter 
Conkle, Religious Liberty] . 
August 2001] RFRA and Federal Law 1961 
out its precommitment - strict judicial scrutiny of religious freedom 
claims - does not force . upon the judiciary an analytic standard it 
lacks competence to administer. The sort of legislative precommit­
ment to prioritize rights manifest in Federal RFRA may be an impor­
tant source of civil liberties in an era in which judicial expansion of 
rights is criticized as an intrusion on the authority of the political 
branches.262 Federal RFRA is the law, and the courts must effectuate 
that law. 
However, the methodology of precommitment, even in the service 
of personal freedom, exacerbates a danger that is always present in 
legislation. By making heightened solicitude for a given right effec­
tively automatic, Congress foregoes case-by-case analysis of the dan­
ger that such solicitude might violate other rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.263 The separation of powers arguments lodged against 
Federal RFRA threaten to distract judicial attention from the essen­
tial task of safeguarding personal liberties.264 Any legislative solicitude 
for religion, including RFRA's sweeping protection of religious free­
dom beyond what the Constitution requires of the federal ·govern­
ment, threatens to violate the Establishment Clause. This is the real 
challenge Federal RFRA presents reviewing courts: to effectuate the 
congressional will to protect religious freedom while preserving the 
separation of church and state. The remainder of this Article explores 
how courts can meet that challenge. 
262. Critics of RFRA have expressed concern that the Act would impede rights by pre­
venting enforcement of civil rights legislation in cases of religious motivated discrimination 
based on race, gender, or sexual orientation. See generally O'Neil, supra note 25 (discussing 
possible conflicts). Federal civil rights protections have several effective layers of protection 
from Federal RFRA. First, note that this is not a constitutional problem. RFRA, a mere 
statute, has nothing to say about constitutional nondiscrimination requirements. Second, 
courts should, and presumably will, consider civil rights enforcement to be a "compelling 
interest" that justifies encroachment on religious exercise in a broad range of cases. Third, 
Congress retains the power to exempt existing or future civil rights protections from the ef­
fect of Federal RFRA. 
263. See supra Section II.A. The potential for a legislative precomrnitment to have im­
permissible consequences should not be confused with the argument that the precommit­
ment methodology's inattention to particular applications makes the methodology inher­
ently suspect under some notion of due process of lawmaking. See supra notes 114-123 and 
accompanying text. 
264. Cf JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FuNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(1980) (arguing that federal courts should forego review of federalism and separation of 
powers questions in order to preserve institutional capital for individual rights cases). 
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III. EFFECTUATING FEDERAL RFRA 
RFRA has met with middling success in its aim of protecting re­
ligious exercise.265 Many more federal RFRA claims have failed266 than 
265. Ira Lupu's 1998 survey of reported pre-Boerne judicial and administrative decisions 
found that, in the administrative arena, "there is absolutely no evidence that RFRA did any­
thing to protect religion in decision making by the agencies of the United States." Lupu, 
Failure, supra note 86, at 589; see id. at 588-97 (surveying pre-Boerne decisions and conclud­
ing that RFRA was largely ineffective). In federal court cases, prisoners raising RFRA 
claims had prevailed in only nine of eighty-four cases, while other RFRA claimants won in 
nine of fifty cases. Id. at 591. Professor Lupu concludes: "If the goal of RFRA was to em­
power religious believers and institutions, it accomplished far less than its backers hoped and 
promised." Id. at 597; see also James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Resto­
ration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407 (1992) (contending that relig­
ious freedom advocates have overstated the harm of Smith and the benefits of RFRA). But 
see Berg, New Attacks, supra note 110, at 419-22 (defending RFRA's effectiveness); 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility of Justice, 56 MONT. L. REV. 95, 95 
(1995) [hereinafter Gedicks, Justice] (expressing skepticism about the likely effectiveness of 
RFRA in protecting religious freedom but suggesting the Act would improve over pre-Smith 
free exercise law in trial courts and administrative proceedings); Douglas Laycock, Religious 
Freedom and International Human Rights in the United States Today, 12 EMORY INT'L L. 
REV. 951, 969 (1998) [hereinafter Laycock, International Human Rights] ("The experience in 
the courts under [RFRA] was not good . . .  but it was not terrible."). Professor Lupu's statis­
tics do not seem to me to support his broad pronouncement that "a crisply codified doctrine 
of free exercise exemptions cannot be made to work." Lupu, Failure, supra note 86, at 597. 
Perhaps eighteen successes out of 134 cases is a disappointing result for RFRA's "backers," 
but it certainly represents meaningful "work" toward checking governmental encroachment 
on religious freedom. What Professor Lupu's numbers establish is that federal courts are not 
applying RFRA with anything like the vigor that Congress directed. My point here is that 
the present posture of Federal RFRA provides a realistic opportunity for courts to do more 
and better with the Act. Because I am not concerned here with the question whether RFRA 
was the optimal means of ensuring religious freedom, I neither endorse nor dispute Profes­
sor Lupu's preference for alternate means toward that end. See id. at 597-603. 
266. A search for rejections on the merits of federal claims under RFRA turned up the 
following decisions (thirteen appellate, eighteen trial-level): United States v. Oliver, No. 00-
3526, 2001 U.S. App LEXIS 13284 (8th Cir. June 14, 2001) (prosecuting a Native American 
for taking a bald eagle for religious purposes is not a violation of RFRA); Henderson v. 
Kennedy, No. 00-5070, 2001 U.S. App LEXIS 14235 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2001) (ban on t-shirt 
sales in public area did not substantially burden religious exercise of group that sold religion­
therried t-shirts); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(applying federal employment tax laws to a church is not a violation of RFRA); Miller v. 
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1 14 T.C. 511 (2000) (requiring Social Security numbers for 
children is not a violation of RFRA); Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of 
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting RFRA defense against copyright 
infringement claim); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (IRS's 
revocation of church's tax-exempt status did not violate RFRA); Lipton v. Peters, No. 
CIV.SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1999 WL 33289705 (W.D. Tex. Oct 12, 1999) (affirming military's 
finding that religious conscientious objector's claim was not based on a sincerely held belief); 
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999) (RFRA claim by 
employee against hospital as private entity invalid); United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215 
(10th Cir. 1999) (RFRA claim invalid where defendant takes, possesses, and sells a protected 
bird for commercial gain); Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1999) (IRS penal­
ties and interest levied for taxes withheld on grounds of religious opposition to war did not 
violate RFRA); In re Grand Jury Empanelling of Special Grand Jury, 171 F.3d 826 (3rd Cir. 
1999) (enforcement of subpoenas to testify did not violate RFRA); Adams v. Comm'r of 
Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 1999) (government's failure to accommodate tax­
payer's anti-military religious beliefs did not violate RFRA); Nichols v. United States, 1999 
U.S. App. LEXIS 10992 (9th Cir. May 25, 1999) (rejecting RFRA defense against enforce-
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succeeded.267 The shortcomings do not appear inevitable from the face 
of the statute.268 Rather, courts appear to have construed the statute 
ment of IRS third-party summonses); McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, 165 F.3d 32 (Table, Text in 
WESTLAW), Unpublished Disposition, No. 97-1701, 1998 WL 879503 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(prison officials did not violate RFRA by punishing prisoner who refused to remove or cover 
religious pin worn on outside of clothing); Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(RFRA does not provide church with basis to challenge Parole Commission's decision to 
deny parole to its pastor); FCC v. Girona, No. 3:99CV1262 A WT, 2000 WL 565496 (D. 
Conn. 2000) (regulation prohibiting issuance of licenses for low-power broadcasters does not 
violate RFRA); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 180-81 (D.D.C. 
2000) (policy statement declaring genetically altered foods presumptively nonharmful did 
not impose substantial burden on RFRA claimants' religious exercise); United States v. Any 
and All Radio Station Equip., 93 F.Supp.2d 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (statutory prohibition on 
operating radio station without license did not violate RFRA); Jackson v. District of Colum­
bia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2000) (Department of Corrections' grooming policy as ap­
plied to federal prisoners did not violate RFRA); Marrero v. Apfel, 87 F. Supp. 2d 340 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denial of SSI benefits to non-disabled claimant, who asserted that his faith 
prevented him from working, did not violate RFRA); In re Tzu Jung, No. 99-0420, 2000 WL 
195066 (D.D.C. 2000) (no unconstitutional burden on free exercise of religion under RFRA 
not to excuse failure to appear at trial); Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 
1999) (regulation requiring that applicants for eagle parts under religious purposes exemp­
tion of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act be members of a federally recognized In­
dian tribe did not violate RFRA as applied to Native American applicant not belonging to a 
recognized tribe); Molotsky v. Henderson, No. CIV. A. 98-5519, 1999 WL 165683 (E.D. Pa. 
1999) (no federal remedy available under RFRA to federal employee suing on employment 
discrimination claim); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 
2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (RFRA does not bar application of Age Discrimination in Employ­
ment Act); In re Three Children, 24 F. Supp. 2d 389 (D.N.J. 1998) (subpoena directing Or­
thodox Jewish children to testify against their parent did not· violate children's rights under 
RFRA); Packard v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Conn. 1998) (penalties levied on 
religious tax protestor for nonpayment of taxes did not violate RFRA); Gunning v. Runyon, 
3 F. Supp. 2d 1423 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (postal employee failed to establish prima facie case un­
der RFRA based on decision of post office to cease playing Christian music station over its 
public address system); Morehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-0300-D, 
1998 WL 320268, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (RFRA claim dismissed where defendant on super­
vised release failed to set out details of his beliefs and burden on his free exercise of relig­
ion); Steckler v. United States, 1998 WL 28235 (E.D. La. 1998) (RFRA claim for refusal to 
use Social Security number for religious reasons improper because government used least 
restrictive means of furthering its interest in tracking taxable income); Hartvig v. Tri-City 
Baptist Temple of Milwaukie, Inc. (In re Gomes), 219 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998) (recov­
ery of debtors' tithes and offerings to church by Chapter 7 trustee did not violate RFRA). 
267. A search for favorable adjudications of federal claims under RFRA turned up the 
following decisions (2 appellate, 6 trial-level): Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-62 
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had substantial likelihood of success in proving that 
prison warden's denial of pastoral visit violated RFRA); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical 
Free Church (Jn re Young), 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) (RFRA prevents recovering bank­
ruptcy debtors' religious tithes as avoidable transactions in bankruptcy proceedings); 
Caldwell v. Caesar, No. 98-1847, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6914 (D.D.C. May 22, 2001) (deny­
ing summary judgment on claim that RFRA is not violated when prisoners are required to 
request religious diets at certain intervals); United States v. Ramon, 86 F. Supp. 2d 665 
(W.D. Tex. 2000) (border patrol's use of religious symbols on vehicle as basis for stop on 
suspicion of drug smuggling violated RFRA when no other factors were sufficient to support 
reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle); United States v. Valrey, No. CR96-549Z, 2000 WL 
692647 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (under RFRA, government's restriction on use of marijuana by 
Rastafarian on supervised release from prison may be accomplished through less restrictive 
means and without burdening exercise of religion); United States v. Any and All Radio Sta­
tion Transmission Equip., No. Civ.A. 99-2260, 1999 WL 718646 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (seizure of 
unlicensed religious radio station's equipment was not least restrictive means of furthering 
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narrowly, in a pattern that replicates the Supreme Court's stingy ap­
plication prior to Smith of the strid scrutiny mandated by Sherbert and 
Yoder.269 Several causes might account for judges' narrow application 
of RFRA.270 One likely cause, prior to Boerne, was the very breadth of 
the Act. Any judge validating a claim under RFRA had to consider 
the possibility that ruling in favor of a claimant might affect fifty state 
governments and thousands of municipalities. Boerne greatly dimin­
ished that source of anxiety. Now any judge who has to apply RFRA 
can rest assured that only Congress - the body that enacted RFRA 
and retains power to alter or repeal it - will be constrained by suc­
cessful RFRA claims. But a second plausible source of judicial caution 
in applying RFRA survives Boerne: the fear that ordering religious 
exemptions might put the court, and the governmental entity at bar, in 
compelling government interest, thus violating RFRA); United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 
33 (D.D.C. 1998) (Buddhist defendant met requirements for third-party standing to chal­
lenge indictment on grounds that it infringed on right of temple and its monastics to free ex­
ercise of religion in violation of RFRA); Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church v. Fitzgerald 
(Jn re Hodge), 220 B.R. 386 (D. Id. 1998) (RFRA provided defense to Chapter 7 trustee's 
action to recover debtors' tithes to their church); see also Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 
(D.N.J. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss damages action against federal officials on ground 
that availability of damages under RFRA remains undetermined). 
268. One important textual impediment to RFRA's success that Professor Lupu empha­
sizes is the Act's mechanical adoption from judicial precedents of the "substantial burden" 
standard, which Professor Lupu ,characterizes as "poorly defined and subject to pro­
government manipulation." Lupu, Failure, suprd note 86, at 594; see also Laycock, Interna­
tional Human Rights, supra note 265, at 969 ("The most common reason for rejecting RFRA 
claims was to find that there was no substantial burden on the religion."); Marshall, Exemp­
. tion, supra note 25, at 394 ("doctrinal inconsistency is an inevitable product of the Sherbert 
methodology"). But see Durham, supra note 227, at 697-711 (defending substantial burden 
standard as necessary to define scope of RFRA); Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra 
note 226, at 469 (arguing that, absent substantial burden standard, courts would develop al­
ternative means to constrain religious freedom protections). 
269. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. Professor Lupu observes that, in ad­
dition to continuing their past narrow construction of the "substantial burden" standard, 
courts applying RFRA have tended to vindicate claims only where the burdened practice 
was compelled by the claimant's religion, validate government actions that merely inhibited 
religious practices rather than prohibiting them entirely, and give undue consideration to 
government claims of expedience and practicality in determining whether the challenged 
action was the least restrictive means of satisfying the posited compelling interest. Lupu, 
Failure, supra note 86, at 594-97; see also Thomas C. Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes 
in Private and Public Education, 32 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 531, 572 (1999) [hereinafter Berg, 
State RFRAs] (warning against undue judicial deference to governmental interests in appli­
cation of RFRAs). 
270. In addition to' the reasons 
'
discussed in the text, several other factors identified by 
Professor Lupu may contribute to courts' reluctance to apply RFRA vigorously. First, courts 
tend to disfavor any claim for exemption from generally applicable laws. Lupu, Failure, su­
pra note 86, at 592. Religious exemption claims in particular present further problems: 
judges, generally drawn from the "educated elite," may be skeptical of religion, and they 
may have concerns about fraudulent claims. Id. at 593. Frederick Gedicks adds the thesis 
that courts partake of a generalized societal commitment to egalitarianism that precludes 
specifically religious exemptions. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The 
Regrettable lndefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 ARK.-LIITLE ROCK L.J. 555, 568-72 
(1998) [hereinafter Gedicks, Unfirm Foundation]. 
August 2001] RFRA and Federal Law 1965 
the position of violating the Establishment Clause by favoring relig­
ious over secular interests.271 
This Part evaluates the implications of the Establishment Clause 
for RFRA and suggests means by which courts can fulfill their dual 
obligation to effectuate Federal RFRA's precommitment to protect 
religious exercise while maintaining the separation of church and 
state. The first section sets forth the Establishment Clause issues that 
may bear on Federal RFRA. The second section considers and rejects 
arguments that the Act on its face violates the Establishment Clause 
but concludes that many applications of the Act will. This means that 
courts must .develop a methodology for distinguishing permissible 
from impermissible applications. The third section proposes a liber­
tarian approach, under which the Court would interpret Federal 
RFRA as mandating accommodation not only of theistic views but 
also of strongly held conscientious beliefs that are not "religious" in 
the conventional sense. The symbiosis of Smith and RFRA, by shifting 
the source of mandatory accommodation claims from the Constitution 
to a statute, provides a distinctly appropriate vehicle for this inclusive 
approach to "religious" accommodation. The fourth section offers an 
alternative, more restrictive approach, under which the Court simply 
would recognize that, to the extent Federal RFRA embodies a level of 
free exercise protection rejected as a constitutional matter in Smith, 
claims under the statute must be subordinated to the Establishment 
Clause. This section proceeds to describe some accommodations un­
der the Act that should survive even under this restrictive approach to 
statutory construction. Either of these approaches would give the Act 
meaningful effect in the federal sphere, preserve the constitutional 
separation of church and state, and facilitate a consistent jurispru­
dence of mandatory accommodation at the federal level. 
A. Federal RFRA and the Establishment Clause 
The task of parsing the meaning and proper effect of the Estab­
lishment Clause has proved notoriously difficult.272 The prevailing ap-
271. See Laycock, International Human Rights, supra note 265, at 969-70 (calling poor 
success rate of RFRA claims "mostly a function of the secular view that religion should not 
get any special treatment, and partly a function of the view that these are hard cases, and the 
courts would rather not be bothered with them"); Lupu, Failure, supra note 86, at 593. 
272. Numerous commentators on RFRA have discussed the analytic problems caused 
by the Court's inconsistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Do 
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Violate the Establishment Clause or Separation of 
Powers?, 32 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 645, 647 (1999) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Establishment 
Clause] ("the Court has not been consistent in its approach or test for this constitutional 
provision"); Teresa Stanton Collett, Heads, Secularists Win; Tails, Believers Lose - Return­
ing Only Free Exercise to the Political Process, 20 ARK.-LIITLE ROCK L.J. 689, 694 & n.33 
(1998) (expressing concern that, after Smith and Boerne, "efforts to obtain political accom­
modations for religious believers will be substantially impeded by the current confusion in 
the jurisprudence surrounding the Establishment Clause"); Marshall, Concerns, supra note 
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proach to Establishment Clause analysis emphasizes the purposes 
and/or effects on religion of the governmental action at issue. In 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,213 the Court set forth a three-part test for a gov­
ernmental action to pass muster under the Establishment Clause: the 
action must have a secular purpose, its primary effect must not ad­
vance or inhibit religion, and it must not excessively entangle the gov­
ernment with religious matters.274 The Lemon test has been frequently 
criticized,275 but it remains one of the primary analytic lenses through 
which the Court considers Establishment Clause claims.276 Other re­
cent decisions have applied an "endorsement" test, articulated by 
Justice O'Connor, which asks whether the purpose of a government 
program is to advance or inhibit religion and whether the program 
creates the impression that its purpose is to advance or inhibit relig­
ion. 211 
14, at 239 (noting absence of theoretical underpinnings for Supreme Court's often inconsis­
tent Establishment Clause decisions). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1994). 
273. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
274. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
275. Commentators who oppose a strongly separationist approach under the Establish­
ment Clause have been particularly .critical of Lemon, see, e.g. , Jesse H. Choper, Federal 
Constitutional Issues, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, 
AND LAW 235, 237 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (calling Lemon 
jurisprudence "a conceptual disaster area"), although separationists also find fault with the 
test. See, e.g. , LEVY, supra note 272, at 158 ("Use of the Lemon test does not really aid the 
Court in deciding establishment-clause cases."). The Court in some Establishment Clause 
cases has declined to apply the Lemon test, see, e.g. , Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 
(1984) (expressing Court's "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this 
sensitive area"), and most of the present Justices have criticized the test. See Lamb's Chapel 
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Thomas, J ., concurring in judgment); County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur­
ring in judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); 
Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J. ,  dissenting). 
276. The Court has applied or adapted Lemon in varied contexts in recent Terms. The 
Lemon test played a pivotal role in the Court's decision in Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), which upheld a facial challenge to a school district's 
policy of allowing prayer before football games. The Santa Fe majority used the Lemon 
"purpose" analysis to support facial invalidation of the policy. see id. at 314-17. On the same 
day the Court handed down Santa Fe, the six justices who made up the majority in that case 
(including three of Lemon's sometime critics) declined Justice Scalia's admonition to grant 
certiorari in a case he saw as "an opportunity to inter the Lemon test once for all." See 
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court applied a variation on the Lemon test that folded the third, 
"entanglement" prong into the "effects" inquiry for the purpose of evaluating government 
support for religious institutions. See id. at 233; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 
(2000) (plurality opinion) (purporting to apply Agostini test). The Court also applied Lemon 
in Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395, a case about religious groups' access to public facilities. 
277. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 
U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Professor Greenawalt has noted that "courts need 
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"Religious accommodation" generally refers to government action 
that relieves religious believers from the effects of adverse govern­
mental regulation.278 In practice, however, this sort of governmental 
consideration for religious believers may closely resemble active gov­
ernmental support for religion, just as a tax exemption may resemble a 
subsidy. Thus, many Establishment Clause cases can also be under­
stood as discretionary accommodation cases.279 Establishment Clause 
challenges oppose governmental efforts to aid religious believers, 
whether by allowing the display of religious symbols on public prop­
erty,280 commingling religion with public education,281 or providing 
benefits to religious institutions.282 Because the Court rarely equates 
Establishment Clause claims with accommodation claims, the cases 
have not clarified the extent to which the Establishment Clause re-
to think carefully about when endorsement terminology is closely similar to other inquiries 
about aid and when the questions are genuinely different." Greenawalt, Religious Law, su­
pra note 25, at 843; see also Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: 
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987) (cri­
tiquing endorsement test). 
278. See supra note 17. 
279. Conversely, many accommodation cases raise Estabiishment Clause issues, al­
though Smith, in which the Court foreclosed most mandatory accommodations under the 
Free Exercise Clause, ignored the Establishment Clause. See supra note 29 and accompany­
ing text. In one line of mandatory accommodation cases that remains vital, those in which 
the Court has required the state to grant religious groups equal access to nonscarce public 
resources under the Free Speech Clause, the Court has considered and rejected Establish­
ment Clause objections. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, slip op. 
(U.S. June 11, 2001) (holding that allowirig religious group to conduct after-school meetings 
in limited public forum does not violate Establishment Clause); Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that public university's funding relig­
ious student publication on equal basis with other student activities does not violate Estab­
lishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (holding that giving religious group equal 
access to public school facilities does not violate Establishment Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that policy allowing student religious group equal access to 
state university facilities comports with Establishment Clause). 
280. See Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (upholding inclusion 
of cross placed by Ku Klux Klan in area of state capitol grounds open to public displays); 
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding government-sponsored display of me­
norah); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (upholding inclusion of creche in municipal holiday display). 
281. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down school district's policy that permit­
ted sectarian prayers at school football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (strik­
ing down sectarian prayer at public school graduation ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down state statute providing for school prayer). 
282. Compare Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (reversing Court's prior decision 
that forbade public school district from sending public special education teachers to paro­
chial schools) with Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down school district's 
policy of providing special education teachers to parochial schools); see, e.g. , Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding use of federal funds to purchase instructional materi­
als for parochial schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding inclusion of 
sectarian agencies among recipients of federal grants for youth sex education); Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding tax benefit that accrued largely to parents of children 
in parochial schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding extension of tax 
exemption to churches). 
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stricts discretionary accommodations. The few cases in which the 
Court has made the doctrinal relationship explicit have reached incon­
sistent results. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,283 the 
Court held that exempting a religious employer from the Title VII 
prohibition on religious discrimination in employment did not violate 
the Establishment Clause. In contrast, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 
Inc. ,'lM the Court struck down a state's mandatory accommodation for 
sabbatarian employees as an Establishment Clause violation; in Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,285 the Court held that a special exemption for 
religious publications from a state's sales and use tax violated the Es­
tablishment Clause; and in Board of Education v. Grumet,286 the Court 
struck down a school district that a state had created especially for a 
religious group.287 
Notwithstanding this doctrinal uncertainty, application of the 
Lemon and end.orsement tests to RFRA raises obvious red flags. The 
Act mandates accommodation in all cases where the government can­
not demonstrate a compelling interest in the application of neutral 
laws to religious conduct. Numerous situations exist in which no gov­
ernmental interest would bar an accommodation that would advance a 
religious belief or religion in general.288 Such applications of RFRA 
would have the purpose and effect of advancing religion, in violation 
283. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
284. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
285. 489 U.S. 1 (1989); see id. at 26-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the "ten­
sion between mandated and prohibited religious exemptions is well recognized" and sug­
gesting that Establishment Clause sometimes may prohibit what Free Exercise Clause re­
quires). 
286. 512 U.S. 687 (1994); see id. at 702-05 (discussing religious accommodations in con­
text of Establishment Clause concerns). 
287. In addition, the Court has limited the Title VII requirement that employers rea­
sonably accommodate employees' religious practices to require only de minimis accommo­
dations. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977). Professor Lupu suggests that the 
result in Hardison was dictated by a concern about the statutory preference for religious be­
lievers. See Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 593. 
288. Several commentators also have suggested that special accommodations of relig­
ious speech might discriminate against nonreligious expression, violating the Free Speech 
Clause and perhaps the Equal Protection Clause as well. See Alan E. Brownstein, State 
RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 605 (1999); Marshall, Ex­
emption, supra note 25 (making equal protection and free speech objections to mandatory 
accommodations); McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11, at 40 ("Favoring religious speak­
ers over similarly situated nonreligious speakers would violate the viewpoint-neutrality re­
quirement of the Free Speech Clause." (footnote omitted)); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, 
supra note 36, at 610-17 (considering argument that purely religious exemptions under fed­
eral and state RFRAs may violate constitutional free speech protections); see also Eisgruber 
& Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1271-72 (suggesting that purely religious exemptions 
under the Free Exercise Clause might violate the Equal Protection Clause). Any free 
speech-based objection to applications of Federal RFRA seems to me subsumed in the Es­
tablishment Clause objection: if an accommodation of religious speech is found to discrimi­
nate against nonreligious speech, that accommodation improperly favors religion over non­
religion. 
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of the Lemon test, and give the appearance of gratuitous governmen­
tal support for religion, failing the endorsement test.289 Thus, while 
various commentators have defended purely religious accommoda­
tions under RFRA290 on the ground that RFRA merely protects relig­
ious exercise from government interference291 or that religion is some­
how distinct from other priorities that might require 
accommodation,292 several others, following lines of argument against 
purely religious accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause,293 
289. Cf Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S. Con­
stitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 769 (1986) (noting, in constitutional context, that "[f]ree 
exercise exemptions from general regulatory statutes are a form of constitutional tribute to 
individual acts of faith"). 
290. Pre-RFRA defenses of purely religious exemptions include John H. Garvey, Free 
Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779 (1986); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins]; Pepper, supra note 229; see 
also Choper, supra note 254, at 1736 (arguing that purely religious accommodations do not 
violate Establishment Clause "when no meaningful threat to individual religious freedom 
can be said to exist"); Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 562-64 (endorsing a narrowly 
defined class of mandatory accommodations under Free Exercise Clause). 
i9l. See Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 25 ("In most cases the exemption works to 
remove a burden on religion rather than creating incentives in its favor."); Chemerinsky, 
Establishment Clause, supra note 272, at 655 ("permitting people to practice their religion 
free from government involvement is a permissible and desirable effect"); Collett, supra 
note 272, at 701-13 (arguing that substantial categories of religious accommodation comport 
with the Establishment Clause under Lemon); Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra 
note 130, at 77 n.187 (arguing that RFRA "does no more than protect religion from govern­
mentally imposed burdens"). The obvious problem with this defense of purely religious ex­
emptions is that it merely reframes the underlying tension between the establishment and 
free exercise principles: a government action that a believer sees as accommodating religion 
may fairly appear to a nonbeliever to advance religion. See supra notes 28-29 and accompa­
nying text. 
292. See Berg, State RFRAs, supra note 269, at 533-34 (arguing that religious interests 
"tend to be deeply felt and constitutive of identity" and "offer a unique counter to the power 
of the state"); Chemerinsky, Constitutional Expansion, supra note 110, at 632-34 (arguing 
.that Court's past strict scrutiny of religious freedom claims proves such scrutiny does not 
violate Establishment Clause and, in the alternative, that protecting free exercise can be a 
compelling interest that justifies violating Establishment Clause); Durham, supra note 227, 
at 667-70 (arguing that proper understanding of social contract compels accommodation of 
religious believers); John H. Garvey, All Things Being Equal . .  ., 1996 BYU L. REV. 587, 
609 (arguing that religious believers deserve accommodation because "they are doing a good 
thing and the government should not interfere with them"); Timothy L. Hall, Omnibus Pro­
tections of Religious Liberty and the Establishment Clause, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 539, 543 
(1999) (advocating "difference-regarding" view of religion as justification for religious ex­
emptions); Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 6-24 
[hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation] (arguing for "[t]he special status of religion"); see 
also Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 
(1993) (arguing that unique political burdens on religion required by the Establishment 
Clause justify unique accommodations under Free Exercise Clause). 
293. Arguments against purely religious accommodations under the Free Exercise 
Clause include Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21; Steven G. Gey, Why Is Relig­
ion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment, 52 U. PIIT. L. REV. 75 (1990); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of 
the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 
VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978-79); Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25; Sherry, supra note 29; Mark 
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have maintained that the Act unconstitutionally privileges religious 
interests at the expense of secular interests,294 or that the Act at least 
creates the potential for applications that would violate the Establish­
ment Clause.295 
I will examine the constitutionality of RFRA based on a separa­
tionist account of the Establishment Clause, which entails skepticism 
about the constitutionality of exclusively religious exemptions.296 That 
Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 
1691 (1988); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 591 (1991). See also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17 (op­
posing purely religious discretionary accommodations but advocating mandatory accommo­
dations under the Free Exercise Clause in some circumstances). 
294. See Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 454 ("RFRA is . . .  a 
clear instance of the favoritism condemned by the Court's decisions in Thornton and Texas 
Monthly."); Gedicks, Justice, supra note 265, at 99 ("Liberal neutrality seems to foreclose the 
possibility of a religious exemption to generally applicable laws precisely because such ex­
emptions distort private religious choice."); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 8-
14; ldleman, supra note 193, at 285-302; Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14; see also Lupu, 
Reflections, supra note 49, at 809 (noting that "[a]ccommodations of religion and religion 
alone have not fared well in the Supreme Court" and calling RFRA's survival under current 
Establishment Clause doctrine "a close question"). 
A distinct objection to RFRA on Establishment Clause grounds rests on the idea that 
the Founders intended the Establishment Clause to prevent the federal government from 
interfering with states' own establishments of religion by, inter alia, enforcing the Free Exer­
cise Clause against the states. See Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA 
Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2347 (1997); see also Graglia, supra note 2, at 
680, 682-83 (asserting that RFRA violated the purpose of the Religion Clauses to protect 
states from federal interference). This federalism-based concern applies only to RFRA's ap­
plication to state and local law. 
295. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, §§ 5-16 at 959 n.169 (suggesting some applications of 
Federal RFRA might violate Establishment Clause); Vikram David Amar, State RFRAs and 
the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513, 527 (1999) (suggesting applications of state 
RFRAs in employment setting might trigger serious Establishment Clause analysis because 
workplace accommodations ·"seem to involve zero-sum games among employees"); Lupu, 
Codification, supra note 83, at 591 ("The argument that some applications of RFRA may 
violate the Establishment Clause by forcing religion-subsidizing transfers is a compelling one 
in those circumstances where it fits the facts."); Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 
12, at 1492-94 (calling limitation of accommodations to religious claims "both morally and 
(less certainly) constitutionally troublesome"). 
296. The view that the Establishment Clause requires a strict "wall of separation" be­
tween religion and the public sphere has its contemporary roots in Everson v. Board of Edu­
cation, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (citation omitted). Two especially helpful expositions of 
separationist principles are LEVY, supra note 272 (contending that separationism comports 
with the Framers' intent and evaluating Establishment Clause jurisprudence from a separa­
tionist perspective), and Sullivan, supra note 26, at 197-99, 202-14 (contending that the Es­
tablishment Clause created a secular civil order to resolve disputes between religions in the 
public sphere). The opposite approach to the Establishment Clause is nonpreferentialism, 
which posits that the government need only avoid preferring one religion over another. See, 
e.g. , Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (advocating 
nonpreferentialism). Neutrality is a middle ground that bars the government from specially 
burdening or benefiting religion. See, e.g. , Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) 
(advocating "benevolent neutrality"). In general, separationists would bar government from 
contact with religion; advocates of neutrality would bar government from endorsing religion; 
and nonpreferentialists would bar government only from coercing religion. See Sullivan, su­
pra note 26, at 202-03. 
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account provides the strongest challenge to my thesis that courts can 
construe RFRA in a manner that will obviate Establishment Clause 
concerns, and it also reflects my own sense of how the Establishment 
Clause should apply in this area. In my view, equitable treatment of 
individuals, without regard to their religious convictions or lack 
thereof, is a central Establishment Clause value.297 Therefore, a gov­
ernmental preference extended only on grounds of religious belief is 
impermissible unless it can be justified and understood without regard 
to religion. One predictable response to this separationist position is 
the assertion that religion is a uniquely important source of conscien­
tious commitments and that, accordingly, an equality norm should 
permit and may even require religious accommodations in various cir­
cumstances.298 Thus, Michael McConnell, in advocating exclusively re­
ligious accommodations, emphasizes that "[n]o other freedom is a 
duty to a higher authority."299 That argument, aside from its dubious 
account of equitable treatment,300 suggests a good reason not to privi-
297. "Most of the framers of [the Establishment Clause] very probably meant that gov­
ernment should not promote, sponsor, or subsidize religion because it is best left to private 
voluntary support for the sake of religion itself as well as for government, and above all for 
the sake of the individual." LEVY, supra note 272, at 146. 
298. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. Michael Perry offers a different re­
sponse: he simply classifies the belief that "there is a God, who created us and who both 
loves us and judges us" and the belief that "because God created us and loves us, we are all 
sacred" as exceptions to the nonestablishment rule that government may not discriminate in 
favor of religious beliefs. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de 
Siecle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 310 (2000). 
299. McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11, at 30. Professor McConnell also points out 
that the government may promote, for example, environmentalism, whereas it may not pro­
mote religion, and he argues that the government accordingly should lack the power to bur­
den religious conduct to the same extent it may burden environmentalism. See id. at 10. The 
argument is unduly linear, because equitable treatment of individuals has nothing to do with 
any other restriction the Establishment Clause may impose on the government. Adherents 
of nontheistic conscientious commitments who bear a heavier regulatory burden than their 
religious counterparts receive no succor from the fact that the government is not barred 
from cheering for their views. A narrower and more viable variation on Professor 
McConnell's insight is Professor Gedicks's suggestion that permissive accommodations are 
constitutional "only in the relatively narrow range of cases in which religion suffers from 
special Establishment Clause or other unique disadvantages." Gedicks, Normalized, supra 
note 50, at 98-99. 
300. Commentators have persuasively refuted the claim that the special status of relig­
ion should entitle religious believers to exemptions. See, e.g. , Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, 
supra note 21, at 1260-67; Gedicks, Unfirm Foundation, supra note 270, at 557-68; Marshall, 
Exemption, supra note 25, at 382-85 (rejecting claims of special nature of religion as grounds 
for religious accommodations generally); Sherry, supra note 29, at 137-42 (critiquing 
McConnell's argument for special status of religious believers). Professor Durham's contrac­
tarian argument demonstrates the problems with claims of this sort. Professor Durham 
maintains that the state must honor religious believers' spiritual commitments because (a) 
those commitments transcend the commitments of secular society in believers' minds and (b) 
thus, believers never would have submitted to secular rule absent an understanding that the 
state would accommodate their religious commitments. See Durham, supra note 227, at 667-
70. Premise (b) ignores the possibility that nonbelievers would have abstained from the so­
cial contract had they known that their own commitments - moral, ethical, ideological, etc. 
- would be subordinated categorically to the presumptively superior commitments of re-
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lege religion belief: religious belief has a unique capacity to promote 
conflict and factionalism in society. We should understand the Consti­
tution to constrain the government from using religion as a singular 
basis for exempting individuals from the law precisely because religion 
is a matter of uniquely intense conviction.301 I now tum to the question 
whether and to what extent RFRA can be construed not to violate this 
separationist conception of the Establishment Clause. 
B. Why RFRA on its Face Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause 
Justice Stevens contended in his brief Boerne concurrence that 
RFRA on its face violated the Establishment Clause.302 Several schol­
ars have entertained the same idea.303 The Supreme Court generally 
will invalidate a statute on its face only where the law has no constitu­
tionally permissible applications.304 Thus, for example, the Supreme 
Court rejected a facial challenge to a statute that included religious so­
cial service providers in a program of grants to encourage family plan­
ning counseling, emphasizing that the statute had a secular purpose 
and effect, but remanded for consideration whether the statute as ap­
plied violated the Establishment Clause.305 The Court in Santa Fe In­
dependent School District v. Doe306 clarified the standard for Estab­
lishment Clause challenges: a state action is subject to facial 
ligious believers. Thus, the argument reduces to the presumption underlying premise (a): 
that religious commitments are more important to their adherents than nonreligious com­
mitments are to theirs. That presumption is both dubious on its face and antithetical to the 
civil society the social contract is supposed to establish. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1260-
62 (rejecting privileging of religious priorities as inconsistent with liberal democracy). 
301. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church 
and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997) (contending that religious conviction is inherently 
incompatible with liberal norms of toleration); Steven G. Gey, When ls Religious Speech Not 
"Free Speech"?, 2000 U. ILL L. REV. 379, 381-82 (arguing that reliance of religious speech 
on a higher authority renders it fundamentally antidemocratic). 
302. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997). 
303. See Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 457-58 (arguing that 
RFRA's use of constitutional language to overprotect religious freedom violates the en­
dorsement test); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 8-14 (agreeing with Justice 
Stevens's Boerne concurrence and arguing that RFRA violates Establishment Clause under 
settled jurisprudence); see also Idleman, supra note 193, at 285-96 (discussing arguments for 
facial invalidity); Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 237-42 (same). 
304. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a leg­
islative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the chal­
lenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid."). 
305. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (emphasizing facial neutrality of statutory provision ex­
empting religious employers from prohibition on religious discrimination in upholding appli­
cation of the exemption to religious employer's nonreligious activity). 
306. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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invalidation under the Establishment Clause if it lacks a secular pur­
pose.307 In Santa Fe, five Justices who had not joined Justice Stevens's 
Establishment Clause reasoning in Boerne concurred with his opinion 
facially invalidating a high school's policy that orchestrated prayers at 
football games, because the policy "specifie[ d] only one, clearly pre­
ferred message - that of [the school district's] traditional religious 
'invocation.' "308 
The most familiar argument for facial invalidation of RFRA bor­
rows the Boerne Court's conclusion, critical to its invalidation of 
RFRA's applications to state and local governments, that Congress 
failed to demonstrate any real-world burden on religious exercise that 
warranted protection from facially neutral laws.309 The Establishment 
Clause variation posits that, absent any discernible burden, RFRA 
fails the Lemon test because (1) Congress lacked a secular purpose for 
RFRA and (2) the sole effect of the Act is to advance religion rather 
than to protect it.310 As to purpose - the crucial inquiry under Santa 
Fe - this argument improperly denies deference to congressional ex­
planations for legislation. Even if Congress's failure to identify con­
crete grounds for extending legislative protection to religious freedom 
claims justified the Court in imposing its stringent "congruence and 
proportionality" test to protect states against congressional power 
grabs under Section 5,311 that failure provides no basis for tightening 
scrutiny of congressional purposes under the Establishment Clause.312 
As to effects, the argument that RFRA violates the Establishment 
Clause because it lacks a discernible basis defeats itself. If no situa-
307. "Our Establishment Clause cases involving facial challenges . . .  have not focused 
solely on the possible applications of the statute, but rather have considered whether the 
statute has an unconstitutional purpose." Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314. But see Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (noting practice in Establishment Clause decisions of dis­
tinguishing between facial invalidity and invalidity of applications and suggesting that facial 
challenge is inappropriate where government aid to religion may provide only secular bene­
fits); see also Dolan, supra note 12, at 189-90 (arguing that RFRA may be invalid on its face 
despite permissible applications). 
308. 530 U.S. at 315. 
309. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32. 
310. See Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 9-10; Garvey, supra note 58, at 
505-06; see also Chemerinsky, Establishment Clause, supra note 272, at 648 (identifying ar­
gument that RFRA lacks secular purpose as central aspect of Establishment Clause objec­
tion); Gedicks, Normalized, supra note 50, at 102-03 (noting that the Court has found insuf­
ficient empirical justification for benign race and sex-based preferences and arguing that 
permissive religious accommodations have less empirical justification than those prefer­
ences); Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 237-38. 
311. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
312. See Sullivan, supra note 26, at 197 n.9 (arguing that under Lemon courts should re­
quire only a post hoc secular rationale and not proof that the legislation reflected a secular 
motive). 
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tions exist where RFRA is necessary, then RFRA, if faithfully applied, 
will have no effect at all.313 
The Court has made clear that at least some discretionary legisla­
tive accommodations do not violate the Establishment Clause,314 and 
even some of RFRA's most ardent critics agree.315 Despite the ac­
knowledgement in Santa Fe of a looser standard for facial invalidation 
of statutes in Establishment Clause cases, the Court never has sug­
gested that the possibility that many or most of a statute's applications 
will violate the Establishment Clause warrants facial invalidation.316 
Federal RFRA, as I demonstrate below, has potential applications 
with permissible, secular effects, even if the Act is construed to pro­
vide exclusively religious exemptions: to safeguard the religious 
equality guaranteed by the Constitution317 and to accommodate idio­
syncratic religious practices.318 Finally, the fact that RFRA explicitly 
forswears any transgression of the Establishment Clause319 under­
scores the Court's obligation to construe the statute not to violate the 
Constitution if possible.320 
313. For a discussion and refutation of the argument that RFRA in effect violates the 
"entanglement" prong of Lemon because strict scrutiny requires courts to make substantive 
inquiries into matters of religious doctrine, see supra Section II.D.2. 
314. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("Values that are pro­
tected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not 
thereby banished from the political process."); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (upholding provision of Title VII that exempts religious employers 
from prohibition against religious discrimination in hiring); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 
664, 680 (1970) (upholding tax exemption for religious organizations). 
315. See Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 134 ("Whatever the fate of 
federal RFRA, nothing in Boerne should prevent either Congress or the states from enacting 
more nuanced protections for religious commitments . . . .  Nor would such laws encounter 
Establishment Clause barriers."); Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 94-95 & n.121 
(estimating that there are as many as 2000 statutory religious accommodations in state and 
federal law, and calling legislative accommodations "common and legitimate"); Hamilton, 
Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 2. But see Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 778-79 (op­
posing discretionary accommodations and arguing that any legislative aid to religion must be 
extended "to other institutions that are, on secular grounds, similarly situated"); Marshall, 
Concerns, supra note 14, at 237 ("By holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require 
exemptions for religious claimants, [Smith] refutes the argument that religious claims are 
constitutionally privileged" in legislative arena). 
316. The question would be different if the Court found those applications of Federal 
RFRA that violated the Establishment Clause inseverable from those that did not. As with 
the question of the severability of RFRA's federal from its state applications, however, the 
far more plausible conclusion is that Congress wanted, at a minimum, whatever statutory 
protection for religious freedom the Court would uphold. See supra note 16. 
317. See infra Section 111.D.2.a. 
318. See infra Section III.D.2.b. 
319. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (1994) ("Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to affect, 
interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws re­
specting the establishment of religion . . . .  "). 
320. Cf. Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 11-12 (calling provision in War Powers Resolu­
tion of 1973 that forswore alteration of political branches' constitutional authority "gratui-
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Professors Eisgruber and Sager make a different sort of appeal to 
nonestablishment principles in support of an argument that RFRA 
should be facially invalidated. They maintain that the strict scrutiny 
RFRA mandates for religious freedom claims is both "normatively 
unjustified" and "wholly unworkable."321 First, they insist strict scru­
tiny would elevate sectarian interests over not only improper, inequi­
table government infringements on religious. practice but also legiti­
mate, even essential government infringements on religious practice.322 
Second, they suggest that courts' pre-Smith inconsistencies in applying 
the Sherbert-Yoder compelling interest standard, which they charac­
terize as "strict only in theory and notoriously feeble in fact,"323 mark 
that standard as ineffectual and counterproductive to religious free­
dom.324 They argue, based on both grounds, that the judicial branch 
may and must declare RFRA unconstitutional. 
The first problem with Professors Eisgruber and Sager's argument 
for facial invalidation is that it talks out of both sides of its mouth. The 
fact that strict scrutiny seemed to underprotect religious freedom in 
practice belies the danger of overprotection. The plausible hypothesis 
tous" but acknowledging that it "represents . . .  legislative acknowledgement of a conserva­
tive rule of construction"). 
321. Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 451; see also Eisgruber & 
Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 104 (arguing that Smith pronounced strict scrutiny of 
religious freedom claims "both normatively unattractive and unworkable in practice"). This 
argument is closely related to Professors Eisgruber and Sager's account of the "substantive 
institutional competence" objection to Federal RFRA. See supra notes 244-245 and accom­
panying text. 
322. According to Professors Eisgruber and Sager, " [t)he compelling state interest test is 
suitable only where it is appropriate to indulge in a broad and robust presumption of uncon­
stitutionality . . . . " Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1306; see also id. at 
1258-60, 1286-89; Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting, supra note 158, at 106; Eisgruber & Sager, 
After Boerne, supra note 36, at 130; Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 63 (calling strict scrutiny 
as set forth in RFRA "an engine of destruction for virtually any policy made subject to it"); 
Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1502 (arguing that state RFRAs should 
avoid strict scrutiny in favor of "explicitly delegat[ing] to courts common-law-making 
authority so that they can generate different tests for different situations"). But see 
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1136 (characterizing strict scrutiny of free exercise 
claims as nothing more than "a way to determine whether government decisions that inter­
fere with the religious exercise of religious minorities are in fact neutral"). 
323. Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting, supra note 158, at 104; see also Lupu, Statutes, supra 
note 6 (arguing that pre-Smith "strict scrutiny" of free exercise claims actually involved a 
nuanced balancing test). 
324. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1307 ("Instead of evaluating 
specific claims for exemption, Congress simply handed the problem back to the judiciary, 
inviting it to continue on its erratic pre-Smith course."); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, 
supra note 36, at 445-46 (" Sherbert's promise of the ruthless compelling state interest test 
proved remarkably toothless."); Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 101 
("RFRA's compelling state interest test could not be defended as a proven vehicle for vindi­
cating Free Exercise Clause concerns. Its track record was - neither extensive nor impres­
sive."); see also Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 65-66 (expressing concern that courts would 
construe constitutional terminology in RFRA so restrictively as to prevent appreciable im­
provement in protection for religious liberty). 
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that the pre-Smith underprotection was a reaction to the undesirable 
potential for overprotection325 provides an argument for refining the 
standard, not for a constitutional quarantine. The overprotection con­
cern, for its part, reflects an unnecessarily rigid account of strict scru­
tiny under RFRA. Fealty to the Establishment Clause should provide 
a compelling government interest that will defeat RFRA claims in ap­
propriate cases. To the extent problems remain, courts may and 
should adjust the strict scrutiny analysis to provide reasonable calibra­
tion of the competing interests.326 Similarly, as to the underprotection 
concern, Federal RFRA gives courts another chance, away from the 
high-stakes game of constitutional doctrine, to develop an approach to 
strict scrutiny that will better protect religious exercise in appropriate 
cases. 
Professors Eisgruber and Sager deride suggestions that courts 
should attempt to refine strict scrutiny to fit the problem of religious 
freedom as "at best fronts for more substantive but obscure intuitions 
about how particular claims for religious exemptions ought to come 
out."327 Fair enough. A statutory scheme that harnesses the analytic 
skills of courts in an effort to refine and actualize such obscure intui­
tions is an eminently reasonable method of making policy in an area 
where obscure and competing intuitions inevitably define the political 
discourse.328 More important, it is the method Congress chose. Even if 
strict scrutiny proves as unworkable as Professors Eisgruber and Sager 
predict, the constitutional constraint of the Establishment Clause, and 
the ability of the courts and Congress to communicate about the Act 
through the interplay of adjudication and legislative oversight, will 
prevent its failure from transgressing constitutional boundaries. 
325. See Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 447 ("The feeble quality 
of the Court's pre-Smith jurisprudence was no accident. The compelling interest test cannot 
bear the meaning in the area of religious exemptions that it has elsewhere."). But cf 
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1144 (criticizing Smith Court for "eliminating the 
doctrine of free exercise exemptions rather than . . .  contributing to the development of a 
more principled approach"). 
326. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing need to adjust strict scrutiny 
inquiry in order to avoid excessive judicial inquiries into religious substance). 
327. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1259; see also Eisgruber & Sager, 
After Boerne, supra note 36, at 130 (asserting that "the compelling interest standard . . .  is 
too blunt and too invasive to serve as a sensible vehicle for identifying instances of disparate 
impact or disparate treatment); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 474-75 
(suggesting that Court could save RFRA by "dilut(ing] the 'compelling interest standard' " 
to render it "duplicative of post-Smith constitutional protection for religious liberty" but 
dismissing such a gambit as undesirable); cf Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 
1498 (rejecting possibility of judicial adjustment as a defense of strict scrutiny under RFRA 
because that solution is "far from certain" and entails "set[ting) up a test that courts have to 
ignore in order to reach the right results"). 
328. Cf Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 21-22 (noting that legislators may adopt consti­
tutional language in order to address "difficulty in resolving the difficult policy questions 
that surround the drafting task"). 
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Invalidating Federal RFRA on Professors Eisgruber and Sager's "un­
workability" reasoning would grossly exceed the judicial function. 
Although I reject arguments that RFRA is facially invalid under 
the Establishment Clause, I believe a freewheeling regime of purely 
religious exemptions would offend both Establishment Clause doc­
trine and separationist principle. Douglas Laycock would construe 
RFRA to create just such a broad-based regime of exemptions, con­
tending that "[RFRA] can work only if it is as broad as the Free Exer­
cise Clause."329 I agree with Professor Laycock's implicit assumption 
that protecting religious believers from unwanted autopsies330 or per­
mitting believers to attend church-affiliated schools331 raises no Estab­
lishment Clause concern. These protections afford believers benefits 
that others generally do not want, what I refer to below as "idiosyn­
cratic accommodations."332 I disagree, however, that the state could 
relieve a religious believer who drives of the otherwise universal obli­
gation to carry a photographic license333 or permit members of a par­
ticular church to practice polygamy.334 These protections would im­
properly privilege religion, because they would inequitably relieve 
believers of constraints from which many nonbelievers might also pre­
fer to be free.335 RFRA is not the Free Exercise Clause, and courts 
therefore must apply the Establishment Clause to draw the constitu­
tional boundaries of Federal RFRA.336 At the same time, courts have 
329. Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 221. 
330. See id. at 226 (discussing Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990)). 
331. See id. at 223-24 (discussing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
332. See infra Section IIl.D.2.b. 
333. See id. at 229 (discussing Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affd 
by an equally divided Court sub nom. Jensen v" Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985)). 
334. See id. at 223-24 (discussing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)). 
335. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. 
336. Some have conceptualized the boundaries in economic terms. Professor Berg, for 
instance, dismisses the Establishment Clause concern on the ground that "[a] great many 
religious accommodations (im]pose only minimal costs on others, or only diffuse costs ab­
sorbed by the whole of society." Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 737; Lipson, 
supra note 226 (emphasizing importance of third-party harms in determining validity of ac­
commodations); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to 
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1989) (discussing permissibility of ex­
emptions in terms of "the prevention of negative externalities"); Pepper, supra note 229, at 
332-35 (arguing for distinction under Establishment Clause between "private" and "public" 
harms). But see Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1290-91 (questioning utility 
of externality approach); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 608-10, 618-24 
(discussing and critiquing externality approach). 
I agree that the absence of externalized costs may be relevant in identifying permissible 
accommodations. Cf infra Section IIl.D.2.b (discussing idiosyncratic accommodations). 
However, permitting establishments on the ground that their costs were diffuse rather than 
concentrated would write the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution. The costs of the 
ultimate Establishment Clause violation - governmental creation of a national church -
would be diffused across society, but that fact would underscore the affront to the 
Constitution, not ameliorate it. The Court has signaled the irrelevance of the concentration 
1978 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1903 
an obligation to construe a statute in a manner that renders it constitu­
tional, where such an interpretation is possible.337 Federal courts that 
apply RFRA can avoid Establishment Clause problems either by ex­
pansively construing the statutory term "religion" or by simply re­
stricting the scope of Federal RFRA's purely religious applications to 
comport with the Establishment Clause.338 
C. A Libertarian Approach to Interpretation: Broad Construction of 
"Religion" 
One approach to construction of Federal RFRA takes account of 
the Establishment Clause at the root ofthe interpretive process, obvi­
ating the need for Establishment Clause analysis of each distinct ap­
plication. The approach is simple: to avoid Establishment Clause 
problems, the meaning of "religion" in the text of RFRA should be 
understood to encompass all deeply held conscientious beliefs, 
whether or not the believers profess faith in a supreme being.339 Sev­
eral commentators have suggested in passing that courts might extend 
of establishment costs in two ways: by suspending for Establishment Clause claims the ordi­
nary prudential standing rule against rai�ing "generalized grievances," see Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 101-06 (1968), and by emphasizing the symbolic costs of actual or perceived 
governmental endorsements of religion. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (dis­
cussing endorsement test). 
337. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see infra 
notes 354-358 and accompanying text (discussing canon of constitutional doubt). 
338. Courts might also attempt to avoid Establishment Clause concerns by construing 
RFRA as returning the law to its pre-Smith state. See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Expan­
sion, supra note 1 10, at 633-34; see also Lupu, Lawyer's Guide, supra note 25, at 221-25 (ad­
vocating such a construction to avoid separation of powers concerns). That approach, how­
ever, might fail both to effectuate RFRA in a meaningful way and to solve the 
Establishment Clause problem. As to effectuating RFRA, the defects of the Sherbert-Smith 
interregnum in protecting religious freedom are well documented. See supra notes 24-27 and 
accompanying text. As to the Establishment Clause, the Court prior to Smith held certain 
endorsements mandatory as a matter of constitutional right under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Smith announced the effective demise of constitutionally compelled accommodations. 
Congress cannot make a law that, like the Free Exercise Clause, stands on equal footing with 
the Establishment Clause. Thus, the Court might construe RFRA as attempting to reinstate 
the pre-Smith law and still hold thaf the Act violated the Establishment Clause because Es­
tablishment Clause concerns trumped Congress's statutory initiative in a way that they could 
not trump the Free Exercise Clause. But see Chemerinsky, Establishment Clause, supra note 
272, at 653 (arguing that congressional power to interpret Constitution extends to expansion 
of free exercise rights to pre-Smith boundaries, apparently without regard to Establishment 
Clause). 
339. Steven Smith has noted that treating nontheistic conscientious accommodation 
claims like religious accommodation claims presumes religion is not meaningfully distinct 
from nontheistic sources of conscientious commitment, and that such a presumption can 
only be sustained by reference to some substantive principle. See Steven D. Smith, Blooming 
Confusion: Madison 's Mixed Legacy, 75 IND. L.J. 61, 65-70 (2000). In my view, religion is 
distinctive, but what makes it distinctive - its status as a uniquely potent and thus divisive 
source of conviction - is what makes it a constitutionally suspect ground for special exemp­
tions from the law. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text. 
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RFRA to cover nontheistic conscientious claims,340 but the problems 
and possibilities such an approach would present for statutory con­
struction remain unexamined. 
The notion of broadly construing the statutory term "religion" de­
rives from the Court's resolution of a similar problem in Welsh v. 
United States.341 That Vietnam-era case required the Court to deter­
mine who could qualify as a conscientious objector under section 6U) 
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The statutory text 
was blatantly sectarian, making the only acceptable basis for exemp­
tion from military service "religious training and belief" and limiting 
that category to "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme 
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human rela­
tion, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo­
sophical views or a merely personal moral code."342 When the Court 
initially confronted the statute in United States v. Seeger,343 it avoided 
the Establishment Clause issue by holding that any "sincere and 
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place 
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
exemption" fell within the statutory definition.344 Welsh, decided five 
years later, went farther, essentially turning the statutory definition on 
its head. The Court made clear that the Seeger umbrella encompassed 
"beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that 
nevertheless impose upon [the believer] a duty of conscience to refrain 
from participating in any war at any time."345 The Court avoided the 
340. See Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 77 n.187; Lupu, Reflec­
tions, supra note 49, at 809 & n.83; Lupu, Codification, supra note 83, at 590-91; Perry, supra 
note 298, at 315 n.67; Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 606; Volokh, 
Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1493-94; see also Smolla, supra note 23, at 942 & n.82 
(proposing an intermediate scrutiny standard �or religious accommodation claims that would 
have the effect of putting theistic and nontheistic conscientious claims on the same footing). 
But see Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 473 (recanting earlier sugges­
tion that saving construction of RFRA might be viable, on ground that RFRA "sends signals 
that are both difficult to ignore and impossible to reconcile with constitutional principle"); 
Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 232-235 (expressing skepticism about interpreting 
RFRA to protect nontheistic conscientious practices); Smith, supra note 113, at 658-59 (ar­
guing, in context of a proposed religious equality statute, that "since contemporary courts 
appear disinclined to engage in dynamic statutory interpretation, it is doubtful that courts 
would interpret 'religion' " to include nontheistic conscientious commitments (footnote 
omitted)). 
341. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
342. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964) (amended 1967). The Welsh Court noted that a 1967 
amendment to the Act had deleted the reference to "a Supreme Being." Id. (1964 ed. Supp. 
IV), cited in Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336 n.2. 
343. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
344. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. 
345. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340; see also id. at 344 (concluding that statute "exempts from 
military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or relig­
ious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of 
an instrument of war"). Justice Harlan, who had joined the Seeger majority, concurred only 
1980 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1903 
Robson's choice between countenancing a blatant preference for re­
ligion and ending the possibility of exemption from the draft, distilling 
from the words of the statute the essence of conscientious opposition 
to violence.346 
Some commentators, recognizing the Establishment Clause prob­
lem raised by disparate treatment of different classes of conscientious 
beliefs, have urged a constitutional system of accommodations that es­
sentially adopts the Welsh principle.347 But understanding the term 
"religion" in the text of the First Amendment - the source of manda­
tory accommodation claims - to encompass nontheistic belief systems 
would present a host of problems. First, such a reading obviously 
would be difficult to justify textually or by reference to the Framers' 
in the judgment in Welsh, rejecting "the liberties taken with the statute" by the Court but 
agreeing that the statute should be applied expansively "as the touchstone for salvaging a 
congressional policy of long standing that would otherwise have to be nullified" under the 
Establishment Clause. See id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). For more detailed 
discussion of the Court's approach to statutory construction in Welsh, see Eisgruber & 
Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1294-95; Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 229-232. 
346. The Court revisited the conscientious objector statute in Gillette v. United States, 
401 U.S. 437 (1971), where it held that the statute's limitation to objectors who opposed all 
wars, as opposed to people who believed that some wars could be just, neither interfered 
with the free exercise rights of the latter group, see id. at 461-62, nor preferred some relig­
ions over others in violation of the Establishment Clause, see id. at 448-60. Justice Douglas's 
dissent portrayed the Court as preferring theistic over nontheistic conscientious claims. See 
id. at 463-70 (Douglas, J. dissenting). The Court, however, was careful to emphasize that the 
interpretive issues aodressed in Seeger and Welsh were "not relevant to the present issue," 
id. at 447, and it repeatedly used the ambivalent phrase "religion and conscience" or "con­
science and religion" to describe the subject of the statute. See id. at 445, 455, 458, 459, 461. 
The Court expressly held "that persons who object solely to participation in a particular war 
are not within the purview of the exempting section, even though the latter objection may 
have such roots in a claimant's conscience and personality that it is 'religious' in character." 
Id. at 447. One of the two objectors in Gillette was Catholic, but the Court described the sec­
ond as basing his claim on "a humanist approach to religion" and "fundamental principles of 
conscience and deeply held views about the purpose and obligation of human existence." Id. 
at 439. 
347. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur­
ring) (suggesting that, where Establishment Clause forbids accommodation Free Exercise 
Clause requires, court should require government to expand accommodation to similarly 
situated nonbelievers); Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1282-1301 (pro­
posing "equal regard" approach to constitutional accommodations); Laycock, Neutrality, 
supra note 29, at 1002; Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 778-79; Marshall, Equality, supra 
note 236, at 205; see also Gedicks, Unfirm Foundation, supra note 270, at 571-72 (discussing 
proposals for extending free exercise accommodations to secular conscientious beliefs). But 
see Durham, supra note 227, at 685 ("It may be that worldviews should receive equal treat­
ment whether they are religious or not. But this does not imply that all worldviews are nec­
essarily religious." (footnote omitted)); Hall, supra note 292, at 545-48 (arguing that Court's 
free exercise jurisprudence accords religious commitments protection not accorded to other 
conscientious commitments based on special characteristics of religion); McConnell, Update, 
supra note 195, at 717 (arguing that text of First Amendment requires preference for ac­
commodation of religious over nonreligious norms); Sherry, supra note 29, at 149 n.103 (ar­
guing that avoiding Establishment Clause problems by accommodating those similarly situ­
ated to religious believers "would be highly impractical"). 
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intent.348 Second, if the Court construed the Free Exercise Clause to 
protect "religion in the traditional sense, or any other conscientious 
belief system," it would dramatically expand the class of beliefs enti­
tled to immutable constitutional protection. The Court has resisted 
expanding Free Exercise Clause protection beyond traditionally con­
stituted religions.349 Third, the word "religion" in the First Amend­
ment animates not only the Free Exercise Clause but also the Estab­
lishment Clause. Reading the Establishment Clause to bar the federal 
government from "establishing" any conscientious belief system could 
inhibit the president and Congress from advocating and implementing 
all manner of policies, from racial justice to free trade and beyond, 
that may constitute deeply held commitments of conscience.350 
. In contrast, Federal RFRA creates an unprecedented opportunity 
to develop a broad-based system of accommodations under federal 
law that incorporates the Welsh principle - if the Court is willing to 
take a significant interpretive step. Because RFRA is only a statute, 
interpreting the word "religion" in its text to encompass nontheistic 
conscientious beliefs would not have the broad implications of trying 
to impose that reading on the Constitution.351 Courts may consider 
348. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 290, at 1488-500 (discussing Framers' consid­
eration and rejection of broad constitutional protection for conscientious beliefs). 
349. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (emphasizing distinction be­
tween Amish religious beliefs and nonreligious, philosophical beliefs as grounds for exemp­
tion from general laws); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (declining to 
extend Free Exercise Clause to nonreligious conscientious objection). But see Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-90, 495 n.11 (1961) (striking down state's requirement that of­
ficeholders profess belief in God because requirement discriminated against nontheistic re­
ligions). 
350. "The culture of liberal democracy may well function as a belief system with sub­
stantive content, rather than a neutral and transcendent arbiter among other belief systems." 
Sullivan, supra note 26, at 199; see also Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the 
Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. 
L. REV. 1047, 1082 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Continuity and Change] ("[G]eneral public 
policy and the operation of public institutions must inevitably be based on the moral deci­
sions of political bodies."); Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 987 ("Government . . .  transmits 
messages about value, direction, and goals for its citizens."). The federal government fre­
quently advocates policy initiatives in moral or conscientious terms. See, e.g. , Jack Germond 
& Jules Witcover, . . .  And a Moral Justification?, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Louisville, Ky., 
Jan. 6, 1991, at 3D (recounting President Bush I's professed moral justification for U.S. in­
volvement in the Persian Gulf); Doyle McManus, Shultz Criticized For Opposing Aid to An­
golan Rebels, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1985, at 16 (recounting House Republican Leader Robert 
H. Michel's statement that U.S. support for Angolan Rebels was based not only on 
geostrategy but moral necessity). See generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT 
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983). 
351. In light of RFRA's textual limitation to "religion," the Court might limit the scope 
of Federal RFRA to those accommodations of conscience that would be constitutionally 
permissible on purely religious grounds. That approach would mirror the view of some 
commentators that religion should receive at least as much protection as any other sort of 
conscientious claim. Cf Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 49-50 (suggesting constitu­
tional "most-favored nation status" for religious liberty claims); McConnell, Accommoda­
tion, supra note 292, at 14 ("Religion . . .  is at least as protected and encouraged as any other 
form of belief and association - in some ways more so."); Smith, supra note 113, at 674 
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nontheistic conscientious claims and religious conscientious claims on 
the same footing, extending heightened protection to both categories 
as a matter not of constitutional mandate but of statutory right. Thus, 
under this approach, the claim of a committed communist to relief 
from a congressional ban on travel to Cuba would stand on compara­
ble footing with the claim of a Sikh who wore a ceremonial dagger to 
relief from a ban on carrying weapons into a federal building. The 
Welsh principle could apply in the same manner to any statutory 
scheme of permissive accommodation, but RFRA presents a distinc­
tive vehicle for extending generalized protection of conscience over 
the whole of federal law. 
The most significant problem with following Welsh as an interpre­
tive model for Federal RFRA is that the statute, as originally enacted, 
defined the term "exercise of religion" to correspond with the mean­
ing of that term in the First Amendment.352 Because of the problems 
presented by reading the Free Exercise Clause to encompass nontheis­
tic conscientious practices, and because the Court has declined to ex­
pand the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause in that manner, 
Congress's decision to lash the statute to the Constitution appears to 
preclude a Welsh approach to RFRA.353 The canon of constitutional 
doubt, however, dictates that the Court must, if possible, construe a 
statutory provision in a manner that avoids serious constitutional 
problems.354 The Court's recent decision in Miller v. French355 followed 
(proposing religious equality statute under which " [n)either religion nor conscience could be 
discriminated against on establishment grounds."); see also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 
779 (suggesting that religion should not be excluded from generally available government 
aid). But see Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1539-42 (objecting to approach 
to accommodations whereby any exception to an application of a legal rule compels equiva­
lent accommodation of religion). On the other hand, the Court might decide that Congress 
drafted RFRA to extend the fullest constitutionally permissible protection to conscience. 
Under that construction, the Establishment Clause might impose constraints on "religious" 
claims within the meaning of the First Amendment that would not limit parallel nontheistic 
claims. 
352. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (1994) ("As used in this [Act) . . .  the term 'exercise of 
religion' means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution."). 
Congress in 2000 ameliorated this problem for future cases when it amended RFRA to de­
fine "religious exercise" without reference to the First Amendment. See supra note 198. 
RFRA now defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2001). The 
new definition arguably bolsters the case for a Welsh-like reading of Federal RFRA, because 
it decouples the "exercise of religion" from any "system of religious belief." The original 
definition still matters in adjudicating claims for retroactive relief brought under RFRA 
prior to the amendment. Cf Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001) (ap­
plying amendment retroactively where primary relief sought was injunctive). 
353. See Idleman, supra note 193, at 288 n.217 (arguing that such a reading would be 
"thoroughly in derogation of clear statutory language and express constitutional intent"); 
Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 232-33. 
354. "When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious 
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain 
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
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a strict line on this principle of construction. The Prison Litigation Re­
form Act ("PLRA") imposes an automatic stay of the terms of exist­
ing injunctive relief if prison officials of ' intervenors move to lift the 
injunction under the new substantive standards announced by the 
PLRA.356 In Miller, the Court declined to read into the automatic stay 
provision an allowance for judges to suspend the automatic stay in 
their equitable discretion, holding instead that Congress clearly had 
intended for the automatic stay to be mandatory.357 The contrast be­
tween the PLRA and Federal RFRA is illuminating. In both instances, 
Congress would have wanted to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality. 
In the PLRA context, however, the path of least constitutional resis­
tance would have required Congress to contradict the policy of the 
statute, which is to raise the hurdle prisoners must clear in order to 
sustain injunctive relief. In contrast, reading Federal RFRA to en­
compass nontheistic conscientious claims would be at worst irrelevant 
to the policy of the statute. Congress in RFRA wanted to protect re­
ligious exercise from governmental interference. Nothing in the text or 
legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress affirmatively 
wanted to privilege religious exercise to the exclusion of other consci­
entious practices. The villain was government regulation, not secular 
conscience. Thus, Miller suggests that application of the canon of con­
stitutional doubt would be appropriate in construing Federal RFRA.358 
avoided." Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). The Court has been very assertive in imputing 
meanings to statutes in order to satisfy the Ashwander directive. See, e.g. , Solid Waste 
Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (refusing to accept agency's con­
struction of Clean Water Act, which invoked the "outer limits" of Congress's Commerce 
Clause power, without clear evidence of congressional intent, due to Court's "prudential de­
sire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues"); United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 
U.S. 64 (1994) (imputing scienter requirement as to age of minority to subsections of statute 
prohibiting child pornography); see also Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 
(1988) (declining to construe subsection of National Labor Relations Act differently from 
that of a materially identical statute in which avoidance of constitutional questions was 
deemed reasonable). 
355. 530 U.S. 327 (2000); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (declining to 
construe reference to "substantial portion" of fetus in statute banning late-term abortions 
narrowly to exclude constitutionally protected abortion procedure); DeBartolo Corp. v. 
Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (holding appli­
cation of canon of constitutional doubt inappropriate where "plainly contrary to the intent 
of Congress"); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985) ("Statutes should be con­
strued to avoid constitutional questions, but this interpretive canon is not a license for the 
judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature."). 
356. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). The substantive provisions of the 
PLRA set forth new, more stringent standards that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to win in­
junctive relief against prisons or to sustain existing injunctive relief against a motion to ter­
minate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (Supp. IV 1998). 
357. See Miller, 530 U.S. 327 (2000). 
358. Cf Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 73 (contending that legislative purpose should 
play a relatively greater role, and plain meaning a relatively lesser role, in judicial construc­
tion of statutes that borrow constitutional terminology, because "[s)tatutes that borrow Ian-
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Apart from the fundamental Establishment Clause issue, two fea­
tures of RFRA provide affirmative reasons for the Court to adopt . a 
Welsh construction of the Act. The first involves . another canon of 
statutory construction: that the Court must, if possible, read a statute 
to give effect to all its provisions.359 A strong reading of Congress's 
statement that the term "exercise of religion" in RFRA means what 
that term means in the Constitution would compromise RFRA by 
equating the statute with the Free Exercise Clause as narrowly inter­
preted in Smith.360 Thus, taking at face value Congress's equation of 
the statutory and constitutional "religion" terms could render RFRA 
incoherent or ineffectual.361 To avoid this conundrum, the Court might 
fairly interpret the Act's definitional language as providing that . the 
statutory term "exercise of religion" meant nothing less than the con­
stitutional term, or that the statutory term should apply as broadly as 
the broadest conception of constitutional free exercise the Court had 
articulated prior to Smith.362 The Court might be reluctant to construe 
RFRA's definitional language in this manner, because Congress knew 
when it drafted the statute that the Smith Court had construed the 
Free Exercise Clause narrowly. Congress, however, did not know con-
guage from judicial decisions, in which that language is both artful and contextually consti­
tuted, simply cannot be understood as possessing meaning that is plain"). 
359. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 at 105 (Norman J. Singer ed., 
5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (footnotes omitted): 
[T]he general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts 
be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object, and if the language is sus­
ceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest 
object, it should receive the former construction. 
See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948) ("[W]e must heed the . . .  well-settled doc­
trine of this Court to read a statute, assuming that it is susceptible of either of two opposed 
interpretations, in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of 
the legislative draftsmen."). 
360. "[I]f [a statutory] definition is arbitrary, creates obvious incongruities in the statute, 
defeats a major purpose of the legislation or is so discordant to common usage as to generate 
confusion, it should not be used." SUTHERLAND § 47.07 at 152. 
361. See Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 26 ("If courts . . .  do no more than wipe Smith 
itself off the books . . .  then the statute will accomplish little."); cf. Eisgruber & Sager, Un­
constitutional, supra note 36, at 474-75 (suggesting the Court could save RFRA from uncon­
stitutionality by limiting its protection to post-Smith understanding of Free Exercise Clause); 
Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 132-33 (suggesting and rejecting same 
narrowing construction); see also Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 25 ("A judge who perceives 
that a legislature has chosen her institutional path rather than its own may erroneously in­
terpret such an enactment as more of an affirmation of judicial discretion than it is meant to 
be."). 
362. In fact, the reason for Congress's adoption of the constitutional meaning of "exer­
cise of religion" appears to have been nothing more than a desire to avoid the need for a 
legislative determination whether protected religious exercise entailed religious compulsion 
as opposed to mere religious motivation. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 230�31 & 
n.125 (describing legislative history of RFRA's "exercise of religion" definition). 
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elusively until Boerne that it lacked authority to expand the meaning 
of constitutional protections when legislating under Section 5.363 
Second, the context of RFRA's drafting and passage should inform 
the Court's understanding of what Congress meant when it set out to 
protect ''religion." Congress drafted, debated, and enacted RFRA in 
1993, in response to a case that itself presented a claim the Framers 
might not have accepted as "religious." The last two centuries have 
brought developments in philosophy and the natural sciences that 
have scattered Americans' spiritual and conscientious commitments 
far beyond the range of traditional, theistic beliefs.364 Those develop­
ments cast doubt on the need to limit the statutory term "religion" to 
traditional, theistic belief systems. RFRA's broad support among 
groups that frequently differ on questions of governmental solicitude 
toward religion365 and its nearly universal . support in Congress366 are 
consistent with a congressional purpose of spreading the statute's 
benefits to the broadest possible set of deeply held conscientious 
commitments. 
Construing Federal RFRA to protect all adherents of conscien­
tious belief systems from federal interference with their conscientious 
exercise would bring significant benefits. First and foremost, the Act 
would present no Establishment Clause problem, because it would dis­
tribute benefits on an equitable basis that would have nothing to do 
with the constitutionally problematic category of "religion." The po­
litical will embodied in RFRA to protect freedom of conscience would 
be fully effectuated in the federal sphere. In addition, the proposed 
construction would dampen the Smith Court's concern about avoiding 
judicial forays into questions of religious doctrine,367 a distinctly prob-
363. This argument would be simpler had Congress enacted an independent Federal 
RFRA without applying the Act to the states through Section 5, and then defined the statu­
tory term "free exercise of religion" to track the constitutional term. In that scenario, if my 
arguments supra Part I are correct, Congress would have had no reason to doubt its power 
to extend the concept of "free exercise of religion" as far as it wished in protecting conscien­
tious beliefs against federal encroachment. Interpretation of the surviving federal applica­
tions of RFRA, however, must take into account the entire Act as originally enacted. 
364. See Conkle, Religious Liberty, supra note 261, at 29-32 (discussing the growing im­
portance of nontheistic analogues to religion and suggesting that "the Court appears to be­
lieve - perhaps with good reason - that the line between religion and nonreligion is in­
creasingly thin in contemporary America"); Laycock, Continuity and Change, supra note 
350, at 1079-81 (discussing ubiquity of theistic religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradi­
tion, "so-called cults," New Age spirituality, and secular humanist attempts "to fill the func­
tions of religion"); Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 592 (noting that ·� [n]onreligious 
associations may perform many of the psychological, social, political, and economic func­
tions commonly associated with religion"). 
365. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
366. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 
30,.at 244 ("The lopsided votes in both houses of Congress should send a strong message to 
the judiciary that accommodating religious exercise is important."). · 
367. See supra Section Il.C. 
1986 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1903 
lematic enterprise under the First Amendment, because the RFRA 
inquiry would focus on whether the claimant sincerely held any con­
scientious belief that the challenged governmental practice substan­
tially burdened.368 
The major disadvantage of this broad construction, aside from the 
interpretive complications discussed above, is that a Federal RFRA 
construed to protect all manner of conscientious claims could shield 
masses of people from the reach of generally applicable laws. Justice 
Scalia's opinion in Smith emphasized the danger that strict scrutiny of 
free exercise claims would yield "a system in which each conscience . is 
a law unto itself."369 Professors Eisgruber and Sager have warned re­
peatedly of the anarchic potential of a wide-ranging religious accom­
modation doctrine.370 With regard to religion in particular, they ex­
plain: 
Religious belief need not be founded on reason, guided by reason, or 
governed in any way by the reasonable. Accordingly, the demands that 
religions place on the faithful, and the demands that the faithful can in 
turn place on society in the name of unimpaired flourishing [of religion], 
are potentially extravagant. 371 
An interpretive approach that constrained RFRA within the Es­
tablishment Clause, which I sketch below, would substantially allevi­
ate this concern in a manner not possible under a constitutional doc­
trine of mandatory exemptions.372 But my proposed broad 
construction of the statutory term "religion" to extend Federal 
368. "Conscience" is a difficult term to define, perhaps more difficult if less problematic 
than "religion," and if the Act is construed in the manner I propose, courts will need to sort 
out what sorts of claims Federal RFRA encompasses. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, 
supra note 21, at 1268-70 (discussing conceptual difficulties inherent in defining "con­
science"); Smith, supra note 1 13, at 675-86 (same); cf supra notes 222-229 and accompanying 
text (discussing possibility of determining whether a claim is "religious"). In the alternative, 
courts could default to a deferential evaluation of the claimant's subjective conscientious 
beliefs. Cf supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text (proposing judicial inquiry into sub­
jective sincerity of claimant's belief as an alternative to determining whether claim is objec­
tively "religious" within meaning of RFRA). The Court's approach in the Vietnam-era con­
scientious objector cases could provide additional guidance. See supra notes 341-346 and 
accompanying text. 
369. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
370. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1256-57; Eisgruber & Sager, 
Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 447-48. 
371. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1256; see also Fish, supra note 301, 
at 2255 ("All of liberalism's efforts to accommodate or tame illiberal forces fail, either by 
underestimating and trivializing the illiberal impulse, or by mirroring it."). But see 
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1149-52 (suggesting that courts must subordinate 
rule of law concerns to constitutional guarantee of religious freedom). 
372. See infra Section IIl.D.1. 
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RFRA's coverage to nontheistic conscientious claims would exacer­
bate the problem.373 
Fortunately, the very scope of a Federal RFRA construed to pro­
tect all conscientious claims implies the means for its own limitation. 
Courts should consider the potentially sweeping effects that accom­
modating particular conscientious beliefs or practices would have over 
a range of cases.374 This sort of analysis has led courts consistently to 
deny free exercise claims for relief from the obligation to pay taxes.375 
Even steadfast defenders of a strict scrutiny standard for purely relig­
ious accommodation claims have acknowledged that consideration of 
a given accommodation's potentially sweeping applications should in­
form the compelling interest analysis to some extent.376 This approach 
to the compelling interest requirement would not implicate the over­
blown concern that applying strict scrutiny under a broadly construed 
Federal RFRA would "water down" the standard in constitutional set-
373. "There is simply no government activity that could not compromise someone's 
conscience." Loewy, supra note 58, at 107; see also Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra 
note 21, at 1268-69 (pointing out that nontheistic conscientious commitments share many of 
the features that cause accommodation of religious commitments to threaten the rule of 
law); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 606-07 (suggesting that extending 
exemptions under RFRA to encompass nontheistic claims might increase the volume of 
claims sufficiently to undermine compelling governmental interests). But see Smith, supra 
note 1 13, at 682-83 (noting "strong cultural currents that often cut against exercising one's 
conscience"). 
374. See supra notes 325-328 and accompanying text. 
375. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (though requirement to pay So­
cial Security taxes burdened Amish employer's free exercise rights, requirement is never­
theless constitutional). Courts applying RFRA have continued to deny accommodation 
claims for relief from the obligation to pay taxes. See, e.g. , Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 
25 (2nd Cir. 1999) (IRS penalties and interest levied for taxes withheld on grounds of relig-
ious opposition to war did not violate RFRA). 
· 
376. See Laycock, Ratchet, supra note 13; at 148: 
I agree that the number of potential claims is relevant to assessing the government's interest; 
it matters if we know that many claims are likely. Because the government must give equal 
treatment to similarly situated conscientious objectors, an exemption for one objector entails 
an exemption for all others who hold the same belief. Arbitrarily exempting some and 
prosecuting others similarly situated is not a less restrictive means of exempting some. So if 
the government has a compelling interest in denying exemption to the whole group of simi­
larly situated objectors, it also has a compelling interest in denying exemption to each one of 
them. 
See also id. at 149 (suggesting that government has compelling interest in denying accommo­
dations in contexts, such as tax objections, where "self interest creates incentives to large 
numbers of claims"); Berg, New Attacks, supra note 1 10, at 431-32; Marshall, Defense, supra 
note 23, at 312. But see Durham, supra note 227, at 715 (arguing that government interest 
must be assessed "by reference to the harm associated with exempting the religious claimant 
alone and not by assessing the total damage if the exemption were somehow universalized or 
turned into a precedent that somehow unraveled the entire governmental program"). 
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tings,377 because the compelling interest in maintaining the rule of law 
is distinctive to the conditions such a statute would create.378 
Despite the drawbacks of a Welsh-like construction of Federal 
RFRA, the Court should follow this libertarian course. Doing so is, on 
balance, the best way for the judicial branch to uphold the 
Constitution while also effectuating the political will embodied in 
RFRA to the greatest possible extent. 
D. A Restrictive Approach to Interpretation: Subordinating RFRA 
Accommodation Claims to the Establishment Clause 
If the Court did not accept the broad interpretation of "religion" 
advocated above, a second mechanism would be available to eliminate 
the Establishment Clause problems raised by RFRA. The symbiosis of 
Smith and RFRA replaces the federal government's political discre­
tion not to accommodate religion with a firm constitutional limitation 
grounded in the Establishment Clause. Reading Federal RFRA to 
permit accommodation of religion within Establishment Clause 
boundaries would secure the Establishment Clause against violation 
under the Act while leaving a significant set of permissible applica� 
tions.379 
1. Subordinating Federal RFRA to the Establishment Clause 
Although RFRA's language reflects clear congressional will to 
"overrule" Smith, the Act may be understood to work in conjunction 
with Smith to form a regime that governs religious accommodation in 
the federal sphere. RFRA states as a statutory matter that accommo­
dation is required to the extent it is constitutionally permissible. Thus, 
377. See supra notes 238-341 and accompanying text (refuting Smith Court's parallel 
objection to broadly applying strict scrutiny under Free Exercise Clause). 
378. A different potential objection to the broad construction of "religion" I propose is 
that it would "water down" the potency of strict scrutiny in religious accommodation cases 
by expanding the range of potential claimants and thus the threat accommodations pose to 
the rule of law. This objection, of course, does not apply to constitutional religious freedom 
claims, because whatever free exercise accommodation claims survived Smith (e.g., "hybrid 
rights" claims) remain limited by narrow First Amendment meaning of "religion." See supra 
notes 347-350 and accompanying text. As to religious accommodation claims under RFRA 
itself, my contention is that the Establishment Clause would void many if not most purely 
religious applications absent my proposed broad construction. Thus, there is nothing to wa­
ter down. 
379. Professor Lupu characterizes the Establishment Clause objection to Federal RFRA 
as broader than the separation of powers objections, "because the Establishment Clause 
ground would have consequences for·state legislation as well." Lupu, Reflections, supra note 
49, at 810 n.84. Presumably Professor Lupu is referring to a facial Establishment Clause 
attack on the Act. My suggestion that the Establishment Clause forbids some but not all 
purely religious accommodations renders its consequences potentially narrower at .the fed­
eral level (and perhaps in the aggregate) than the consequences of a separation of powers 
problem. 
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the task of courts that apply RFRA is simply to measure the scope of 
the Act against the Establishment Clause.380 In the past, the jurispru­
dence of religious accommodation has been complicated by the often 
unstated imperative to balance free exercise against establishment 
concems.381 Under Federal RFRA, the Supreme Court can administer 
a meaningful regime of accommodations without having to choose be­
tween competing constitutional provisions.382 It can limit its constitu­
tional analysis to "monitor[ing] its religion clause jurisprudence to en­
sure that the lines it has drawn pursuant to the Establishment Clause 
result in an appropriate and pragmatic balance of power between 
church and state. "383 The federal government likely will intensify the 
Establishment Clause focus of RFRA cases by advancing its duty to 
380. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 60 & n.272 (stating that "[a]ll courts need do 
with [discretionary accommodations] is measure them against the Establishment Clause" but 
noting that such measurement "is no simple task"); Marshall, Defense, supra note 23, at 323 
("Statutory exemptions raise the Establishment Clause issue of what the Constitution allows; 
the free exercise exemption asks what the Constitution requires."); Smith, supra note 1 13, at 
652-53 (noting that a religious equality statute would continue to be trumped by the First 
Amendment); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 601 (suggesting that under 
RFRAs the "constitutional norm of equal treatment without regard to religiosity trumps the 
statutory preference for religious objectors over conscientious objectors"). 
381. See supra notes 283-287 and accompanying text; see also Lupu, Reconstructing, su­
pra note 233, at 575-76 ("Free exercise rights trump Establishment Clause limits, but free 
exercise 'values' do not . . . .  By the same token, Establishment Clause 'values' do not trump 
free exercise rights."). · 
· 
382. Enforcing Federal RFRA under a strong conception of the Establishment Clause 
does not endanger the possibility that the Court might revisit Smith and expand the reach of 
the Free Exercise Clause. Such freezing in place of Smith was a danger under RFRA as 
originally enacted, because the Act converted almost all religious freedom claims from con­
stitutional to statutory. See Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 75; 
Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 142; Hamilton, S�ction 5, supra note 85, at 382; 
Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 254-56; see a.Isa ldleman, supra note 193, at 328-29; Lupu, 
Codification, supra note 83, at 580-82 (discussing general danger that religious freedom leg­
islation will cause "atrophy" in development of constitutional religious freedom norms). Af­
ter Boerne, however, any free exercise claim against a state or local government could pro­
vide a vehicle for overruling Smith. 
383. Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 12. Professor Hamilton emphasizes 
the Court's duty to enforce the Establishment Clause in accommodation cases as a reason to 
reject RFRA. See id. In my view, RFRA makes that duty far easier to perform than it was 
under the Sherbert era's constitutional tension between the religion clauses. Indeed, Federal 
RFRA may enhance the scope of judicial review of accommodations under the Establish­
ment Clause. Professor McConnell noted prior to RFRA's enactment that "[legislative] 
[a]ccommodation can be accomplished by inaction just as it can by action . . . .  [L]egislatures 
can simply refrain from passing laws that burden the exercise of religion by mainstream 
groups, and there is nothing the Establishment Clause can do about this." McConnell, Revi­
sionism, supra note 21, at 1132. Under Federal RFRA, Congress need not fear that any gen­
erally applicable law will substantially burden religious practice; thus, it may enact some laws 
that previously it would have foregone. The Court, however, may then have an opportunity 
to weigh religious believers' claims for exemption from such laws against the Establishment 
Clause. Until and unless Congress begins to consider the danger of judicial action, the net 
result under RFRA should be a federal regulatory structure in which favoritism toward re­
ligion plays a lesser role. 
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avoid establishments as the compelling interest that justifies depar­
tures from Federal RFRA's mandate.384 
The Eighth Circuit's In re Young385 decision is an example of an 
application of RFRA that should have been scrutinized and rejected 
under the Establishment Clause. That court properly rejected a facial 
challenge to Federal RFRA on Establishment Clause grounds386 but 
declined to consider the possibility that applying RFRA to the case at 
bar might offend the Establishment Clause. To award religious believ­
ers a special exemption from bankruptcy law, a mechanism provided 
by the federal government to sort out private rights under circum­
stances of financial hardship, does not protect religious exercise. Re­
ligious exercise, like any expression of conscience, is necessarily sub­
ject to material constraints of the believer's own making.387 Rather, the 
result in Young advanced religion by protecting a church's coffers, and 
the court created a strong appearance of endorsement by validating a 
purported congressional decision to favor churches' creditors.388 
384. Cf Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ . .  of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-46 (1995) (rejecting 
state's argument that Establishment Clause prevented it from funding religious publication 
at public university); see Brownstein, supra note 288, at 611 (contending that government's 
duty to avoid establishments should provide compelling interest to prevent RFRAs from 
providing exemptions from content-neutral speech regulations); Chemerinsky, Establish­
ment Clause, supra note 272, at 657-58. Professor Chemerinsky implies that the Establish­
ment Clause is relevant in RFRA cases only if the government invokes the clause as the 
source of its compelling interest in denying a RFRA claim. See id. at 657 (contending that 
"the Establishment Clause is not irrelevant under a state RFRA" because " [t]he government 
should be regarded as having a compelling interest in not violating the Establishment 
Clause"). Courts, however, have the prerogative and the duty to raise the Establishment 
Clause sua sponte where appropriate, in order to prevent their own actions in enforcing 
RFRA claims from establishing religion. Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding 
that judicial enforcement of private discrimination violates Equal Protection Clause). 
385. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854 (1998). 
For a description of the Young case, see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. 
386. See id. at 861-63. 
387. In this sense Young differs significantly from cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court determined that the claimant, who lost her job because she 
followed her religious tenet of refusing to work on Saturday, was not voluntarily unem­
ployed. Her lack of employment was, in a sense, her own choice, but her religious convic­
tions motivated that choice, and the Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause pre­
cluded the state from punishing her for adhering to those convictions. See id. at 409-10. In 
contrast, the bankruptcy of the claimants in Young presumably had nothing to do with their 
religious convictions: it was, instead, a consequence of nonreligious choices (and circum­
stances), but one that happened to affect their ability to tithe to their church. In Sherbert, the 
Court barred the government from penalizing a religious believer based on her religious ex­
ercise. In Young, the court forced the government to grant religious believers a special re­
prieve from the consequences of their nonconscientious actions. 
388. The Eighth Circuit has not been alone in its errant application of RFRA in bank­
ruptcy cases. See Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church v. Fitzgerald (Jn re Hodge), 220 
B.R. 386 (D. Idaho 1998) (RFRA provided defense to Chapter 7 trustee's action to recover 
tithing payments made by debtors to their church). But see Hartvig v. Tri-City Temple of 
Milwaukie (Jn re Gomes), 219 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998) (recovery of debtors' tithes and 
offerings to church by Chapter 7 trustee did not violate RFRA); cf Waguespack v. 
Rodriguez, 220 B.R. 31 (W.D. La. 1998) (holding that Boerne declared RFRA unconstitu-
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Subordinating RFRA to the Establishment Clause, like the alter­
nate interpretive course of broadly construing the statutory term "re­
ligion," would relieve courts of the need to balance and reconcile es­
tablishment and free exercise principles. In addition, this more 
restrictive approach would dramatically limit the breadth of Federal 
RFRA's coverage, thereby alleviating rule of law concerns.389 On the 
other hand, the Act under this construction would do less than under 
the libertarian construction to effectuate Congress's intent to protect 
religious exercise to the broadest possible extent. The restrictive con­
struction, by keeping the focus of RFRA on "religion" as understood 
in the Constitution, also would have the disadvantage of requiring 
courts to engage with religious substance. In addition, Rodney Smith 
has suggested - approvingly - that religious liberty statutes might 
influence courts to soften their applications of the Establishment 
Clause at the margin.390 The likelihood that courts would follow such 
an approach to Federal RFRA is uncertain, but from a separationist 
standpoint it is a danger that cannot be ignored. 
RFRA's critics might see this analysis as an alternative route to 
their conclusion that the Act, in all its applications, must fall before 
the Establishment Clause.391 Certainly, under the formulation of the 
Establishment Clause I am applying here,392 many conceivable ac­
commodations will be barred in regulatory fields ranging from immi­
gration to criminal law to taxation. Likewise, direct governmental sub­
sidies of religious practice, whether demanded under RFRA or 
volunteered, raise unacceptable establishment concerns on both sym­
bolic and fiscal grounds.393 Significant accommodation, however, is 
tional in its totality; thus, RFRA has no application as to claim that denial of debtors' tithing 
infringes on their free exercise). 
389. See supra notes 369-373 and accompanying text. 
390. See Smith, supra note 113, at 653-54. 
391. See, e.g., Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 242 (suggesting that applications of 
RFRA might present a categorical problem under the endorsement test for Establishment 
Clause violations); cf ldleman, supra note 193, at 325-27 (lamenting possibility that interpre­
tation of RFRA in light of the Establishment Clause might result in extremely narrow con­
struction). 
392. See supra notes 296-301 and accompanying text. 
393. Cf Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding that state finan­
cial aid programs for nonpublic schools serving low-income families, ·and for parents of pu­
pils of such schools, violate the Establishment Clause by subsidizing and advancing religious 
activities of sectarian schools); see Sullivan, supra note 26, at 209-10 (explaining that forcing 
the public to fund religious activities "will cause profound divisiveness and offense"). But see 
Perry, supra note 298, at 322 (arguing that Establishment Clause permits direct aid to relig­
ious entities if "the aid is provided on a religiously neutral basis" and "the aid program is not 
a subterfuge for discriminating in favor of one or more religions in relation to one or more 
other religions or to no religion"). Professors Eisgruber and Sager argue generally that 
purely religious exemptions are indistinguishable from subsidies of religious institutions, and 
thus they assail "the incongruity of calling for exemptions on the one hand while renouncing 
subsidies on the other." Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 106. The equa­
tion of exemptions with subsidies may be accurate in many circumstances, but it does not 
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permissible under the Establishment Clause, even if RFRA extends 
only to "religious belief" as conventionally understood. 
2. Some Permissible Religious Accommodations Under Federal 
RFRA 
The question of what applications of Federal RFRA, as construed 
in the restrictive manner just articulated, would be permissible under 
the Establishment Clause implicates debates about what accommoda­
tions the Court should understand the Free Exercise Clause to man­
date and what accommodations legislatures may choose to make.394 
This brief discussion aims not to resolve those debates, nor to diagram 
the full set of accommodations that federal . courts might or should al­
low under RFRA.395 I merely want to set forth two important catego­
ries of mandatory statutory accommodations that I believe are permis­
sible under a separationist conception of the Establishment Clause, in 
order to demonstrate that a RFRA subordinated to the Establishment 
Clause would still have meaningful impact. Both of these categories of 
religious accommodations can be justified and understood without re­
gard to religion - the first as a nondiscrimination principle, the sec­
ond as a utilitarian principle. 
a. Egalitarian accommodations 
First, Federal RFRA can bolster the constitutional protection 
against religious discrimination. The law of free exercise typically di­
vides legal affronts to religious practice into two categories: (a) willful 
state action that discriminates against a particular religion or against 
religion in general, and (b) neutral state action that incidentally bur­
dens religion. The Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City 
describe the categories of purely religious accommodations defended below. See infra Sec­
tion III.D.2.a. (discussing egalitarian accommodations); infra Section 111.D.2.b. (discussing 
idiosyncratic accommodations). A straightforward equation of exemptions with sut.sidies 
misses the emphasis that Establishment Clause doctrine properly places on the apparent 
character of a government action, a factor manifest in the purpose inquiry under the Lemon 
test and central to the endorsement test. See supra notes 273-277 and accompanying text. 
394. See supra notes 290-295 and accompanying text. 
395. Others have offered general theories of permissible legislative accommodation. See 
Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 45-51 (suggesting interpretive theory to prevent establish­
ments under RFRA, focused on avoiding accommodations that coerce or strongly encourage 
religious participation and emphasizing accommodations' function of guaranteeing "auton­
omy" for religious practices; McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at 710-12 (suggesting ways 
in which "government's authority to accommodate is broader than its obligation to accom­
modate under pre-Smith law"); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 600-08 
(recognizing "the possibility tha.t some religion-only exemptions are constitutional and oth­
ers aren't," and accordingly attempting to identify critical questions that need to be an­
swered in order to sort out religious exemptions that may violate the Establishment Clause 
from those that do not). 
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of Hialeah396 confirmed that the first category requires strict scrutiny, 
while Smith held that the second does not. But a third sort of case does 
not fit comfortably into either category: neutral state action that, over 
a range of cases, disproportionately burdens some religions - typi­
cally minority religions - while expressly or implicitly accommodat­
ing others. Although courts generally lump such state actions with the 
second, "incidental burdens" category, they raise a different, more se­
rious problem. It is one thing if a neutral law - a building code, say -
happens to hamper a minority religion and not a majority religion in a 
particular case. It is another thing if a law intended to be neutral, such 
as a provision for worship opportunities in a federal prison, is designed 
in a way that systematically discriminates against a particular religion. 
Because of the nondiscrimination principle at the core of free exercise 
doctrine, such discriminatory effects warrant close scrutiny,397 but the 
Court in Lukumi extended constitutional protection only against will­
ful discrimination. 
Part of the problem is that the conventional antidiscrimination 
norm that similarly situated persons must be treated similarly does not 
always recognize discrimination whe.re similarities in situation are not 
obvious.398 In the words of Professors Eisgruber arid Sager: 
[T]he deep concerns of religious believers can differ sharply from each 
other and from widely shared secular concerns; systems of religious be­
lief can rest on radically distinct epistemologies and be inaccessible to the 
reason and intuitions of nonbelievers; and religious believers may be 
tempted to celebrate or reward their own faith, even . while filled with 
396. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or 
not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the com­
mands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance 'interests 
of the highest order' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests."); see also 
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (striking down provision in state's charitable solicita­
tion statute that required only those religions that receive more than half their financial sup­
port from members to register and report). 
397. See McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at 706 ("[T)he logic of the Religion Clauses 
requires that accommodations be extended to all comparable religious practices unless the 
government has sufficient justification for differential treatment."); see also Lupu, Burdens, 
supra note 29, at 982-87 (arguing that Equal Protection Clause must be invoked to prevent 
religious discrimination). But see Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1542-44 
(arguing that democratic process properly may set policies that have differential effects on 
different religions). I do not extend the egalitarian principle, as Professor McConnell does, 
to encompass consideration of counterfactuals in which the majority must adhere to a base­
line defined by a minority religious practice. See, e.g. , McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at 
706 (arguing that government should accommodate religion-motivated desire not to make 
social security contributions because it would make such an accommodation if the majority 
shared that desire). My view is that courts under Federal RFRA may require the govern­
ment to accommodate minority religions to the same extent majority religions are, in fact, 
accommodated. 
398. This insight has been richly developed in the literature on race-based and gender­
based discrimination. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec­
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1286-87 (1991). 
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loving concern for the souls of nonbelievers. As a result, the interests of 
religious believers may be invisible, or may appear as mere tastes or even 
delusions, from the standpoint of outside observers.399 
Strict scrutiny forces courts to examine seemingly dissimilar relig­
ious practices in the same light. Some religious practices, of course, are 
distinct in ways that will make a difference under strict scrutiny. For 
example, a plausible argument exists that the federal government has 
a compelling interest in preventing the abuse of peyote, which could 
justify enforcing the ban on that drug even as to its religious uses, but 
lacks a similarly compelling interest in preventing the abuse of wine.400 
The requirement of showing a compelling interest, however, ensures 
that similar religious practices will not be treated differently simply 
because government decisionmakers and reviewing courts fail to no­
tice their similarity.401 Far from creating any Establishment Clause 
problem, using RFRA to root out unwitting government discrimina-
399. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1298-99; see also Laycock, Neu­
trality, supra note 29, at 1015-16 ("The practice of a small faith may be forbidden just be­
cause the legislature did not know about it and never considered its needs."); Lupu, Reflec­
tions, supra note 49, at 800 (noting that "[e]lected politicians will rarely be insensitive to 
mainstream religions, but they may readily overlook the interests of other religious tradi­
tions"); Pepper, supra note 229, at 314 (observing that, although the religious majority is un­
likely to disadvantage itself, it is likely to impose inadvertently on the interests of minority 
religions); Sherry, supra note 29, at 145 ("Those who oppose exemptions for believers often 
fail to see that neutral laws, rigidly applied, constitute a form of discrimination against be­
lievers . . .  "); Sullivan, supra note 26, at 2fJ7 ("[m]ajority practices are myopically seen by 
their own practitioners as uncontroversial"). 
400. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment in Smith on this basis, strongly dis­
agreeing with the Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny but concluding that, under that test, 
Oregon had a compelling interest in preventing abuse of peyote that justified a ban on the 
drug even in the religious setting. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); cf id. at 913 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (analogizing Native American 
Church's ritual use of peyote to Catholic Church's ritual use of wine, and noting lack of 
compelling interest in preventing alcohol abuse that would justify banning wine in the relig­
ious setting). But see McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1 135 ("Evidence in the 
Smith case showed that ingestion of peyote by members of the Native American Church is 
not dangerous and does not lead to drug problems or substance abuse."). 
401. See Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 15 (arguing that courts, unlike legisla­
tures, are bound "to treat like cases alike"); Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 600-09 
(developing reasons why courts are preferable to legislatures in defining religious accommo­
dations); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at 157 (explaining that strict scrutiny "re­
quire[s] government officials to think seriously about the feasibility of accommodations and 
[gives] aggrieved persons the right to a hearing on the accommodation issue from a more 
disinterested governmental figure, a judge"). But see Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra 
note 36, at 130 (asserting that strict scrutiny "is too blunt and too invasive to serve as a sen­
sible vehicle for identifying instances of disparate impact or disparate treatment"); Sherry, 
supra note 29, at 128 (arguing that Sherbert-era strong-Establishment, strong-Free Exercise 
regime allowed Court "to pick and choose among religions" in accommodation decisions); 
Tushnet, supra note 212, at 381-83 (contending that courts are likely to favor mainstream 
religious claimants). The possibility that cultural disconnect may lead to underprotection of 
minority religions absent strict scrutiny is exacerbated by the coincidence between religious 
and racial minority status. See Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 226-27 (discussing cases in 
which courts denied accommodations to African-American and Hmong religious believers). 
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tion against religion minimizes the extent to which the government af­
fords any particular religion preferential treatment.402 
Egalitarian themes are familiar in accounts of constitutional free 
exercise protection.403 The most prominent example in recent scholar­
ship is the "equal regard" formulation of Professors Eisgruber and 
Sager, which "requires that the state treat the deep, religiously in­
spired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as 
that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally."404 That prin­
ciple protects religious interests somewhat more broadly than my no­
tion of egalitarian accommodations under RFRA, which would re­
quire courts to accord minority religions only the same level of 
accommodation accorded other religions, not necessarily the same 
level of accommodation accorded any nonreligious interest. In addi­
tion, Professors Eisgruber and Sager would impose a distinct "reason­
ableness" requirement for judicial validation of secular claims.405 The 
differences in appropriate equality principles under the Free Exercise 
Clause and RFRA reflect the understanding that the Act is subordi­
nate to the Establishment Clause. 
b. Idiosyncratic accommodations 
Second, Federal RFRA may appropriately be applied in "idiosyn­
cratic" cases, where granting a religious believer's request for accom­
modation would neither deny adherents of other religions, or of no 
religion, any benefit that they want and have a factual basis for claim-
402. Professor Marshall objects to equality justifications for generalized religious ac­
commodations on the theory that two wrongs don't make a right: if an accommodation vio­
lates the Establishment Clause, expanding its scope to benefit minority religions would ex­
pand the violation. See Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 379-80. Courts certainly 
should address substantive establishment concerns in RFRA cases where they arise. It seems 
unlikely, however, that discrimination in accommodations stops at the elusive line where 
accommodations begin to satisfy the Establishment Clause. To the extent Federal RFRA 
leads courts to conclude that accommodations violate the Establishment Clause, fairness will 
be enhanced because all religions will be subjected to the same establishment bar. 
403. A particularly rich examination of equality and antidiscrimination themes in free 
exercise jurisprudence is scattered throughout Symposium, Religious Liberty at the Dawn of 
a New Millennium, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000). See Conkle, Religious Liberty, supra note 261, at 5-
24 (discussing ascendance in religion clause jurisprudence of ideas of denominational equal­
ity and formal neutrality); Gedicks, Normalized, supra note 50 (assessing free exercise juris­
prudence in light of equal protection jurisprudence); Marshall, Equality, supra note 236 
(analyzing and advocating equality principle as basis for religion clause jurisprudence); cf 
Smith, supra note 339, at 62-70 (criticizing prominence of equality rhetoric in religious free­
dom scholarship and jurisprudence). 
404. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1285; see also id. at 1277-82 (con­
tending that equal regard principle explains pre-Smith cases in which Court granted free ex­
ercise exemptions); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 449-50 (same); 
Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 104-05 (arguing that Smith and Boerne 
decisions are best understood as adopting an equal regard approach); cf McConnell, Sin­
gling Out, supra note 11 ,  at 32-38 (criticizing equal regard theory). 
405. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1291-97. 
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ing, nor impose substantial costs on nonbeneficiaries. As discussed 
above, most of the objections to purely religious accommodations em­
phasize the problem of favoring religion over nonreligion.406 Providing 
a religious accommodation is less problematic when few nonbelievers 
want it, because the religious benefit does not entail distribution of 
scarce resources based on religion.407 A variation on the idiosyncratic 
accommodation is a benefit that believers in other religions or nonbe­
lievers might want but lack any factual (as opposed to doctrinal or 
spiritual) predicate for claiming. Both sorts of idiosyncratic accommo­
dations avoid the problem of favoring religious interests.408 The idea of 
idiosyncratic accommodation resembles the notion of measuring per­
missible accommodations based on the absence of externalized 
costs,409 but it takes account of the sometimes invisible cost of unmet 
desire on the part of nonrecipients. Even if a believer's accommoda­
tion costs a nonbeliever nothing, separationist values are threatened if 
the nonbeliever values and has a factual basis for claiming the accom­
modation. 
Goldman v. Weinberger410 demonstrates the viability of idiosyn­
cratic accommodations. In that case, an Orthodox Jewish Air Force 
doctor sought the right to wear a yarmulke with his uniform, in con­
travention of a military restriction that forbade the wearing of head­
gear indoors. The Court rejected the free exercise claim, deferring al­
most completely to the military's assertion that the requested 
406. See supra notes 293-295 and accompanying text. 
407. Loewy, supra note 58, at 115; see also Greenawalt, Religious Law, supra note 25, at 
840 ("In determining whether a religion is impermissibly assisted, a court should ask whether 
other groups have similar needs that are unmet."). Arnold Loewy notes another advantage 
of accommodations not sought by nonbelievers: "the general undesirability of the benefit 
sought is some evidence of, though certainly not a perfect proxy for, sincerity." Loewy, supra 
note 58, at 115; see also Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 43 (arguing that accommodation 
requests that "coincide[] strongly with secular self-interest" will be more likely to "encour­
age many other claims, including false ones that may be difficult to identify"). Thus, idiosyn­
cratic accommodations avoid not only the Establishment Clause concern with religious ac­
commodations but also the rule of law concern of Smith. 
408. By contending that courts may apply RFRA to require idiosyncratic accommoda­
tions, I do not mean to suggest that they must grant accommodations in all instances, such as 
voluntary human sacrifice, where the government asserts paternalistic concerns for the lives 
or safety of consenting believers. See Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 624-
30 (discussing paternalistic justifications for nonaccommodation). Certainly such concerns 
may amount to compelling government interests. My point is simply that idiosyncratic ac­
commodations generally should not violate the Establishment Clause. 
409. See supra note 336. Other close analogues to the idiosyncratic accommodation idea 
include Professors Eisgruber and Sager's suggestion that accommodations might not violate 
the Establishment Clause where the challenged government policy is "irrational," Eisgruber 
& Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 455 n.66, and cases in which a religious believer 
seeks equal access to a nonfinite state resource, which the Court has analyzed under the 
nondiscrimination norm of the Free Speech Clause. See cases cited supra note 279. 
410. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
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accommodation would undermine order and discipline.411 Strict scru­
tiny of the claim in Goldman would have compelled the Court to 
strike what was a close balance even under rationality review in favor 
of the claimant. Accommodation would have given him what he 
wanted while denying nothing to devotees of other conscientious be­
liefs, theistic or otherwise. Most people who did not share Goldman's 
religious beliefs would not care one way or another about accommo­
dating his preference. Others might have wanted the same accommo­
dation but lacked a basis for claiming it because their preferred relig­
ious headgear or attire would have presented bona fide concerns 
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.412 Requiring the government to 
make a strong showing before interfering with a religious practice that 
matters to the claimant but not to everyone else comports with Estab­
lishment Clause values. 
. CONCLUSION 
In the federal sphere, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act con­
strains only federal power, reflecting a congressional precommitment 
to heightened protection for religious exercise. That precommitment 
required no exercise of constitutional power and has nothing to do 
with the Court's prerogatives to interpret and apply constitutional 
principles. The courts' proper role in applying a legislative precom­
mitment to "overprotect" rights is to prevent violations of the rights 
secured by the Constitution. Federal RFRA presents a serious danger 
of Establishment Clause violations, but ".Ourts can defuse that danger 
through careful construction and application of the Act. The Supreme 
Court can, and should, construe the Act as applying to all deeply held 
conscientious beliefs, thereby maximizing the Act's effectiveness while 
411. Id. at 507-10. Congress subsequently overruled Goldman, passing a statute that al­
lowed military personnel to wear "neat and conservative" attire compelled by their religious 
beliefs. 10 U.S.C. § 774(b)(2) (1994). 
412. Justice Stevens, concurring in Goldman, argued that allowing Goldman to wear a 
yarmulke presented a danger that the military might in the future confront a claim by a Sikh 
to wear a turban or a Rastafarian to wear dreadlocks. In Justice Stevens's view, " (t]he Air 
Force has no business drawing distinctions between such persons when it is enforcing com­
mands of universal application." Goldman, 475 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring). A yar­
mulke, however, differs from dreadlocks or a turban in that it does not protrude from the 
head. The military might well establish a compelling interest in barring protruding headgear. 
Federal RFRA, by requiring strict scrutiny, would alleviate what appears to be Justice 
Stevens's driving concern - that such distinctions would reflect discriminatory premises 
rather than actual differences. See supra Section 111.D.2.a. Moreover, Justice Stevens's 
premise - that any regime of accommodation will lead to discrimination - discounts the 
possibility, later made manifest in Smith, that a regime of ostensible nonaccommodation 
could result in discriminatory preferences for majority religions. See supra notes 252-255 and 
accompanying text; cf Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 77 n.187 
("RFRA's generalized scheme of accommodations might actually mitigate one Establish­
ment Clause concern, the risk of selective accommodations that discriminate among similar 
religious claims"). 
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eliminating any favoritism it shows religious commitments over non­
theistic commitments of conscience. Alternatively, courts simply can 
subordinate all accommodation claims, which now have a strictly 
statutory basis, to the Establishment Clause, and mandate only those 
accommodations that comport with secular values. Separationists and 
defenders of judicial authority should spend their energy encouraging 
prudent, rights-regarding adjudication of RFRA's applications to fed­
eral law, rather than urging the Court to overstep its authority and 
strike those applications down. 
